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Abstract 
This thesis critically examines exports of Iranian natural gas to regional and international 
markets. Owning the world’s 2nd largest proven natural gas reserves, Iran can potentially 
be considered a major gas exporter. Yet, stringent international sanctions, coupled with 
domestic politicisation of the industry and lack of an ‘attractive’ investment framework, 
have made Iran unable to capitalise its huge natural gas potential both in domestic and 
international markets. In this research, a multidisciplinary approach is adopted to examine 
the main challenges hampering Iran’s ability to become a major gas exporter. These 
challenges range from political and legal to economic and fiscal. 
In this thesis, the extent to which the Iranian gas industry is affected by progressive 
international sanctions, particularly as a result of U.S. pressures, is considered 
extensively. It appears that U.S. and international sanctions have had detrimental impact 
on the development of the Iranian petroleum industry through limiting Iran’s access to 
financial institutions and technologies. In addition, in Iran the constant policy struggle 
between the need for foreign investment and technology in the petroleum sector on one 
hand, and the sentiment towards foreign exploitation on the other, is analysed in terms of 
impact of political challenges in the development of Iran’s natural gas industry.  The legal 
and fiscal terms of buyback contracts as the only available contractual framework for 
development of the upstream petroleum sector is also reviewed as a part of the evaluation 
of the ‘attractiveness’ of Iran’s investment framework. This research offers second 
thoughts on the over-estimated role of law in development of natural resources and 
illuminates the importance of other factors, including policy making and governance 
institutions, in attracting foreign investors and the development of the petroleum sector. 
In the discussion about the development of Iran’s natural gas industry, subsidies are also 
identified as economic challenges, deterring foreign investors, causing wasteful 
consumption and creating an inflated domestic market. Two years into the subsidies 
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reform in Iran, the plan has fallen short of achieving its objectives, including controlling 
domestic energy consumption and freeing up capital to be re-invested in the petroleum 
industry, mainly as a result of deteriorating economic conditions and Government 
mismanagement.  
 The issue of supplying gas to domestic or export markets in the light of the country’s 
current limited production capacity has turned into a major political debate between the 
Parliament and the Government resulting in failure to fully meet its supply commitments 
to either market. Inability to produce adequate volumes of gas and its ‘ambitious’ gas 
expansion policies both in domestic and international markets, has forced the country to 
import gas from Turkmenistan. The unexpected title of ‘a net gas importer’ for a country 
with the 2
nd
 largest gas reserves in the world, has raised many questions over the 
country’s ability to substantially contribute to the growing global gas market. In this 
thesis, attempts are also made to highlight the social and economic benefits of allocating 
gas to domestic and export markets. However, conducting a solid economic analysis is 
not possible, as first of all, such an analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis, and 
secondly the required data and statistical material is not available or accessible. 
This research suggests that given the country’s huge domestic market, industrialisation 
targets, young population and the necessity for job creation, as well as country’s 
dependence on gas re-injection into oilfields to maintain the oil production, Iran may not 
want to be “the next Qatar” in terms of exports. Available data suggest that gas export is 
not the most beneficial economic outcome for Iranian gas; and for all of the foregoing 
reasons, and even if sanctions are removed, it would take Iran 15-20 years to develop 
such a major export capability. This thesis offers recommendations to policy makers to 
conduct comprehensive economic analyses over costs and benefits of allocating gas to 
domestic and export markets, while giving due consideration to the pressing issue of 
‘welfare maximisation’ and distributional impact of consuming gas domestically.  
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction  
Introduction and Background  
During the last few decades, global economic growth and increasing concerns about 
local, regional and global environmental problems have encouraged the consumption 
of natural gas as the cleanest fossil fuel on an unprecedented scale. Abundant natural 
gas reserves worldwide, availability of required technologies and extensive 
infrastructures to explore, exploit, and transfer natural gas to the end users have 
illuminated new horizons for further development and consumption of natural gas.  
Uneven distribution of natural gas resources throughout the world and declining 
production capacity of major consuming regions, such as Europe, have highlighted 
the significance of natural gas export across borders. In addition, growing concerns 
over the issue of climate change and the requirement for consumption of cleaner 
fuels, and equally important the issue of energy security, have forced policy makers to 
look for additional gas resources in order to diversify supplies. 
Iran as a major natural gas owner, whose reserves are ranked as the 2
nd
 largest in the 
world, is potentially in a unique position to fulfil growing demands in regional and 
international gas markets. Massive proven reserves, geographical proximity and ease 
of access to the regional markets as well as low costs of development and developed 
infrastructure equip Iran with required conditions to become a major supplier of gas 
to global markets. 
But, in reality, the country has exhibited a completely different picture. The 
prolonged exposure to various challenges, ranging from legal and political to 
economic and fiscal have posed serious hurdles to the development of the country’s 
natural gas resources. Iran’s political stand-off against the international community 
over its nuclear activities has entailed imposition of progressive economic sanctions 
on the country which have directly affected the development of its petroleum 
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resources. In addition to international sanctions, domestic political and economic 
challenges and Government’s unstable natural gas policies have placed additional 
constraints on the development of the sector. 
Iran’s petroleum industry has been significantly affected by important historical 
events, including the D’Arcy Concession Agreement of 1901, the Nationalisation 
Movement in 1951 as well as the 1954 Consortium. The victory of the Islamic 
Revolution changed the Iranian oil and gas industry in many aspects, as it caused 
annulment of all previous rules and regulations and gas export contracts. Followed by 
the Iran-Iraq war, the situation further exacerbated leaving the country with heavy 
damages to the petroleum industry. Starting from the mid 1990s, the systematic U.S 
sanctions targeting the Iranian petroleum sector combined with all of those historical 
events had a permanent impact upon Government’s politicised behaviour in the 
petroleum sector. 
Although Iran’s policies in the development of its petroleum sector may be puzzling 
in relation to the unrestrained nature of global commerce, they cannot be dismissed 
out of hand as arbitrary, due to the economic and historical background preceding 
their rise. Without studying the historical reasons for Iran’s current policies in the 
petroleum sector, it is impossible to fully understand the current difficulties faced in 
the course of gas transactions or predict the future trend in its development.  
This research, therefore, aims to provide an empirical rather than a theoretical 
analysis of Iran’s position in the global gas market in the light of political, legal and 
economic challenges to the development of its natural gas industry. 
1.1. Importance and Objectives of the Study 
The study of Iran’s gas exports has direct implications for supply to both domestic 
and international markets. Specifically, it derives its significance from the growing 
trend of natural gas consumption worldwide, concerns over energy security and the 
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import diversification, and last but not least the important role Iran can play as a 
potential major gas supplier.  
Natural gas is an increasingly important fuel in meeting the world’s energy needs. 
Growth in demand for gas has far surpassed that for the other fossil fuels due to its 
more favorable environmental attributes, flexibility as a fuel, affordability and ample 
resources available. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), in 2010 
natural gas constituted more than one fifth of the world energy consumption (Figure 
1.1).
1
  The share of natural gas in the global energy mix increased from 16% in 1973 
to 21.4% in 2010 and is projected to further increase to 23% in 2035 (Figure 1.2).
 2
   
 
Figure 1.1- World Total Primary Energy Supply from 1973 to 2010 by Fuel (Mtoe) 
  
Source: IEA (2011) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1“Key World Energy Statistics.” International Energy Agency, 2012 
2
 "World Energy Outlook." International Energy Agency, 2011 
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Figure 1.2- Shares of Energy Sources in World Primary Energy Demand 
 
Source: IEA (2011) 
The growth in natural gas consumption can mainly be attributed to population growth, 
increasing economic development, industrialisation as well as its role in diversifying 
away from oil and improving environmental standards, particularly air quality. It is 
used across all stationary sectors: industrial, power generation, in addition to 
household and commercial sector. The largest share of global gas demand comes 
from the power sector, where gas consumption for electricity generation is projected 
to increase to more than 1.9 tcm by 2035, at an annual rate of 1.8 percent (Figure 
1.3).
3
 The next largest consumption of gas is in buildings, primarily for space and 
water heating. According to the IEA, in industry, global consumption of gas is set to 
grow faster than in any other end-users sector, where gas is used mainly for 
production of steam for mechanical energy and supplying heat to produce materials 
and commodities. Gas use in industry is also projected to grow from 535 bcm in 2009 
to 890 bcm in 2035, with petrochemicals, iron and steel, and non-metallic minerals 
sub-sectors such as cement, taking the largest shares.
4
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 "World Energy Outlook." International Energy Agency, 2011 
4
 ibid 
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Figure 1.3- Primary Natural Gas Demand by Sector, 2009 and 2035 
 
Source: IEA (2011) 
Although resources of natural gas are finite and it is a non-renewable source of 
energy, global resources are plentiful.
5
 Natural gas reserves are continuously 
increasing as new exploration and extraction techniques allow for wider and deeper 
drilling. The Development of unconventional gas (shale gas, tight gas, and coal-bed 
methane) through utilising modern techniques of horizontal drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing has unlocked a major new class of gas reserves which are set to play a 
central role in meeting rising natural gas demand. According to the IEA, 
unconventional gas accounts for close to half of the increase in global gas production 
between 2011 and 2035, its share of production rising from 16% to about 26%.
6
 
Nevertheless, the prospects for unconventional gas production worldwide remain 
uncertain, mainly due to public concerns about the environmental and social impacts, 
an adverse fiscal and regulatory framework, limited access and proximity to pipelines 
and markets and shortages of expertise, technology and water.
7
  
                                                          
5
 The remaining conventional resources of natural gas by the end of 2011 totalled more than 400 
tcm globally, equal to about 120 years of production at current rates. Adding unconventional 
recoverable resources (which are of similar size) extends this figure to nearly 250 years. "World 
Energy Outlook." International Energy Agency, 2011 
6
 "World Energy Outlook." International Energy Agency, 2012 
7
 ibid 
9 
 
The growing importance of natural gas as a major source of energy is also shown by 
the investment devoted to the natural gas industry worldwide. According to the IEA, 
projected trends in gas demand and supply call for total cumulative investment of 
around US$9.5 trillion in supply infrastructure in the period between 2011 and 2035. 
Over the projected period, US$5 trillion is estimated to be the gross upstream 
investment requirement for conventional gas production capacity.
 8
  Despite market 
uncertainties created as a result of changes in pricing mechanism in Europe and the 
shale gas development in the U.S., increasing demand in the recent years have led to 
new expansion and exploration projects. According to the IEA, international trade in 
natural gas is set to continue to expand through 2035 where inter-regional gas trade 
increases by nearly 80% between 2010 and 2035, from 675 bcm to nearly 1,200 bcm.
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The largest share of inter-regional gas trade is carried by pipeline, with 58% of the 
total in 2011. Pipeline trade is set to further expand as new inter-regional pipeline 
projects are put into operation, including lines from Russia to China and Europe, and 
from the Caspian to Europe and India. According to the IEA, in 2035, pipeline trade 
still represents about half of global inter-regional gas trade. It has also projected that a 
larger share of the growth in inter-regional gas trade over the coming decades is set to 
be taken by LNG. Global LNG trade has been growing rapidly in recent years, with a 
wave of capacity additions led by Qatar, which has the largest LNG export capacity in 
the world. There are at present a dozen LNG liquefaction projects under construction- 
seven of them in Australia- with a combined capacity of 108 bcm per year; when all 
of them are completed, probably by 2018, they boost global LNG export capacity to 
around 480 bcm per year.
10
 
As projected by the World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2012, global gas demand is set to 
increase from 3.3 tcm in 2010 to 5.0 tcm in 2035, an increase of 50 percent.
11
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Developing Asian countries are the main drivers of this growth, followed by the 
Middle East. In non-OECD countries, the supportive Government policies 
particularly in China and India are targeting an increasing role for natural gas. The 
Middle East region is predicted to have an incremental output of 550 bcm by 2035, 
about 60 percent of which is projected to be consumed locally, mainly in power 
stations.
12
 The growing trend of consumption in the region is essentially fuelled by 
rapid economic and population growth, and due to continuing urbanisation and 
industrialisation.
13
 
Natural gas consumption in OECD countries, with the exception of the U.S., is 
expected to slowly recover after the economic recession of 2009. In Europe, gas 
demand is projected to return to the level of 2010, i.e. 569 bcm, only towards the end 
of the current decade.
14
 In most European countries, decline in the gas production and 
the need for gas import through either pipeline or LNG is a problematic issue. In gas 
importing countries, energy security and ‘geopolitical rivalries’, instability in 
exporting countries, as well as fears of a scramble for supplies and exporting nation’s 
fundamental need for energy to power their own economic growth, have encouraged 
debates on how to manage dependence on imported natural gas.
15
 The Russia-Ukraine 
gas disputes in 2006 and 2009 and the resulting gas cut-offs, was a turning point in 
EU energy policy. The crisis not only seriously damaged the Russia’s reputation as a 
supplier to Europe and Ukraine’s reputation as a transit country, but also intensified 
European consumers’ efforts to diversify away from Russian gas. Although there are 
disagreements among commentators about the reasons behind the occurrence of the 
incident, and whether the Russian government uses energy as an economic and 
political ‘weapon against European countries’, the Russian gas cut-offs highlighted 
the significant level of European dependence on the Russian gas and taught an 
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important security lesson to Europe: “It is not wise for any country or region to 
become overly dependent on a single supplier or a single supply route.”16 
 Iran, having geographical proximity to energy markets of the West and the East, and 
owning some of the world largest gas resources, can be considered a potential major 
supplier of regional and international gas markets (see Chapter 2). The country, 
holding approximate proven reserves of 33.1 tcm, is the 2
nd
 largest gas owner in the 
world, after Russia and is followed by Qatar.
17
 Only a single major gas field, known 
as the South Pars field,
18
 is estimated to contain nearly 50 tcm of gas, “accounting to 
over one-fifth of the world’s proven reserves.”19 The country also has a remarkable 
gas production rate, ranked as the fourth largest gas producer in the world in 2011, 
producing around 152 bcm.
20
 Domestic gas consumption has also increased 
remarkably during last 30 years; experiencing a 1400-percent growth, it reached 138 
bcm in 2011.
21
 Reasons such as, low prices charged nationwide due to energy 
subsidies (see Chapter 5), old oilfields and the requirement for re-injection of gas to 
enhance the rate of recovery (see Section 2.8.4), and population growth, thus increase 
in households and industrial consumptions, have made the country the 3
rd
 largest gas 
consumer in the world after the U.S. and Russia.
22
 The country’s growing domestic 
consumption exceeding production capacity forced the Iranian Government to import 
gas from Turkmenistan. (see Section 2.10) The unexpected title of ‘a net gas 
importer’ for a country like Iran with huge gas resources raises serious questions 
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about the country’s ability to become a major gas exporter and the reasons behind the 
country’s current weak position in supplying gas to both domestic and international 
markets.  
Although Iran, measuring its current production capacity against its resource base, is 
“underperforming" as a gas producer, it has been rigorously pursuing gas exports to 
regional and international markets.
23
 Beginning in the late 1960s, Iran first exported 
gas to the former Soviet Union at a peak rate of nearly 10 bcm/yr (see Section 2.2). 
Following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, all export projects were cancelled and 
replaced by domestic market expansion plans. However, in the early 2000s, Iran 
restarted its gas exports, mainly to Turkey, with a long history of failure to fulfil its 
export commitments either due to insufficient production, or disputes over the price, 
volume or quality of gas or sudden stoppage due to sharp increase in domestic market 
consumption particularly during cold winters (see Section 2.9).
24
 
This research, therefore, intends to identify the reasons which, throughout the history 
and contemporary era i.e. during the period 1979-2012, prevented Iran from 
developing gas export projects. One of the direct benefits of this study is to enable 
readers to understand the future development of the Iranian gas industry, as well as its 
current state by accessing a single analytical study, in English, rather than the 
scattered, less detailed resources, available mostly in Farsi. The study will also benefit 
Iranian readers, by providing a comprehensive, analytical overview of the flaws 
within the current political, legal and fiscal frameworks and, therefore, pointing to the 
need for reform and revision of certain aspects of Government policy. 
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1.2. The Conceptual Background of the Research  
Iranian natural gas industry, since its inception in the late 1960s, has undergone many 
historical, political and economic crises which have directly affected Iranian 
Governments’ strategies for the development of the industry.  Before the Revolution, 
the country had planned many export projects; one successfully implemented i.e. 
Iran-Soviet Union gas export and the rest postponed or cancelled, mainly as a result 
of the Islamic Revolution. In the post-revolution era, Iran demonstrated an 
unfavorable legacy for its under-developed gas export projects. Its notoriously 
unstable gas export to Turkey, cancellation or substantial postponement of major 
LNG and pipeline projects and the country’s difficulties in meeting the growing needs 
of its domestic market as well as failure to sufficiently supply gas for oilfields re-
injection, are all regarded as indications that the country is struggling to keep up the 
pace in its gas production with that of domestic and export market growth. Hence, 
given the country’s underperformance in development of its natural gas export 
capabilities in the past, one may pose the question of will the future be different to 
the past?  
In Iran, despite the country’s vast natural gas reserves, the domestic gas market offers 
great competition to exports. Both domestic and export markets are reasonably 
favourable for Iran’s massive potential in the natural gas sector; though each entails 
different levels of political, economic and social benefits. The country is 
geographically, very well situated, facilitating ease of access to regional and 
international markets. It has substantial developed gas transmission infrastructure in 
place as well as growing population whose needs can be met through exchange 
revenue gained from gas exports. Iran also believes it can strengthen its geopolitical 
position through establishing gas exporting links with neighboring countries and 
international markets as a way of consolidating its bargaining power in the 
international arena (see Chapter 6). 
14 
 
Besides export markets, Iran has a growing domestic market the fulfilment of whose 
needs requires thorough analysis of various economic and social factors. During the 
last few decades, there has been a tendency to see the MENA region and south-east 
Asian gas exporting countries as the world’s petroleum supplier, whereas today, as a 
result of policies of further advancement, industrialisation and population growth, the 
region itself is in the need of massive energy supply. In Iran, for the same reasons, 
some politicians have strongly opposed export projects, arguing that they undermine 
domestic supply and especially urgent requirement for re-injection of gas into 
oilfields.  
Insufficient gas production resulting from inadequate capital investment and lack of 
modern technologies (see Section 3.4.2) in addition to an ill-oriented, subsidised 
domestic market (see Chapter 5) are two major problems leaving Iran in a chaotic 
situation in adequate supply of gas to these markets. Central to the discussion about 
the development of Iran’s natural gas industry are international sanctions directly 
affecting attraction of capital investment and technologies to its energy sector (see 
Chapter 3). Initiated by the U.S. Government in the mid 1990s, sanctions were further 
intensified by the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) as a result of 
concerns over the country’s nuclear activities. In addition, decision-making process in 
Iran in the petroleum sector is unclear and constantly subject to changes due to the 
politicisation of the sector in which historical and political events play a major role 
(see Section 3.2.2). 
In addition to political challenges, lack of investment in Iran’s petroleum sector can to 
some extent be attributed to the absence of a transparent, investor-friendly legal and 
contractual framework (see Chapter 4). Its upstream development contractual 
framework, known as buy-back, has been subject to numerous criticisms both by the 
Iranian energy analysts and International Oil Companies (IOC). Since the victory of 
Islamic Revolution, many regulatory changes were made in the country’s petroleum 
15 
 
industry, such as restrictions on foreign participation in development of the country’s 
petroleum sector, which was previously included in the Constitution and the1987 
Petroleum Law. In the 1990s and after the Iran-Iraq war, urgent requirements for the 
sector’s reconstruction called for significant changes in the country’s attitude towards 
foreign investments (see Section 4.3.1). For the first time after the Revolution, the 
country’s petroleum sector was opened to foreign participation through buy-back 
contracts while ensuring protection of foreign investors by ratification of the Foreign 
Investment Promotion and Protection Act (FIPPA), the Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration and several other related legislations (see Section 4.4). 
Despite all these regulatory changes, the country’s investment framework is still 
criticised by many analysts for being “unattractive”, arguing that had Iran introduced 
a more attractive legal and contractual framework, like those in successful gas 
exporting countries, such as Qatar, it would have been more successful in attraction of 
foreign investment and development of its petroleum resources (see Section 4.3.3). 
However, prior to proposing any legal changes, it is important to examine whether the 
notion of legal transplant from developed countries or those successful in 
development of their natural resources would bring about the same positive results for 
Iran (see Section 4.5.1). An inherent risk that this approach embraces is that 
“proposed legal changes derived from these grown out of local legal culture laws, 
although having the advantage of being tested already, may not take root when 
transplanted, due to influential historical, political, economic and cultural settings in 
which the importing state functions.”25 
Further to political and legal challenges, the Iranian Government has been facing 
major economic hurdles in development of its natural gas resources (see Chapter 5).  
The country’s massive domestic gas consumption, substantially resulting from 
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Government subsidies, was not only a burden on the treasury but also affected the gas 
volumes available to other markets including exports. Low gas prices have also 
reduced investors’ interest in the domestic gas sector and created a bias in favour of 
gas export projects which can be questioned by thorough and neutral analysis of 
economic and political benefits of allocating gas to different options (see Chapter 6). 
Although reaching to a concrete conclusion about the best allocation option, which 
most effectively fulfil the economic and social needs of the Iranian people is a 
difficult task due to unavailability of data and limited scope of this study, it is 
important to address this issue and try to shed some light on the complex debate over 
the subject matter. 
Elimination of energy subsidies and increased natural gas prices is a policy that 
should, at least in theory, free up gas for export and release capital for development of 
gas infrastructures. The Iranian Government  implemented the subsidies reform plan 
in 2010 with the aim to control domestic market growth, prevent wasteful 
consumption of energy, generate revenue for the Government to re-invest for 
development of energy sector and redistribute national wealth, fairly and equally (see 
Section 5.4). Two year into the reform, it is important to examine how successful the 
reform was in materialising the Government’s objectives. 
1.3. Statement of Problems and Research Questions 
Natural gas, despite being a relatively new fuel, is playing an increasingly important 
role in global energy balances, mainly due to its abundant resources worldwide and its 
environmental advantages. Iran, owning some of the largest natural gas reserves and 
its vicinity to major consuming regions, could play an important role in international 
gas trade as a key exporting country. The history of Iran’s natural gas exports shows 
that in the 1970s the country was, politically and economically, in the right position to 
integrate its gas in global markets. However, following the Islamic Revolution, 
17 
 
fulfilment of this goal proved to be challenging as the country has faced major 
domestic and international political and economic difficulties.    
Therefore, the central question to this research is: 
1. Will Iran become a major exporter of gas to global markets over the next 
10-20 years? 
It will be then followed by the second question, which is: 
2. What are the major challenges which have prevented Iran from becoming 
a major gas exporter, and can they be resolved? 
The importance to focus on this particular topic is derived from two main reasons: 
first of all, there is a major gap in the existing literature relating to Iran’s domestic gas 
industry, and Iran’s potential role in international gas market; and secondly, for 
academic discussions as well as corporate strategies, it is important to better 
understand the barriers to development of the country’s gas industry with political and 
commercial implications both in domestic and international level.  
1.4. Literature Review 
Issues related to natural gas production and export, are increasingly important for a 
country which is heavily reliant on these resources. In this context, an objective and 
comprehensive assessment of Iran’s gas supply potential and barriers can provide 
greater certainty both for domestic and international consumers.  
This study aims to approach the issue of Iran’s gas export with a view of the country’s 
historical, political, legal and economic variables influencing Iran’s decision making 
process to monetise its natural gas resources in global markets. This is not an 
approach that has been taken in any detailed English-language publication or 
academic work on this issue. The rationale behind this approach is that it permits 
better understanding of future development, which is a consequence of previous 
matters and policies. Extensive material is available on the historical background of 
18 
 
the Iranian oil industry,
26
 but in order to provide sufficient space for analytical 
material within this study, only those historical events that have significant political 
and legal aspects, common with natural gas industry, have been highlighted.   
The historical gap in the coverage of the subject of Iran’s natural gas industry results 
in uncertainty regarding many aspects of the sector’s development, such as the 
direction in which the Iranian Government’s policies are heading and whether an 
alternative approach may be adopted. An example of such a narrow focus can be 
found in the work of Ule and Brexendroff.
27
 Despite presenting a satisfactory 
overview of the regulatory and contractual framework of the Iranian petroleum 
industry, the study nonetheless fails to provide sufficient historical context to enable 
an accurate assessment of the present situation and its future development.  
Despite abundant oil and gas reserves with the potential to evolve as a major gas 
supplier, Iran’s natural gas policies have been little discussed in academic literature. 
This can be to a large extent attributed to the lack of accurate and detailed information 
and data on the subject matter and also international sanction which, by aiming to 
exclude Iran’s energy from global markets, have created a discouraging, academic 
atmosphere over the country’s petroleum resources. Although Iran is widely seen to 
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be in “an exceptional position to help meeting the increasing domestic and 
international markets”, practically almost all reviewed literature reflect a sense of 
hopelessness with regards to any significant development in its natural gas industry.
28
 
Adibi and Fesharaki offer a clear and different perspective and provide extensive 
details about Iran’s natural gas infrastructure.29 However, the study lacks historical 
background and, due to its limited scope, fails to present a thorough analysis of 
challenges to the development of Iran’s natural gas industry.  
The literature on Iran’s post-revolutionary investment framework in the petroleum 
sector has been extensively covered in academic and journalistic works. The Iranian 
buy-back contracts have particularly been criticised by many scholars and industry 
officials on the basis that they do not serve the interests of the parties concerned.
30
 It 
is widely believed that a legal and regulatory framework is a fundamental element in 
the stability and flexibility needed for the investment environment; and perhaps the 
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worst damage that a State can do to its prospects of investment is to cultivate an air of 
uncertainty. As a result, opponents of buyback contracts urge reform in the country’s 
contractual and regulatory framework in order to promote foreign investment. Their 
arguments, however, lack analysis of the gradual improvements of Iranian petroleum 
law and policy within the context of the Iranian politics- that is the context of 
prohibition of foreigners from being engaged in oil and gas activities and total ban on 
any form of foreign investment in petroleum sector.
31
 The Iranian Government has 
taken major steps in modifying its legal and contractual framework, for example 
through offering better terms than those traditionally contained in the NIOC’s 
buyback contracts, including more flexibility in fiscal terms, shorter payback periods, 
and a slightly higher rate of return for contractors. But the major question which 
remains to be answered is the extent to which such changes can lead to substantial 
attraction of foreign investments. This question directs the current research towards 
the comparative law and economic development literature in which the role of legal 
institutions, including property rights and contracts are analysed in the economic 
development.
32
 Among the reviewed literature are the works of Ulen and Cooter 
which have presented well-documented research on the subject matter.
33
 In one of his 
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articles, Ulen highlights the importance of governance institutions in attraction of 
investors, and concludes that more important than adopting a modern, investor-
friendly legal framework is addressing the concerns and uncertainties related to the 
application of the rule of law as a result of the discretionary power of a host state and 
weak judicial and administrative institutions.
34
 The late Professor Wälde also 
conducted many research on the role of modern legal framework in the development 
of international investments in hydrocarbon sector.
35
 He argues that large investors 
are less reliant on effective, investor-friendly legal systems, as they “operate on the 
basis of their political-economic leverage than on the basis of law-and the restrictive 
tendencies often found in host state economic regulations.”36 In this research, prior to 
making any recommendation for modification of the Iranian legal and fiscal 
framework, the role of law in the development of natural resources will be studied. It 
will also endeavour to identify the benchmark against which Iran’s investment regime 
can be examined and offer thoughts on the notion of the legal transplant for 
improvement of Iran’s contractual regime in the hydrocarbon sector (see Section 4.5). 
In Iran, the growing domestic market demand in excess of the production capacity has 
caused significant challenges to adequate supply of gas to both domestic and export 
markets. Energy subsidies and resulting low gas prices are considered the main reason 
behind excessive growth in domestic market.
37
 There is a very large literature on the 
topic of subsidies, their impact on global economy, and economic and political calls 
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for their reform.
38
 However, very few case studies of countries which have 
undertaken such a reform are available. In case of energy subsidies reform in Iran, 
aside from a descriptive report published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
39
 
no academic work was found to examine the economic and political impact of 
subsidies reform in Iran. Careful examination of the IMF report on explanation of 
subsidies reform planning and procedure in Iran reveals an apparent bias in the study. 
Whereas the Fund and Iranian Government’s concerns about benefits of subsidies 
elimination and the effective initial planning are extensively addressed in the report, 
there is little mention of the plan’s drawbacks and Government’s failures of 
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implementation. Therefore, there was a pressing requirement that after two years 
since the start of the subsidies reform in Iran, an impartial review of the plan is 
provided, analysing its advantages and disadvantages and how it has affected the 
Iranian economy and development of its natural gas sector.  
 Another area in the literature on Iran’s post-revolution gas exports is the notorious 
political debate between the Iranian politicians and decision makers over export or 
domestic consumption of gas.
40
 The reviewed literature on arguments of proponents 
and opponents of Iran’s gas export policy is rather politically-oriented and lacks 
economic reasoning. The only academic literature found on the subject of economic 
benefits of allocating Iranian gas to export or domestic markets was a doctoral thesis 
by Dehghani. However, this study, due to various reasons, including lack of data, 
does not provide exact economic returns from allocation of gas to different options. 
Although this thesis is not able to examine the economic benefits resulting from 
optimal allocation of Iranian natural gas resources, it aims to illuminate the 
importance of economic considerations in addition to social justifications for 
allocation of Iranian gas to domestic and export markets. 
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1.5. Research Methodology 
As the quality of a study’s conclusions inevitably correlates with the procedure and 
method used within the work, a careful analysis of these procedural factors is required 
in order to ensure valid conclusions.
41
 This is particularly the case in qualitative, 
social research, where the intent is to create a ‘decision rule’, a systematic means of 
assessment, in order to analyse the various theories and explanation in an effort to 
decide which best fit the facts.
42
 
As this study addresses various disciplines in social science, the research is 
complemented by a multidisciplinary approach, studying various variables which, 
throughout Iran’s historical and contemporary era, have affected the development of 
natural gas industry. For this purpose, the descriptive part of the research 
encompasses fact-finding enquiries for various political, legal and economic matters, 
describing surrounding conditions during a certain historical period and contemporary 
era. The analytical part of the study will address the facts and theories already 
available to critically evaluate the influential elements in this particular research topic. 
The purpose is to assess the research already available and to make original empirical 
contributions to the study of Iranian natural gas exports. 
As this research was conducted during a period of unprecedented political and 
economic instability as a result of intensifying international sanctions and domestic 
political conflict between the President and the Parliament over the country’s 
economic reform, the author had to adopt a flexible research framework in order to 
accommodate any unexpected changes in the country’s political and economic 
environment with direct impact on the natural gas industry.   
With regards to the order in which the chapters in the thesis are presented, it should 
be highlighted that an approach consistent with the emphasis on contextual analysis 
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was used. As such, it was decided to place the section on history of the Iranian natural 
gas industry at the beginning of the study, in order to provide a context in which the 
remainder of the work, focusing on the contemporary era, can be found upon. The 
inclusion of an initial historical background also minimise the risk of the thesis being 
overly focused on the current state of the Iranian natural gas industry. The remainder 
of the study is structured in such a way which allows broad information related to 
political, legal and economic challenges to ensure that the reader is equipped with all 
the required facts and figures before the start of critical analysis of each of these 
challenges. 
With reference to information sources, as one of the goals of this study was to assess 
controversial issues pertinent to the Iranian natural gas industry from both the foreign 
and domestic perspectives, and to achieve this, numerous English and Farsi sources 
have been reviewed. In addition to general academic literature on the issue in both 
languages, additional information was gathered from sources closer to the petroleum 
industry itself, including National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), National Iranian Gas 
Company (NIGC), National Iranian Gas Export Company (NIGEC) and National 
Iranian Petrochemical Company (NIPC) officials and archives, the Presidency Office 
for Strategic Planning, Majlis Research Centre and the Institute for International 
Energy Studies, Tehran. Additional sources on Iran’s natural gas industry, its political 
background and the investment regime were found in the libraries of University of 
Dundee, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) and the Information Centre at the 
Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy (CEPMLP).  Sources used 
for the research on history of Iranian petroleum industry and its impact on Iran’s 
decision making process, were collected from the Iranian National Library’s archives, 
the Middle East Centre at the University of Oxford and the British Library. Extensive 
data was also collected on energy subsidies and their reform during a three-month 
visiting fellowship at the Global Subsidies Initiative, International Institute for 
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Sustainable Development in Geneva. In addition to the primary sources, secondary 
sources from various online journals, including Oil & Gas Journal, Middle East 
Economic Survey and Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law as well as media 
monitoring sites and news agencies were utilised covering the recent developments.    
In this thesis, in addition to written compilations, the author has also approached 
instrumental figures in the study of Iranian natural gas industry, including senior 
analyst at the Centre for Global Energy Studies in London, Dr. Manouchehr Takin, 
Director of International Institute for Caspian Studies (IICS), Dr. Narsi Ghorban and 
independent senior analyst Mehdi Varzi. These academics’ comments were of 
extensive use in highlighting the uncertainty in the Iranian natural gas industry 
prevalent at the moment, but also the ongoing and potential development within the 
industry.  
Although an extensive number of sources have been consulted from various 
perspective, some desirable materials could not reasonably be accessed due to 
practical restrictions. Among such resources were particular investment contracts, the 
access to which was restricted due to issues of commercial secrecy. Further 
unavailable sources were some of the Parliamentary reports and meeting minutes; 
attempts to access to these failed due to political and security reasons.  
Among the problematic areas of the research were the political issues surrounding this 
study, which have further increased the sensitivity of the work. A large scope of the 
controversy surrounding the Iranian petroleum industry derives from historical 
precedents which, for some segments of public opinion view any arrangements other 
than those articulated since the Revolution as against the national interest. Historical 
literature was often restricted, censored or propagandised since the victory of the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979. Therefore, the political controversy of the topic should be 
considered when assessing the methodology of this issue, as the circumstances affect 
the material published about it, as well as the stance of Iranian politicians, media and 
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foreign partners. In particular, this tends to radicalise the opinion of both sides when it 
comes to analysing the challenges in the development of Iranian natural gas industry. 
Moreover, mounting domestic and international political tensions have reduced 
transparency of data and information on sensitive issues. Throughout the course of the 
research, the author encountered significant contradictions and inconsistent 
information on subjects, such as the subsidies reform plan in Iran, the inflation rate 
and the impact of international sanctions on the country’s overall economy and its 
natural gas sector. In order to minimise the risk of presenting data which could not be 
independently verified, the author had to review an extensive literature in order to be 
able to base arguments on a wide range of materials.  
1.6. Organisation of the Thesis  
The thesis is organized in 7 chapters which are divided into 3 parts. Part 1 which 
consists of chapters 1 and 2, sets the general research background. Chapter 1 
provides the introduction to the research and defines its research problem and 
research questions. It also presents the justification for choosing this research problem 
and provides a review of the available literature, followed by a detailed account of the 
research methodology.  
Chapter 2 presents a historical background to the Iranian natural gas industry from 
the 1960s to the present. It examines Iran’s natural gas export projects before and 
after the Revolution and elaborates on natural gas domestic market developments, 
including natural gas transmission and distribution, re-injection and gas import from 
Turkmenistan.  
Part 2 comprising chapters 3,4,5 and 6 identifies and examines the challenges 
affecting the development of the Iranian natural gas industry. Chapter 3 analyses the 
political challenges which have slowed down the progress of gas export projects. It 
examines the petroleum industry’s politicisation and establishes linkages between the 
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various historical events which have contributed to the sensitivity of the sector. U.S 
and international sanctions and their impact on withdrawal of foreign investors from 
Iran’s petroleum industry also constitute a major part of this Chapter. Chapter 4 
presents a descriptive and analytical account of the Iranian petroleum contractual 
regime, namely buy-back contracts. The remaining part of this Chapter is devoted to 
the analysis of the role of law in development of natural resources. It aims to examine 
the extent to which changes in the Iranian contractual and legal system can affect the 
trend of foreign investment and consequently the development of its natural gas 
sector. Chapter 5 is mainly concerned with economic issues, trying to appraise the 
role that the energy subsidies play in deterring foreign investors from participating in 
the development of the country’s petroleum sector. It also provides a detailed account 
of subsidies reform in Iran and its implications on Iran’s overall economy and its 
natural gas sector. Chapter 6 highlights the prolonged political debate among Iranian 
politicians over allocation of natural gas resources to export or domestic markets. It 
addresses the issue of wealth maximization in discussions about optimal allocation of 
resources while giving due consideration to the important issue of equity and 
distribution.     
Part 3 encompasses the conclusion Chapter, namely Chapter 7. It draws conclusions 
on the study and presents future research potential.  
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2. Chapter 2: A Background to Iran’s Natural Gas Industry 
2.1. Introduction  
The study of Iran’s natural gas industry cannot be accomplished without examining the 
country’s past and present policies over the industry’s development. While in the pre-
revolution era priority was given to the policy of gas export, after the Revolution a drastic 
policy shift from export to domestic consumption caused an ‘aggressive expansion’ of the 
domestic market, the fulfilment of whose needs placed the country amidst many 
challenges. Confident as a result of its mammoth natural gas reserves, the country also 
undertook significant gas export commitments. In the wake of the country’s inability to 
produce adequate volumes of gas and existence of competing markets, one may pose the 
question of whether the country is able to meet all its gas supply commitments. To 
answer this question, this chapter starts by briefly reviewing Iran’s natural gas history. It 
continues by examining the country’s current gas infrastructure with an aim to identify 
the natural gas development policies of the post-revolution Governments.  
2.2. The History of Iranian Natural Gas Industry  
The history of Iranian natural gas dates back to the ancient Persian era when the natural 
gas reserves were surprisingly found near the wreckage of ancient fire temples, such as 
‘Eternal Fire’ near Kirkuk, also known as ‘Nebuchadnezzar’.43 There is also other 
evidence proving the consumption of natural gas in ancient Zoroastrian temples in the 
vicinity of Masjid Soleiman where today it is a major petroleum-rich region in Iran. The 
first historical evidence on actual commercial consumption of natural gas goes back to 
Naser-al-Din Shah Qajar dynasty when he first visited London in 1873 and spotted bulbs 
in the streets which were lit by gas. After returning to Iran, he ordered construction of a 
gas bulb factory in Tehran which started production in 1881.
44
 Limited consumption of 
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natural gas continued in Iran until 1908 when, following the discovery of Iran’s first oil 
field in Masjid Soleiman, the natural gas industry entered into a new stage which 
involved substantial flaring.
45
  The gas associated with oil was flared for more than 60 
years in Iran, wasting more than 130 bcm (118 Mt oil equivalent) of the country’s 
wealth.
46
 In 1916, Iran signed its first natural gas field development contract with a 
Russian individual, Mousier Mededivitch Khoshtaria, for exploration and exploitation of 
oil and gas resources in Gilan, Mazandaran and Estarabad for a 70-year period. The 
agreement, however, was never approved by the Parliament of Iran.
47
  It was only after 
the ‘White Revolution’ of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1963, and his revolutionary 
vision for rapid economic development of the country, that utilisation of natural gas 
became a strategic goal to prevent resource waste and maximise economic benefits. As a 
result, the Shah ordered establishment of the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) and 
underlined the immense opportunities for Iran in the field of natural gas- not only because 
of its vast domestic consumption potentials, but also as a prospective opportunity to 
supply gas to the world markets. He also declared that “the flames that are burning the 
nation’s wealth must be extinguished at once and forever”.48   
Following the Shah’s new policy and the gradual development of the oil industry, 
consumption of gas as a fuel for electricity generation, commercial and residential units 
first started in the regions rich in natural gas resources, such as Masjid Soleiman, Agha 
Jari, Haft-Gol, and Abadan. Natural gas used as a feedstock was first consumed in Shiraz’ 
Fertiliser Manufacturing Complex which started its operation in 1964. For this purpose, a 
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10-inch and 215 km pipeline was constructed by NIOC from Gachsaran to Shiraz.
49
 
Later, the same pipeline facilitated the supply of gas to Shiraz’s Namazi Hospital where 
the gas was first consumed for non-industrial purposes.  
Substantial development of Iranian natural gas goes back to the mid 1960s when the 
country initiated its Third and Fourth Economic Development Plans putting great 
emphasis on industrialisation and attraction of foreign investment. It was then that the 
country started negotiations for export of gas to the former Soviet Union. As a result, in 
January 1966, a Fifteen-Year Economic and Technical Co-operation Agreement was 
concluded in which Iran committed to export 10 bcm/yr of natural gas to the Soviet 
Union in return for credit finance of 260 million Soviet Roubles and the construction of 
various mega projects, including a steel plant, the first Trunkline pipeline (IGAT-1) and 
an automotive factory in Arak.
50
 The parties agreed to review the contract in 1980 with 
the possibility of an extension for another 10 years. Construction of the 40 and 42-inch 
pipeline started immediately, and exports of Iranian gas to the Soviet Union started in 
1970 after finalisation of natural gas sales and purchase agreement between the two 
countries. Besides export of 10 bcm of gas to the Soviet Union through IGAT-1, Iranian 
officials also planned to transmit and distribute 6.5 bcm of gas for domestic markets via 
future extensions from the same Trunkline pipeline.
51
  Thus, IGAT-1 was considered as a 
mega project which was made up of various smaller projects, including (see Map.2-2): 
- Construction of 100 km of natural gas network collecting gas from the Agha Jari 
and Maroon fields; 
- 9 gas-processing facilities to improve the gas quality; 
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- Construction of the pipeline in two phases: 617 km and 42-inch diameter and 487 
km long and 40-inch diameter (overall 1104 km) from the Bid-Boland gas processing 
facilities to Astara; 
- 112 km and 20-inch pipeline extension to Tehran; 
- 302 km and 16-inch pipeline extension to Shiraz; 
- 102 km and 4, 6, 8, 12 and 16-inch pipeline extensions to Isfahan; 
- Extension of a 6-inch and 71 km pipeline to Kashan; 
- Extension of a 6-inch and 67 km pipeline to Qom and Sarajeh; 
- Installation of 18 compressor stations between Panaveh and Astara, and; 
- Construction of delivery stations and distribution networks in all above-mentioned 
cities.
52
 
Natural gas export to the Soviet Union started at a marginal volume of less than 1 bcm, 
and reached a record of 9.4 bcm in 1977. In the gas export contract, the price of gas was 
set at 6 Roubles per thousand cubic meter of gas or US$0.185 MMBtu.
53
 Hence the 
Government’s annual revenue from gas export was estimated at around US$ 41 million in 
1970 and an aggregate income of US$950 million was expected during the contract’s 15-
year term.
54
  
In addition to gas export to the Soviet Union, Iran initiated negotiations for export of gas 
to other markets, including the European market. In 1973, Iran held around 17 percent of 
the world’s natural gas resources,55 which made the country confident enough to consider 
expanding its presence in international gas markets. At that time, Iran’s gas was mostly 
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the associated gas derived from development of the oil fields such as Maroon, Agha Jari, 
Koranj, Fars, Pazanan, Bibi-Hakimeh, Gachsaran and Rageh-Sefid and therefore 
produced along with oil. In 1973, the country signed its second gas export contract with a 
U.S. Company, Tenneco, for export of 5Mt of methanol and 1.6 Mt of LNG to the U.S. 
market based on the Gachsaran, Bibi-Hakimeh, Pazanan and Rage-Sefid fields. The 
discovery of non-associated gas in Shiraz in the mid 1970s encouraged further 
negotiations with the Soviets and Germans for exports of gas to West Germany. There 
were ongoing talks about export of Kangan LNG to the Japanese and U.S. markets, and 
therefore conclusion of the Europe gas protocol between Iran, the Soviet Union, 
Germany, France and Austria took many by surprise. Based on the protocol, Iran 
committed to export an additional volume of 15 bcm/yr of gas to the Soviet Union after 
construction of the 2
nd
 export pipeline to this country and the latter committed to export 
the same volume to Germany.
56
 The shares of the 15 bcm of gas were 50 percent for West 
Germany, 33.33 percent for France and16.67 percent for Austria.
57
 The duration of the 
contract was 20 years and gas price was fixed based on the prices of alternative fuels in 
West Germany’s market with estimated total revenue of 20 million German Mark for 
Iran.
58
 Another contract was also concluded for export of gas to Europe with a future 
extension pipeline to Czechoslovakia.  It was anticipated that once these projects were 
operating, Iran would hold a leading position among natural gas exporting countries in 
international markets.
59
 Iran’s close economic ties with the Soviet Union gave rise to 
much disappointment among U.S. and British Government officials as they had serious 
concerns about losing their influence over Iran to the Soviet Union. There was even 
speculation that the explosion of the IGAT-1 pipeline in 1977 was planned by the U.S. 
and British intelligence services as retaliation for the growing Iran-Soviet cooperation, 
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and the Shah’s ultimatum to the western countries over review of the oil contract of the 
1953 Consortium.
60
 
In addition to export through pipelines, Iran had planned to diversify its gas export 
options and negotiated about the construction of LNG plants with potential customers. 
Iran’s LNG export projects date back to the early 1970s when the country made an 
agreement with a consortium of Japanese, Norwegian and U.S. companies to construct, 
produce and export 4.8-7.2 Mt/yr of LNG from the North Pars field.
61
 As a result, a 
consortium named Kangan Liquefied Natural Gas, also known as Kalingas, was 
established. Following the completion of exploration and exploitation, three potential 
export projects were defined: the first, known as MRW, was the export of LNG to the U.S 
market, which was cancelled in late 1970s; the second project was export of LNG to West 
Europe which was abandoned during the negotiation stage; the most promising project 
was the third, known as JKC, for export of 2.8 Mt/yr of LNG to Japan.
62
 In the JKC 
project, the gas price was set at US$0.36 MMBtu and was expected to gradually increase 
to US$0.46 MMBtu by 1979.
63
 The Kalingas project, however, was cancelled in 1979 as 
a result of the Islamic Revolution.  
In 1980, eleven months after the Revolution, following a decision by the special 
commission established under the supervision of the oil minister, all oil and gas contracts 
were reviewed and, according to the commission’s single-article mandate, petroleum 
contracts whose terms were considered inconsistent with the provisions of the Petroleum 
Act of 1950 were declared null and void.
64
 Gas exports to the Soviet Union were also 
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suspended after the Revolution as a result of the two countries’ failure to reach to an 
agreement over export duration and price. More than a decade later, in 1990, export to the 
former Soviet Union resumed, recording an export rate of about 2.2 and 2.7 bcm of gas in 
1990 and 1991, respectively.
65
 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and growth of 
the domestic market, export volume was reduced to 487mcm in 1992 and was terminated 
thereafter. In 1992, Tehran and Baku signed a 10-year contract for exports of 250 mcm of 
Iranian gas to Azerbaijan in return for import of gasoline.
66
 Supplies were suspended in 
1993 and cancelled in March 1995 due to Baku’s failure to pay for the exported gas. 
Meanwhile, NIGC tried to utilise the pipeline for storage of gas in the north-western part 
of Iran, though this was never successful.
67
 
After the Revolution, in the 1980s and early 1990s, activities relating to the export of gas 
continued through conducting small-scale feasibility studies for potential LNG projects. 
In 1987, British Gas (BG) examined the feasibility of exports of 6 Mt/yr of LNG from 
Iran to western European markets which was compared with the export of the same 
volume of gas from Nigeria, Qatar and Trinidad and Tobago.
68
 Another study was 
conducted by a Japanese company in 1988 on the construction of a liquefaction plant with 
a capacity of 24 mcm/d of gas from the South Pars field.
69
 The study showed that export 
of Iran’s LNG could be economically viable if the prices were set at US$5.3 MMBtu for 
CIF Japan delivery.
70
  
In late 1990s, Iran’s natural gas and its strong presence both in domestic and international 
gas markets became a strategic goal for the Government of the time. The production was 
increasing giving the country confidence over its ability to become a major domestic and 
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international gas supplier. The next section elaborates on developments of Iran’s natural 
gas industry since late 1990s and highlights the country’s allegedly ‘ambitious’ gas 
expansion strategy. 
Table 2-1 The Chronology of the Iranian Natural Gas Industry (1881-2012)  
Year Major Events 
1881 Establishment of the first gas bulb manufacturing company in Tehran 
1908 Start of natural gas flaring era as a result of oil discovery in Masjid Soleiman 
 
1916 
Conclusion of 70-year exploration and exploitation contract for oil and gas 
resources of Giland, Mazandaran and Rostam-Abad (Gorgan) between Iran and 
Khoshtaria; the contract was never ratified by the Iranian Parliament 
1926 Discovery of Pazanan gas field in the southeast of Agha-Jari  
1931-
37 
Drilling of the 2
nd
, 3
rd
 and 4
th
 wells of Pazanan gas field 
1934 Natural gas field discovery in Naft-Sefid region 
1954 Oil and gas sales and purchase agreement signed between Iran and a 
consortium of Seven Sisters 
1959 Discovery of Sarajeh gas field by National Oil Export Company  
1961 Construction of natural gas transmission pipeline from Gachsaran to Shiraz 
1963 -The 1
st
 oil well in Rageh-Sefid reached  a high-pressure natural gas reservoir  
-Establishment of Iran’s National Petrochemical Company 
1964 Consumption of natural gas as feedstock for Shiraz’ Fertiliser Manufacturing 
Complex 
 
1965 
-Utilisation of natural gas as feedstock for Shahpour and Mahshahr 
petrochemical plants 
-Conclusion of the Technical and Economic Agreement with the Soviet Union 
which led to the construction of IGAT-1 and Iran’s first gas export project  
-Establishment of Iran’s National Gas Company (NIGC)  
1967 -Start of IGAT-1 construction 
-Inauguration of Shiraz’ natural gas grid 
 
 
1968 
-Conclusion of a contract with a British Company, Brefcon, for supply of 
machineries required for the construction of the pipeline and Bid-Boland 
refinery  
-Discovery of Sarakhs natural gas field (proven reserves of 5.5 tcm) 
-Oil well number 311 of Masjid Soleiman  reached a natural gas reservoir 
-Conclusion of a contract with British Caston Portman Company for 
construction of Bid-Boland gas refinery and compressor stations needed for gas 
export to the Soviet Union 
 
1970 
-Natural gas sales and purchase agreement signed with the Soviet Union and 
start of Iran’s natural gas export to the Soviet Union 
-Inauguration of Bid-Boland gas refinery  
1973 Conclusion of contract between the NIGC and the U.S.  Trensco Company for 
export of 5Mt/yr methanol and 1.6 Mt/yr of LNG to the U.S. market 
1973 Agreement reached for export of gas through the Soviet Union to West 
Germany, France, Austria and Czechoslovakia 
 
1974 
-Conducting technical study on some of Iran’s natural gas fields including 
Tangeh-Bijar, Qeshm and Sarakhs 
- Conclusion of contract with U.S., French and British companies for 
exploration and exploitation of oil fields which led to discovery of more gas 
37 
 
reserves 
1975 Kalingas agreement finalised for export of LNG to U.S. and Japanese markets 
1977 Exploration, drilling and exploitation of Nar and Kangan fields by a French 
company which was cancelled after the Revolution 
1977 Explosion of IGAT-1 gas export pipeline by an unknown group 
1978 Design and planning of Shahid Hasheminejad refinery and opening of 
Khorasan and Mazandaran Provinces grid network supply  
1979 Inauguration of Gourzin natural gas field in Qeshm Island  
1981 -Start of Iran-Iraq war  
-Serious damage to Bid-Boland gas refineries and  consequent severe gas 
shortages  
1982 Inauguration of Shahid Hasheminejad (Khangiran) gas refinery 
1985 1
st
 bombardment of Bid-Boland refinery by Iraqi air forces 
1987 2
nd
 , 3
rd
 and 4
th
  bombardment of Bid-Boland refinery by Iraqi air forces 
1988 Discovery of super giant gas field at South Pars  
1990 Recommencement of gas export to the Soviet Union and Azerbainjan 
1997 Start of gas import from Turkmenistan  
1998 Establishment of South Pars Gas Complex Company as one of the NIGC’s 
subsidiaries  
1999 Construction of the IGAT-5 for transmission and re-injection of 100 mcm/d of 
sour gas from phases 6, 7, and 8 of South Pars to Agha Jari and Salman Oil 
fields 
2001 Start  of gas export to Turkey 
2005-7 Cancellation and suspension of development contracts of South Pars Phases by 
the European counterparts 
2009 Commencement of gas export to Armenia  
2010 Inauguration of the 2
nd
 gas import pipeline from Turkmenistan  
2012 E.U ban on import of Iran’s gas into European markets  
 
Source: Author’s Data Collection (2012) 
2.3. Iran’s Natural Gas Policy 
Since the start of the Iranian natural gas industry in 1960s, different Governments 
adopted various and in some cases contradictory policies with regard to natural gas 
industry development. In the pre-revolution era, Iran’s natural gas policy was mostly 
based on export priorities in order to maximise the country’s net income from the 
international sale of gas, in addition to securing direct access to international markets 
through direct participation in refining, marketing, distributing and sales and purchase 
activities in major energy consuming countries.  In the 1970s, the Government also 
38 
 
decided to develop domestic market infrastructure in order to expand domestic 
consumption.  
Iran’s pre-revolution policy of development of gas export projects was replaced by 
domestically oriented development policies of the post-revolutionary regime, followed by 
cancellation of all export contracts and ‘aggressive’ expansion of domestic market 
transmission and distribution infrastructure.  
In the years following the Iran-Iraq war, Iran’s natural gas industry was affected by 
reconstruction problems and challenges resulting from lack of a comprehensive plan for 
development of the natural gas sector, in addition to the absence of any planned strategic 
commercial interaction between the gas producing and distributing companies.
71
 
In the late 1990s, following to coming to power of Khatami’s Government, a clear policy 
change was seen in the country’s natural gas sector development, embedding the 
promotion and improvement of both domestic and export markets. According to the Third 
Five-Year Development Plan, natural gas export was placed second in the Government’s 
allocation priority after fulfilling domestic market needs. In the 20-Year Economic 
Perspective, known as the country’s key policy instrument, the economic development 
agenda for a 20-year period i.e. from 2000 to 2020 is articulated by the Iranian Supreme 
Leader. In the Perspective, natural gas is referred to as the country’s “pillar of 
development”.72 As development of Iran’s massive natural gas resources requires 
investment and technology, the Perspective characterises the natural gas industry as a 
strategic tool through which Iran can benefit from global facilities and sustain and 
stabilise its economic and political relations with the international community.
73
 The 
Economic Perspective has defined Iran’s overall policy in the petroleum industry as 
maintaining the country’s position as the second largest oil producer in OPEC, improving 
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its position to the third largest gas producer in the world and aiming to achieve the 
position of the largest oil and gas producer in the region.
74
  
The election of Ahmadinejad and the coming into office of an extremist Government put 
an end to the previous Government’s long-term and strategic planning for development of 
the country’s natural gas resources. Ahmadinejad’s tough stand against the international 
community and the controversies over the country’s nuclear programme (see Chapter 3) 
led to termination of almost all investment and development activities in Iran, leaving the 
country’s already under-developed oil and gas industry remarkably weak and vulnerable. 
Despite the current poor trend of investment and development in the petroleum industry, 
the country’s Fifth Five-Year Development Plan which came into force in 2010 has 
articulated another ‘ambitious’ plan for the country’s gas industry. It aims to attract 
US$140 billion of investment in the oil and gas upstream sector.
75
 Defining the country’s 
strategic goals in supplying both domestic and international markets, the Plan has also 
aimed for the world’s third largest gas exporter position for Iran by 2025.76 To achieve 
this goal, the Plan has required the Government to: 
- Increase natural gas production to 450 bcm/yr;  
- Increase the share of natural gas in the country’s energy balance (up to 70 percent, 
compared with its share of 60 percent in 2010) through substituting oil products 
with natural gas;  
- Accelerate the implementation and completion of re-injection projects;  
- Develop natural gas export through both pipeline and LNG; 
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- Develop natural gas-based industries such as petrochemical and GTL.77 
Article 125 of the Fifth Development Plan requires the Government to prepare and 
present to the Parliament the country’s ‘National Bill for Energy Strategies’ to govern all 
energy activities in the country for a 25-year period.  The bill is expected to include the 
country’s overall energy strategies, such as clarification of oil and gas production 
capacity, the country’s energy balance, resource exploration and development and export 
projects. The Bill was initially planned to be prepared by the Ministry of Petroleum and 
ratified by the Parliament within one year from coming into force of the Fifth 
Development Plan (i.e. 2010), but its final ratification has been reportedly postponed by 
the Parliament due to growing political tensions between the Government  and the 
Parliament.
78
 
2.4. Organisation of Iran’s Natural Gas Industry 
There are three major companies which control and manage Iran’s gas industry: NIOC, 
NIGC and NIGEC (see Figure 2.1). Depending on upstream and downstream segments of 
the industry, one of these companies manages and controls development activities, 
creating an unintegrated management system in the industry. NIOC handles the gas 
industry’s upstream activities including exploration, development and production of gas. 
It controls these activities through several other subsidiary companies such as National 
Iranian South Oil Company (NISOC), Iranian Central Oil Fields Company (ICOFC), 
Iranian Offshore Oil Company (IOOC) and Pars Oil and Gas Company (POGC).  
The other managing company, namely NIGC, was established in 1965 and is one of four 
principal companies affiliated to the Ministry of Petroleum. It is responsible for 
downstream activities, including transmission and distribution of gas, downstream project 
engineering and construction, and underground storage. NIGC itself has more than 40 
subsidiary companies which include: 
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- 8 gas processing companies: Ilam, Bid-Boland I, Parsian, South-Pars, Fajr, 
Sarkhoon & Qeshm, Shahid Hasheminejad, Bid-Boland II; and 
- 30 provincial gas companies: Azarbaijan Sharghi, Azarbaijan Gharbi, Ardebil, 
Isfahan, Ilam, Tehran, Chahar-Mahal-va-Bakhtiari, Khorasan Shomali, Khorasan Razavi, 
Khorasan Jonoobi, Khoozestan, Zanjan, Semnan, Fars, Qazvin, Qom, Kordestan, 
Kerman, Kermanshah, Kohkilooye-va-Boyerahmad, Golestan, Gilan, Lorestan, 
Mazandaran, Markazi, Hamedan, Yazd, Bushehr, Hormuzgan, Sistan-va-Baloochestan. 
Figure 2.1-Iran’s Natural Gas Organisation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: NIGC (2012) 
To manage natural gas marketing and sales in regional and international markets, NIGEC 
was established in 2003 as a subsidiary of NIOC. It manages all international related 
investments and projects on behalf of NIOC and its key responsibilities include:  
- Marketing of Iranian natural gas and related  products; 
- Establishing joint-ventures with potential buyers/investors; 
- Negotiating and finalising natural gas and LNG sales and purchase agreements; 
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- Managing and carrying out GTL projects and developing market for GTL and 
related gas products. 
As mentioned above, the management of the Iranian petroleum industry has been 
scattered among various state-owned companies with overlapping responsibilities. The 
resulting mismanagement and lack of a long-term strategic vision for development of the 
industry has created institutional confusion. For example, in July 2012 and following an 
unprecedented decision, NIOC dissolved NIGEC and assigned its responsibilities to the 
international division of NIOC. A few months later and after consultation with a 
designated commission, the Minister of Petroleum ordered re-establishment of NIGEC 
and its incorporation with NIGC in an attempt to broaden the latter’s responsibilities in 
new natural gas projects. There are still disagreements among officials over the status of 
NIGEC which has left its future unclear.
79
  
2.5. Natural Gas Reserves and Production  
As of 2011, Iran had proven natural gas reserves of around 33.1 tcm.
80
 Holding 15.8 
percent of the world’s gas resources, the country stands as the world’s 2nd largest gas 
owner after Russia.
81
 The 10 percent increase in the country’s proven gas reserves in 
2011 compared with that of in the previous year can be attributed to the NIOC’s new 
discoveries of Shoorijeh, upper and lower Mozdooran,Toosan Rood, Forooz and Sefid, 
Neiriz of Azadegan, and Dehrom fields which increased the country’s primary in-place 
reserves capacity to about 1071 bcm.
82
 In terms of production, despite the country’s 
exposure to numerous challenges in developing its resources, including international 
sanctions and lack of investment capital and technology, the country has a remarkable 
record of natural gas production (see Figure 2.2). Producing around 151.8 bcm in 2011, 
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the country maintained its 4
th
 position as the largest natural gas producer in the world 
after the U.S., Canada and Russia.
83
 In the same year, Iran’s natural gas reserves-to-
production (R/P) ratio was estimated at around 100 years.
84
  
Figure 2.2 Iranian Natural Gas Production, 1968-2011 (bcm) 
 
Source: Iran Energy Balance (1968-2000), BP Statistics (2012) 
Non-associated natural gas reserves in Iran are predominantly located offshore. Although 
production from associated gas fields started around half a century ago, substantial 
production from non-associated fields, which constitute over two-thirds of the country’s 
reserves, dates back only to the early 2000s.  
According to Iran’s Energy Balance, in 2010 there were 25 major natural gas fields in 
Iran: 
- On-shore reserves consist of 15 non-associated fields, including Khangiran, 
Gonbadli, Aghar, Dalan, Naar, Kangan Qeshm, Sarkhoon, Tabnak, Homa, Shanul, 
Varavi, Sarajeh and Tang-e Bijar, and 5 associated gas reserves of Jurassic Masjid 
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Soleiman,and  Khami Maroon reserves, and the natural gas domes of Paazanan, Lab-
Sefid and Naft-Sefid;  
- 5 off-shore reserves which include the South Pars, Golshan, Ferdowsi, Kish and 
North Pars.  
Figure 2.3- Composition of Iranian Natural Gas Reserves 
 
Source: EIA (2011)  
Among the fields, South Pars is strategically very important for the Iranian Government  
as the field is shared with the neighbouring country Qatar which has substantially 
developed its production capacity from this joint reservoir; consequently, production 
maximisation from the field is a priority for both countries(see Map 2.1). The giant South 
Pars gas field constitutes over 47 percent of the country’s total gas reserves and is the 
location of 35 percent of Iran’s total gas production. Discovered in 1988 and located 100 
km offshore in the Persian Gulf, the South Pars field has a 24-phase development scheme 
to produce 790 mcm/d of gas.
85
 Each phase has a combination of natural gas, condensates 
and/or natural gas liquids production.  
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Map 2-1- Iranian Major Natural Gas Fields 
 
Sources: NIOC (2009) 
According to the Pars Oil & Gas Company, the South Pars project managing company 
and a subsidiary of the NIOC, phases 1-10 of the field are operational and the remaining 
phases are either under development, or contracts for their development have been 
concluded (see Table 2.2).
86
 Natural gas produced from the South Pars field is mainly 
allocated for domestic market and for oil field re-injection, with a few phases designated 
for export and GTL projects.
87
 Since 2007, more than US$30 billion has been invested in 
the development of the South Pars phases, and an estimated additional investment of 
US$40 billion is required for development of the remaining phases within the next 10 
years.
88
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Table 2-2- Production from South Pars’ Phases 
Completed Phases 
 
Ph
ase  
 
Capacity  
(Natural Gas; Condensate)  
 
Participating Companies 
 
Start-up 
 
1 
25 mcm/d 
40,000 bbl/d 
 
Petronas; Petropars Ltd 
 
2003 
2 50 mcm/d 
80,000 bb/d 
 
Total; Gazprom 
 
2002 3 
4 50 mcm/d 
80,000 bbl/d 
 
Eni; Petronas, NIOC 
 
2004 5 
6 110 mcm/d 
 
158,000 bbl/d 
 
Statoil; Petropars Ltd 
 
2008-9 7 
8 
Future/ Ongoing Phases 
9 50 mcm/d 
80,000 bbl/d 
 
LG International; OIEC;IOEC 
 
2011-12 10 
 
11 
50 mcm/d 
80,000 bbl/d 
 
NIOC; CNPC 
 
2015-16 
 
12 
78 mcm/d 
110,000 bbl/d 
 
SonAngol; PdVSA; Petropars 
Ltd 
 
2013-14 
 
13 
50 mcm/d 
77,000 bbl/d 
 
Mapna; SADRA; Petro Paydar 
 
2016-17 
 
14 
50 mcm/d 
80,000 bbl/d 
 
IDRO;NIDC; IOEC 
 
2016-17 
15 50 mcm/d 
80.000 bbl/d 
 
KACH; IOEC; Saaf; ISOICO 
 
2014-15 16 
17 50 mcm/d 
80.000 bbl/d 
 
IDRO;OIEC;IOEC 
 
2015-16 18 
19 50 mcm/d 
77.000 bbl/d 
 
Petropars Ltd; IOEC 
 
2017-18 
20 50 mcm/d 
75.000 bbl/d 
 
OIEC 
 
2016-17 21 
22 50 mcm/d 
 
77.000 bbl/d 
 
Petro Sina Arian; SADRA 
 
2015-16 23 
24 
 
Source: Pars Oil & Gas Company (2012)
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In addition to the South Pars field, Iran owns other major gas fields with substantial gas 
reserves such as North Pars, Kish, Golshan and Ferdowsi. Located in the east of Lavan 
Island, Kish gas field is estimated to have 1.4 tcm of gas in place.
90
 It is known as the 
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“country’s second gas pole” and is expected to produce 10.3 and 31 bcm/yr in the first 
and second phases of its development.
91
 The gas produced is expected to supply domestic 
and export markets and is planned to connect to IGAT-7 through a 92 km 56-inch 
pipeline. The development of the field has been started and continued by the Iranian 
companies and contractors and its first phase is expected to come on stream in 2014.  
North Pars gas field is another major gas field located 120 km of south-east of Bushehr. 
The four-phase development plan of the North Pars field has been assigned to the Chinese 
oil company CNOOC through a buyback contract. Golshan and Ferdowsi are also two 
other major gas fields with an estimate reserve of 1.4 tcm of gas in place.
92
 In December 
2007, a 66-month buy-back contract was signed between NIOC and the Malaysian SKS 
Company for development and production of 610 and 153 mcm/d of gas from Golshan 
and Ferdowsi fields, respectively.
 93
 The production from these fields is allocated to the 
domestic market.  
2.6. Natural Gas Transmission System  
As mentioned earlier, after the Revolution Iran’ natural gas priority shifted from gas 
export to domestic consumption. Even during the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian Government 
persistently continued the expansion of its national gas grid. Iran has developed an 
extensive gas pipeline system which includes trunklines, import-export pipelines and 
distribution networks. The ‘backbone’ of the country’s domestic pipeline system is the 
Gas Trunkline (IGAT) pipeline series, which transport natural gas from processing plants 
to end-users both in domestic and export markets. Almost all of these pipelines are fed by 
the gas produced from the phases of the South Pars project which have already been 
developed.  IGAT-9 and 10 are in planning stage and unlikely to come on stream before 
2017. Construction of IGAT-3 to IGAT-8 started after the South Pars development 
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project began.
94
 In 2010, Iran’s high-pressure transmission pipelines reached 33098 km, 
of which 30781 km is currently operational.
95
 
IGAT-1 
IGAT-1, 42-inch in diameter, was Iran’s first nation-wide transmission pipeline, which 
was constructed between the Bid-Boland gas processing plant and Astara to export Iran’s 
gas to the Soviet Union.
96
 The 1103 km pipeline has a capacity of 32 to 46 mcm/d of gas 
with 10 compressor stations.
97
 The pipeline is divided into two parts: the first part is from 
the Bid-Boland plant to the 4
th
 compressor station close to Isfahan and the second part is 
from there to the measurement station in Astara.
98
  
IGAT-2  
IGAT-2 is 900 km of 42 and 58-inch pipeline with a transmission capacity of 60 mcm/d.
99
 
The pipeline was constructed to supply gas to the northern cities of Iran, including 
Semnan, Golestan, Mazandaran and Southern Khorasan. According to NIGC, this 
pipeline has been planned to improve gas transmission infrastructure in the north and 
north east regions and to reduce the country’s further dependence on gas imports from 
Turkmenistan.
100
  
IGAT-3 
IGAT-3 is a 1267 km 56-inch pipeline constructed to supply gas from Assaluyeh to 
Kangan, Saveh and Rasht.
101
 Its transmission capacity is 90 mcm/d and it has 9 
compressor stations.
102
 The pipeline supplies gas to the west and northwest of the 
                                                          
94
 "Iran's Energy Balance." Ministry of Energy, 2011 
95
 ibid 
96
 "History of National Iranian Gas Company." NIGC, 
http://en.nigc.ir/Site.aspx?ParTree=11131515. 2010 
97
 "Iran's Energy Balance." Ministry of Energy, 2011 
98
 ibid 
99
 ibid 
100
 Owji, J. "Tavafogh Jadid Iran Va Torkamanestan (Iran-Turkmenistan New Deal)." Shana, 
NIOC official news website (27 November 2012) 
101
 "Iran's Energy Balance." Ministry of Energy, 2011 
102
 ibid 
49 
 
country, including Hamedan, Sanandaj, and Zanjan. IGAT-3 also has a 273 km-extension 
between Saveh and Rash expected to become operational in 2013.
103
 
IGAT-4 
IGAT- 4 transports 110 mcm/d of gas from the South Pars and Parsian gas plants to the 
domestic market.
104
 It is a 1145 km 56-inch pipeline divided into two parts: the main part 
(which came on stream in 2004) is a 351-km pipeline gas to Fars province and connecting 
to Pol-Kaleh compressor station in Isfahan; the second part includes various pipelines 
supplying gas to Kerman province (42-inch), Fars petrochemical plant (24-inch), Yazd 
(40-inch) and Isfahan Mobarakeh (40-inch).
105
 To maintain the pressure and maximise 
transmission capacity, 10 compressor stations have been put in place throughout the 
pipeline route.
106
  
IGAT-5 
The 56-inch IGAT-5 supplies 95 mcm/d of sour gas to the Agha Jari oil field for 
reinjection from the South Pars phases 6, 7 and 8.
107
 The 504 km-pipeline has five 
compressor stations, including 2 stations in the South Pars region and 3 in the cities of 
Khormoj, Ab-Pakhsh and Sar-Dasht. 
108
 
IGAT-6 
IGAT-6, mostly in parallel with IGAT-5, has a capacity of 110 mcm/ d, serving around 
30 cities in Bushehr and Khoozestan provinces for domestic consumption and oil field re-
injection.
109
 It also transfers sweet gas from South Pars phases 9 and 10 to the Bid-Boland 
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processing plant. The pipeline is 610 km long 56-inches in diameter with 4 compressor 
stations and went into operation in 2008.
110
 
IGAT-7 
The 902 km, 56-inch IGAT-7 pipeline transfers 110 mcm/d gas from the South Pars 
phases 9 and 10 to 48 southern towns and cities of Iran including 17 cities in Kerman and 
Hormuzgan provinces and 31 cities in Sistan and Baluchestan province with the 
possibility of exporting to the U.A.E., Pakistan and India.
111
 The pipeline extends to 
Gavbandi, Rudan and Kahnooj and ends in Iranshahr. There are two compressor stations 
which can increase to 11 in case of export to Asian markets.
112
  
IGAT-8 
IGAT-8, a 1,050 km 56-inch pipeline with 10 compressor stations transporting 110 
mcm/d of natural gas from Assaluyeh to the Parsian gas processing plant in Fars province 
and from there to Isfahan and Qom provinces.
113
 IGAT-8 came on stream in 2009 and is 
planned to reach the north and northeast regions in 2014. 
114
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Map 2-2- Iran’s Natural Gas Transmission System 
 
Source: Adibi & Fesharaki (2010) 
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IGAT-9 
The 56-inch IGAT-9 is another potential gas export pipeline designed to connect Iran’s 
South Pars gas field to the European markets.
115
 The 1863 km IGAT-9 pipeline with 17 
compressor stations aims to transfer gas from Assaluyeh to the border city of Bazargan. It 
has been said that 23 percent of the pipeline project would be handled by Iran and 77 
percent by the Turkish partners.
116
 A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed 
by the two countries in 2008, which contains cooperation plans and, according to MEES, 
calls for “the participation of Turkish state petroleum company TPAO in the development 
of phases 22, 23, and 24 of South Pars, along with its participation in the construction of 
the 1850 km IGAT-9 gas trunkline from Assaluyeh to Bazargan, near the Turkish-Iranian 
border.”117  Once completed, the pipeline is planned to export 35 bcm of Iranian gas to 
Europe via Turkey. The project is said to operate on a Build- Own -Operate (BOO) 
framework with an estimated investment cost of US$8 billion.
118
 It was originally 
expected to come on stream in 2014 but the substantial delay in its construction has made 
its construction unlikely in the near future.   
IGAT-10 (Loop line) 
IGAT-10 will transport the processed gas of Fajr treatment plant in Pataveh to Pol-Kalleh 
in Isfahan. The pipeline is 205 km (175 km is 56-inch and 30 km is 40-inch) and has a 
transmission capacity of 88 mcm/d.
119
 En route, it is planned to supply gas to the north 
and northwest provinces of Azerbaijan Sharghi and Azerbaijan Gharbi as well as southern 
provinces of Iran. The pipeline is also designed to compensate for the gas deficit of 
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IGAT-2 pipeline and to free-up some capacity in IGAT-7 for domestic consumption by 
supplying additional volume of gas for potential export to India and Pakistan.
120
  
Third Azerbaijan Pipeline 
The pipeline is 470 km of 40 and 48- inch with three compressor stations and has the 
capacity to transport 40-50 mcm/d via Saveh, Hamedan, Bijar, Takab and Miandoab.
121
  
North and North-East Pipeline 
The pipeline is 1024 km and 42 and 48-inch in diameter with six compressor stations and 
consists of two phases: phase one is 418 km between Parchin and Miami and 106 km 
between Miami and Dasht.
122
 The second phase is a 500 km and 48-inch pipeline between 
Miami and Sang-Bast which transfers 58 mcm/d of gas from the second import pipeline 
from Turkmenistan to the Shahid Hasheminejad gas processing plant.
123
   
2.7. Natural Gas Distribution System  
As a result of domestic market expansion policy, Iran has extensively added to its 
distribution network. In 2012, the aggregate urban and rural distribution network 
was 225,000 km, supplying gas to more than 15.35 million beneficiaries, 
including households, commercial and industrial units in 920 cities, 12504 
villages and 69 power generation plants.
124
 Tehran, Isfahan, Khorasan Razavi and 
Fars are the top four provinces with most developed natural gas grid.
125
 In the period 
between 2004 and 2010, 13341 km of pipeline was added to the national 
distribution network, an average pipeline construction of 2223.5 km per year.
126
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More than 96 percent and 54 percent of the urban and rural population have 
access to a gas supply (i.e. 55 million). As shown in Figure 2.4 , only in 2010, the 
national grid expansion was measured around 17000 km, an increase of 37 percent 
comparing to that of in 2009 (12366 km).
127
  
Figure 2.4 - Natural Gas Distribution Network in Iran, 2007-2012 (km) 
 
Source: NIGC (2012), Iran Energy Balance (2011) 
2.8. Natural Gas Domestic Consumption in Iran 
Natural gas consumption in Iran has skyrocketed during the last 25 years, reaching 153.3 
bcm in 2011, making the country the third largest gas consumer in the world after the 
U.S. and Russia.
128
 The major reasons for the country’s increasing gas consumption have 
been: low prices charged nationwide with subsidies from the Government; the 
requirement for re-injection of gas into old oilfields to enhance the rate of recovery; 
population growth and consequent increase in household and industrial consumption. 
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 Table 2.3- Natural Gas Domestic Consumption in Different Sectors 1980-2010 (bcm) 
Sector 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Residential & Commercial 0.9 3.4 3.4 13.1 22.7 37.1 47 
Power Generation 2.4 4.1 8.6 13.7 23.7 36.3 45 
Industry 0.5 1.5 3.1 6.9 10 15.4 20 
Transportation & Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 5.9 
Energy Sector 
 
Reinjection  
0.3 
 
0 
1.1 2.6 3.5 5.1 9.8 11 
 
 
Total* 4.8 10.2 20.4 40.3 64.4 103 153 
*The total amount is inclusive of gas volume consumed for petrochemical plants, compressor stations, 
and gas shrinkage and loss. 
Source: Iran Energy Balance (2011) 
In 2010 natural gas constituted 48.53 percent of the country’s energy demand of which 
commercial and public sector accounted for 32 percent, power generators 31 percent, 
industries 14 percent, the petrochemical sector 11 percent, oil refineries 7 percent and 
transportation and agricultural sector 5 percent.
129
 
2.8.1. Residential and Commercial Sector 
The household and commercial sector is the largest sector in Iran’s natural gas domestic 
market, consuming around 32 percent of the natural gas. More than 55 million Iranians 
have access to natural gas which represents around 75 percent of the population. Heavy 
dependence of the residential sector on natural gas consumption has caused significant 
challenges for the supply of gas to other sectors particularly during cold winters. Recent 
implementation of energy subsidies reform in Iran has, to some extent, prevented the 
wasteful and inefficient consumption of gas in household sector. (see Chapter 5) In 2010 
the natural gas consumption dropped by 1.3 percent and reached 47 bcm. In the 
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commercial sector, consumption experienced an increase of 4.4 percent over the previous 
year and stood at slightly less than 6 bcm.
130
 
2.8.2. Power Generation and Petrochemical Sectors 
Power generation accounts for the second largest share of natural gas consumption. In 
2010 the sector witnessed an increase of 3.4 percent, consuming around 45 bcm of gas. 
Most of the power generation plants in Iran reached the end of their design lives and need 
to be replaced. As a result, the low energy efficiency rate has caused extensive wasteful 
energy consumption in the power generation sector.  
The petrochemical industry is also a major natural gas consuming sector in the country. 
Iran has 10 petrochemical plants, 2 of which are located in special economic zones. 
Development and operation of petrochemical facilities is assigned to the National Iranian 
Petrochemical Company (NIPC). Founded in 1964, NIPC began its activities by operating 
a small fertiliser plant. In 2010, it was the second largest producer and exporter of 
petrochemical products in the Middle East.
131
  
2.8.3. Industrial, Transportation and Agricultural Sectors 
In 2010, the industrial sector consumed around 20 bcm of gas, showing an increase of 
13.7 percent. This was mostly due to the increase in oil product prices which forced the 
sector to consume more natural gas. The industrial sector has always been facing 
challenges for the secure supply of its natural gas demands, particularly during cold 
winters when the priority is given to the residential sector.  
Natural gas consumption in the transportation sector has also seen a remarkable increase 
as a result of the Government’s policy of substituting oil fuels with natural gas for 
vehicles. In 2010, natural gas consumption in the transportation sector increased 61 
percent, reaching 5.5 bcm.
132
 The policy of shifting to natural gas as a transportation fuel 
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has encouraged the replacement of over 2.5 million inefficient gasoline and diesel 
vehicles.
133
 More importantly, the conversion of vehicles’ engines to natural gas has 
reduced the need for import of refined petroleum products which today is almost 
impossible as a result of international sanctions.
134
  
In the agricultural sector natural gas consumption has also experienced a gradual increase 
during last few years. According to Iran’s Energy Balance, natural gas consumption in the 
agricultural sector increased 5.1 percent, representing consumption of 422.6 mcm of gas 
in 2010.  
2.8.4. Gas Re-injection into the Oil Fields  
Gas re-injection is a maintenance technique which is applied in ageing oil fields to 
prevent the reservoirs pressure from dropping in order to facilitate the recovery of a 
greater percentage of crude oil. In Iran, natural gas-reinjection technology was first 
introduced by NIOC in 1971. From 1971-74, a comprehensive study was conducted by a 
group of reservoir engineers urging natural gas re-injection for Haft-Gol, Gachsaran, Lab-
Sefit, Maroun, Agha Jari, Parsi and Bibi-Hakimeh oilfields and was first implemented in 
1976-77 in Haft-Gol and Gachsaran oil fields, respectively.
135
 In 2002, over a 25-year 
period since the start of the re-injection, the aggregate injected gas to these oilfields was 
estimated at around 22.51 and 219.99 bcm, respectively, adding 154 and 2500 million 
barrels of oil to the country’s oil production output.136 Another study conducted on eight 
other oilfields in 1975 also showed that re-injection of 250 mcm/d of natural gas could 
result in a total oil recovery of 35 billion barrels by 2000.
137
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In 2012, Ministry of Petroleum had 34 re-injection projects in oil-rich regions which 18 
are located in the southern part of the country. Phases 6, 7, and 8 of the South Pars are 
designated to supply gas for reinjection purposes. In 2009, Iran completed the 
construction of a 56-inch, 508 km gas pipeline from the South Pars to the Agha-Jari 
oilfield. This pipeline is planned to deliver up to 40.3 bcm/yr of gas for re-injection to oil 
fields located in the south and southwest of the country (20.8 bcm/yr for Agha-Jari and 
19.5 bcm/yr for other oil fields). The gas re-injection in Agha-Jari has been operational 
since 2010, though the injected capacity has been significantly lower than the planned 
volume.
138
  
A study of the history of gas reinjection in Iran shows that re-injection projects were 
never implemented as planned either due to unavailability of enough gas for re-injection 
purposes as a result of growing domestic demand or the high cost of injection process or 
both. In the years following the Iran-Iraq war, reconstruction problems and challenges 
resulting from the lack of a comprehensive plan and a strategic commercial interaction 
between the gas producing company, NIOC, and the distribution company, NIGC, led to 
the Government’s failure to sufficiently re-inject gas into oilfields.  
Today, there is an urgent requirement for re-injection of gas into oilfields due to both 
deteriorating conditions of the oilfields and rising oil prices (see Section 6.3.2.1). Iran’s 
oil production capacity has been decreasing at a rate of around 300-600 thousand barrels 
per annum.
139
 According to the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan, the required volume 
for natural gas re-injection was estimated at around 149 mcm/d, while the actual 
reinjection was only 88.40 mcm/d in 2010. For onshore oilfields gas re-injection and for 
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off-shore fields a mixture of water and gas re-injection, have been introduced as the most 
effective re-injection fluids.  
Table 2-4- Natural Gas and Water Injection into Oilfields (2000-2010) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Iran’s Energy Balance (2011) 
2.9. Natural Gas Export Projects 
2.9.1. Pipelines  
After the Revolution, Iran’s rigorous attempt to develop new gas export projects goes 
back to the Khatami era, i.e. 1997-2005. The export plans were in line with the 
development of the South Pars field and Iran’s response position. The plans were also 
consistent with the Khatami Government’s overall policy of reducing tensions between 
Iran and the international community and promoting the country’s presence in 
international economic and trade transactions. It was during this era that many gas 
industry development plans, including export to Turkey, conclusion of contracts for 
construction of LNG terminals, and development of the South Pars gas field were 
implemented. However, in the mid 2000s, following the coming to power of Mahmood 
Ahmadinejad and the 7
th
 Parliament, opposition against development of gas export 
intensified. The harsh, and sometimes hostile, stand of Ahmadinejad’s Government 
against the international community, created tension between Iran and the West which 
virtually eliminated prospects for further development of gas export projects.  
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006           2007 2008 2009 2010 
NG 
(mmcm 
p/d) 
71.1 75.4 72.3 77.8 80 77.2 73                    87.7 77.7 79 88.4 
Water 
(Mbbl/yr) 
- 106 92.1 99.4 75.6 98.9 130.3               132.9 420.6 152 152.5 
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Figure 2.5- Iranian Natural Gas Export 1970-2011 (bcm/yr) 
 
Source: International Institute for Energy Studies (2008), Iran Energy Balance 
(2011), BP Statistics (2012) 
2.9.1.1. Iran-Turkey Gas Export Project 
In August 1996, NIGC signed a 23-year contract with the Turkish BOTAŞ Company for 
export of 10 bcm/yr of gas to Turkey via pipeline (an aggregate export of 228 bcm). The 
pipeline is 40-inch and 253 km and transfers gas through the border city of Bazargan in 
Iran to Dogubeyazit in Turkey.
140
 The agreement provided for the initial export of 4 bcm 
of gas in 2002 and its gradual increase to 10 bcm in 2007. When the gas export started in 
December 2001, the actual volume was only 357 mcm, much lower than the volume 
initially agreed upon by the parties (see Figure 2.7).
141
 The gas trade has never reached to 
its designated volume during the first few years of export. Only recently Iran managed to 
export around 9 bcm in 2011 as a result of the coming on stream of the South Pars’ new 
phases.
142
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Figure 2.6- Iran’s Gas Export to Turkey 2001-2011 (bcm/yr) 
 
 
Source: BP Statistics Review (2001-2012) 
Export of Iran’s natural gas to Turkey has been interrupted several times particularly 
during the times of spiking domestic demand in Iran when the country was hit by cold 
winter weather or by attacks on the pipeline by regional terrorist groups. Iran has also 
reportedly been demanding comparatively high prices, while gas quality and quantity 
often fall below the agreed terms.
143
 In 2010, following a dispute over a ‘take or pay’ 
clause regarding the price and amount agreed upon between the two countries, Turkey 
took the issue to an international arbitration tribunal seeking compensation for losses 
incurred as a result of supply failure, and demanding modifications of the contractual 
terms. The dispute actually began in 2002 when Turkey halted import of Iranian gas due 
to, according to Turkish side, unsatisfactory technical specification of the gas. The actual 
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reason, however, was believed to be lack of gas demand in Turkey at the time and the 
Turkey’s interest in renegotiating the price and terms of the ‘take or pay’ clause.144 
As reviewed above, the gas trade between Iran and Turkey has embedded many 
impediments. The parties’ gas deal interactions evidently lack trust as they failed to prove 
their long-term reliability as gas importer and exporter. This has, to a large extent, 
affected the prospect of Iran being perceived as a major and reliable exporter to European 
markets.  
2.9.1.2. Iran- Armenia Gas Contract 
Iran signed a gas export contract with Armenia in exchange for Armenian electricity in 
2004. The contract provides for the supply of 1.1 to 2.3 bcm/yr of gas for a 20-year 
period.
145
 The Iran-Armenia gas pipeline is 113 km and 30-inch in diameter, connecting 
Tabriz to the Armenian border.  Gas export to Armenia started in 2009 after two years 
delay reaching 1 bcm in 2011.
146
 In exchange for every cubic meter of gas, Armenia 
exports 3kWh of electricity to Iran. In March 2012, further negotiations started with 
Armenian counterparts for a 6-fold increase of Iran’s gas export to Armenia, which would 
increase the total export capacity to around 6.5 bcm/yr.
147
  
2.9.1.3. Iran-Azerbaijan Gas Contract  
Based on a 25-year swap contract with Azerbaijan, Iran started exporting an average of 
300-350 mcm/yr of gas to Azerbaijan in 2005 through a 16-inch pipeline connecting Jolfa 
(on the Iranian border) to Nakhchivan.
148
 In exchange, Azerbaijan supplies the same 
volume of gas to Iran’s northern city of Astara. The Iran-Azerbaijan gas swap deal was a 
result of a prolonged territorial dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia preventing the 
former’s domestic pipeline system from reaching Nakhchivan.  
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2.9.1.4. Iran-UAE Gas Contract 
In 2001, NIOC and Crescent Petroleum Company (CPC) singed a 25-year contract for 
export of 5.2 bcm/yr of sour gas from the Salman field to the Emirate of Sharjah.
149
 
Although the initial completion date of the project was December 2005, there have been 
substantial delays. In addition to a price dispute between the two companies, the Iranian 
contractor, Petro Iran, delayed the development of the Salman field and the construction 
of the export pipeline to the Mubarak oil platform for over three years. Iranian officials 
and members of Parliament opposed the price formula for the UAE gas export which was 
set around US$1 MMBtu. According to Adibi and Fesharaki, the price was even lower 
than initial Qatari Dolphin prices for export of gas to Abu Dhabi and Dubai.
150
  
2.9.1.5. Future Gas Export Pipeline  
2.9.1.5.1. Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline  
 The Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline also known as the ‘Peace Pipeline’ is another 
controversial export line planned to export Iranian gas from South Pars to the Asian 
Subcontinent. With a proposed 2800 km and around 40 bcm/yr of export capacity, 
pipeline construction has been stalled in both Pakistan and India due to various problems 
including prolonged political tension between two countries, pricing disputes and the U.S. 
Government’s objection to the project.151 Consequently, in 2007, India decided to 
suspend negotiations for the development of the project.
152
 India has become more 
interested in the U.S. backed pipeline stretching from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.   
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On Iranian territory, the pipeline will be the extension of IGAT-7 to the Pakistani border, 
avoiding construction of a new parallel pipeline.
153
 The pipeline in Pakistan is planned to 
start from southern Baluchistan and proceeds to Nawabshah in Sindh province. The 
pipeline’s length in the Pakistani territory is expected to be around 750 km. Pakistan has 
so far been unable to secure funding for the project. It has approached foreign companies 
including OAO Gazprom, International Petroleum Investment Co., and China National 
Petroleum Corp without success. Iran and Pakistan, in the absence of India, finalised the 
gas sales and purchase agreements in 2009. The initial pricing formula was based on 47 
percent linkage to Japan Crude Cocktail (JCC).
154
 The new formula is 79 percent linked 
to the JCC price which at an average oil price of around US$100 per barrel as of in 2012, 
means that Pakistan should pay around US$14.5 MMBtu. Adding transportation and 
transit fees, the final gas price jumps to around US$16 MMBtu which is highly unlikely 
to be affordable for Pakistan.
155
 There are also other problems which make completion of 
the project unlikely in the near future. As the project is planned to continue without India, 
some believe that it is no longer economically viable as there is virtually no chance for 
further expansion of the pipeline beyond the Pakistani borders.
156
  Also the availability of 
other alternatives, including the potential export of Qatari LNG and the construction of 
the Western-backed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline, has cast doubt over the 
future of the project.
157
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2.9.1.5.2. Iran-Europe Gas Export Pipelines  
Nabucco was, perhaps, the most promising pipeline project for the export of Iran’s gas to 
Europe.
158
 In January 2004 Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the 
Nabucco project leader OMV of Austria and its 50 percent-owned Austrian gas marketing 
arm EconGas to assess the flow of Iranian gas in the project, as well as the upstream 
development cooperation with Iran. However, a few years later, as a result of 
international sanctions, it was announced that the Nabucco project would proceed without 
Iranian gas.
159
 
Another gas export project to Europe is the 520-km Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) 
which is planned to link Iran to Greece, Albania and Italy via Turkey. Gas export to the 
Swiss market is also expected to be done through the same pipeline. A 20-year gas 
purchase contract between the Swiss-based EGL Company and NIGEC was signed in 
2008 for export of 5.5 bcm/yr of Iranian gas to the Swiss market.
160
 It was reported that 
the export to the Swiss market can start by using the existing infrastructure which exports 
Iran’s gas to Turkey. However, as a result of the U.S. Government’s pressure on 
Switzerland and the E.U. ban on Iran’s gas import to Europe, the project needs to proceed 
without Iranian gas. 
 Another potential export project is the Iran-Iraq-Syria-Mediterranean Pipeline for 
which a MoU was signed between Iran and Syria in 2011 to finalise a gas export deal 
through Iran, Syria and the south of Lebanon to Mediterranean-Europe. The pipeline 
capacity is 110 mcm/d requiring investment of US$10 billion.
161
 The decision to build 
this pipeline, also known as the Islamic pipeline, was taken when Iran was excluded from 
the Nabucco pipeline. The Islamic pipeline is 1500 km, of which 490 km will be 
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constructed in Iraq and 600 km in Syria.
162
 According to the deputy minister, Javad Owji, 
the construction of the pipeline both in the Iranian and Iraqi territories has already been 
started and 25 percent of the project is completed in Iran.
163
 However, it is increasingly 
unlikely that the project makes significant progress mostly due to the political turmoil in 
Syria in 2012 and strong possibility of the collapse of Assad regime which has had strong 
political and trade ties with Iranian Government.   
There is also another proposed pipeline route for exporting Iran’s gas to Europe through 
Armenia and Ukraine. However, there is doubt over the profitability of this project due to 
the lack of strong markets and economic infrastructure in these two countries, and 
Russia’s relatively strong influence over the region’s transit pipelines.164  
2.9.1.5.3.  Export to the GCC Countries  
In addition to the Emirates, there have also been other efforts to export Iran’s gas to other 
GCC countries including Kuwait and Oman. In 2004, during the OPEC Ministerial 
Conference, Iran and Kuwait signed an agreement worth US$7 billion for the export of 
Iran’s gas to Kuwait for 25 years.165  Also the joint natural gas field of Hengam between 
Iran and Oman brought the parties to the negotiation table in 2000 which eventually led to 
conclusion of a contract for joint development of the field and the export of 10 to 20 
bcm/yr of gas to Oman.
166
 None of these projects, however, made any significant 
progress.  
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Table 2-5- Gas Pipeline Export Projects (2001-2015) 
 
Source: NIGC (2008)  
2.9.2. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
Iran’s post-revolution initiative to develop its LNG plans resumed in late 1990s when the 
country started negotiations with some European and Asian companies to construct 
several LNG projects, including Iran LNG, Pars LNG and Persian LNG. Iran planned to 
produce LNG from South Pars phases 11-14 through a partnership between NIOC or its 
subsidiaries such as NIGEC with foreign companies. 
68 
 
2.9.2.1. Iran LNG 
The Iran LNG project consists of two 5.4 Mt/yr trains and is located in the port of Bandar 
Tombak, 50 km from Assaluyeh.
167
 The gas for the project is provided from phase 12 of 
the South Pars. The project is owned by NIGEC (49 percent), the NIOC Pension Fund Co 
(50 percent), and the NIOC Pension Investment Fund Co (1 percent).
168
 Iran LNG’s 
feasibility study was first conducted in 1996 by Linde, GES and OIEC. In 1997, the study 
was completed by Daewoo and JGC and eventually reviewed and finalised in 2000 by the 
Iran Oil Engineering and Construction Company.
169
 Iran LNG is the most advanced LNG 
project in Iran (more than 55 percent physical completion) and is managed by the NIOC’s 
subsidiary, Iran LNG Ltd (ILG).
170
 Based on the latest news, the project is expected to 
come on stream in late 2014. However, the construction of the liquefaction plant, the 
most important part of an LNG project, has not made any progress as a result of access 
restriction to the required technologies and lack of capacity of the Iranian and Chinese 
contractors to provide such technologies.
171
 In addition, the Iran LNG Company has not 
had any success in marketing its LNG production. Some contracts which were signed a 
few years ago, such as export to India, were reviewed and cancelled due to low gas 
prices. There are also other preliminary development and sales and purchase contracts 
with Austrian (OMV), Chinese (Sinopec) and Indian (ONGC) companies which are 
highly unlikely to materialise.
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2.9.2.2. Pars LNG 
Pars LNG is located in Tombak Port in Assaluyeh and its feed gas comes from phase 11 
of South Pars. The shareholders of the project are the NIOC (50 percent), Total (40 
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percent) and Petronas (10 percent).
173
 The project includes two liquefaction plants with a 
capacity of around 5 Mt/yr each. The output of Pars LNG was expected to reach markets 
of Japan, South Korea, UK and France. The withdrawal of Total and Petronas from the 
project in 2008, as a result of mounting international sanctions, caused the Iranian 
Government to cancel the project in 2010.
174
 
2.9.2.3. Persian LNG 
Persian LNG is also located in Tombak Port and consists of two liquefaction plants with a 
total production capacity of 16.2 Mt/yr. NIGEC, Shell and Repsol hold 50 percent, 25 
percent and 25 percent share in the project, respectively. The plants feed gas comes from 
South Pars phases 13 and 14.  The project consists of two phases; the first phase which 
includes two units for sweetening and condensate extraction and one unit for LNG 
production. The second phase, in addition to sweetening and condensation units, includes 
another LNG train.
175
 Shell and Repsol were also engaged with marketing the LNG to 
India and Europe. The prices for gas were expected to be linked to a crude oil basket, 
including JCC and Brent but not at a fixed price. Industry sources reported that NIOC had 
offered gas to Shell from South Pars at a wellhead price of US$0.7 MMBtu.
176
 The 
project, however, was cancelled due to the international sanctions and withdrawal of 
foreign partners from the project in 2007.
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Table 2-6- Iran’s LNG Projects (2001-2015) 
 
 Source: NIGC (2008) 
2.9.2.4. Other LNG projects  
In addition to the major LNG projects reviewed above, agreements were reached with 
some Asian companies for construction of additional plants. For most of these potential 
projects, no actual physical developments have been reported, not to mention that some 
signed MoUs have already been expired.
178
 The North Pars project is for example one 
where NIOC signed a MoU with the China National Offshore Oil Cooperation (CNOOC) 
for development of the field and export of 20 Mt/yr of LNG. Although a buyback contract 
was signed in 2008, due to the political pressures and the Chinese company’s lack of 
technical expertise little hope remains for significant development of the project. Qeshm 
LNG is another project for which NIOC signed an agreement with the Australian LNG 
Ltd Company in December 2006 for production of 3-3.5 Mt/yr of LNG in Qeshm Island. 
However, as the Australian counterpart has no experience in construction and 
development of such projects, it is unlikely this can proceed. Golshan LNG is another 
project for which NIOC signed a contract with the Malaysian company SKS Venture for 
production of 10 Mt/yr of LNG from Golshan and Ferdowsi gas fields. The development 
of the fields is also assigned to the same Malaysian company based on a 7-year buyback 
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contract.  Based on the contract, NIOC is responsible for marketing of 5 Mt/yr of LNG 
and the sale of remaining capacity is tentatively assigned to SKS.
179
 Another potential 
LNG plan is Lavan LNG for which the Iranian Offshore Oil Company (IOOC), one of 
the NIOC’s subsidiaries, has been negotiating with a Polish company, PGNiG, for the 
development of Lavan gas field with the prospect of LNG export. The LNG plants 
production capacity is estimated at around 2-3 Mt/yr. However, considering the current 
state of negotiations, it is likely that the Lavan LNG project will also fail. 
2.10. Natural Gas Imports 
Poor transmission facilities in the northeast of Iran and its inability to produce an 
adequate volume of gas forced Iran to start imports of gas from Turkmenistan. The 25-
year contract signed in 1995 provided for the import of 8 bcm/yr of gas, allocating 35 
percent of total supply as re-payment of Iran’s contribution to construction of the 
pipeline.
180
 Imports from Turkmenistan started in 1997 through a 200 km and 40-inch 
diameter pipeline which stretches from Korpedzhe in Turkmenistan to Kurd-Kui in 
Iran.
181
 Volumes were initially 0.4 bcm and reached around 6.5 bcm in 2010 when the 
second import pipeline from Turkmenistan was inaugurated. It is a 35 km and 48-inch 
pipeline, constructed between Dauletabad in Turkmenistan and the Shahid Hasheminejad 
gas processing plant, and is connected to the North and North East pipeline in Sang-Bast 
region in Khorasan Razavi.
182
 The new pipeline increases Iran’s gas import capacity to 14 
bcm/yr.
183
 According to BP Statistics, the gas import volume from Turkmenistan reached 
10.2 bcm in 2011.
184
   
                                                          
179
 ibid 
180
 "Iran's Energy Balance." Ministry of Energy, 2011 
181
 ibid 
182
 ibid 
183
 Owji,J. “Aghaze amaliate khate looleye shomal vas shomale shargh.” Shana, NIOC, 24 
November 2011) 
184
 British Petroleum, ‘British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy’, 2012 
72 
 
Disputes over pricing have caused gas supply cut offs to Iran on several occasions - with 
the most recent case being in November 2012.
185
 It is difficult to ascertain the exact price 
Iran pays for its natural gas imports from Turkmenistan; however analysis published by 
PFC Energy shows that Iran paid US$9-10 per MMBtu in the first half of 2009.
186
 
Although the pricing terms were changed in the second half of 2009 and Iran now pays an 
oil-linked price for its imports, the Turkmenistan Government is still dissatisfied; hence, 
it is likely that future halts in supply of gas to Iran, particularly, by start of cold weather 
happen again. 
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3. Chapter 3- Political Challenges: International Sanctions and 
Politicisation of the Petroleum Sector  
3.1. Introduction 
The study of the Iranian petroleum industry is strongly affected by U.S. and international 
sanctions. Targeting the country’s vital segment of the economy, i.e. the oil and gas 
sector, sanctions have been put in place as a response to Iran’s allegedly hostile foreign 
policy and ambitions over development of its nuclear programme. The creeping 
sanctions, which initially started in the form of U.S. unilateral sanctions in mid 1990s, did 
not meet their objectives until late 2000s when they were supplemented by EU 
multilateral and UN international sanctions. Due to the prevailing consensus over their 
imposition, these collective sanctions have placed dramatic impact on the development of 
the country’s oil and gas sector which will be studied in more detail in this Chapter.  
Besides international sanctions, the Iranian petroleum sector has been chronically affected 
by domestic politicisation, causing uncertainty over the country’s petroleum sector’s 
decision-making process and confusion over its overall development policies. A historical 
account of the political events affecting the industry since the discovery of oil in the early 
1900s, shows how the fear of foreign intervention pushed the country towards a situation 
in which domestic political interventions have caused politicisation of the oil and gas 
sector.  
This Chapter consists of two parts, reviewing and examining the domestic and 
international political challenges influencing the development of Iran’s energy sector. The 
first part focuses on the industry’s politicisation and the background to the domestic 
political intervention in the petroleum sector; and in the second part, international 
sanctions and their impact on the Iranian economy and its petroleum industry will be 
reviewed.  
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3.2. Domestic Politics and the Impact on Politicisation of the Petroleum 
Industry  
The political discussion over challenges of Iranian oil and gas industry cannot only be 
confined to U.S. and international sanctions. Since the discovery of oil in the early 1900s, 
the petroleum industry has been chronically affected by domestic politicisation. The study 
of Iran’s petroleum history encompasses handful concession contracts in which exclusive 
privileges were given to foreign participants. The foreigners’ intervention in Iran’s 
interior affairs to secure cheap and easy access to country’s petroleum resources has been 
widely perceived as a violation of the nation’s sovereignty and aroused negative 
sentiments towards foreign companies’ involvement in the development of the industry. 
Hence, a careful analysis of the historical background of the Iranian oil industry is 
required to show how the fear of foreign exploitation of the country’s national wealth 
impacted the policy making processes and drove the industry towards a politically rather 
than a commercially-oriented sector.  
3.2.1. A Historical Overview of the Petroleum Sector’s Political Sensitivity 
A critical component of the Iranian petroleum industry is the earliest days of oil 
production in Iran, when a concession was concluded for exploration and development of 
Iranian oil resources which substantially favoured foreign interests. The history of Iran’s 
oil industry dates back to 1901, when Mozaffar-al-Din Shah of Qajar granted a 60-year 
oil extraction and production concession to a British speculator, William Knox D’Arcy in 
all areas of the country except the five northern provinces bordering Russia.
187
 The 
harshness of D’Arcy Concession’s provisions can be found in the contract’s most 
controversial article stating: 
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“The Government  of His Imperial Majesty the Shah grants to the concessionaire by these 
presents a special and exclusive privilege to search for, obtain, exploit, develop, render 
suitable for trade, carry away and sell natural gas, petroleum, asphalt and ozokerite
188
 
throughout the whole extent of the Persian Empire for a term of sixty years as from the 
date of the signing.”189  
The scope of the granted exploration and exploitation area is striking noting that the right 
is exclusive and effective for a 60-year period. Also, the number of exploitable 
commodities and resources is unprecedented comparing to current oil field development 
contracts which substantially cover smaller areas. The tax-free status was another 
controversial clause of the concession contract granted under Article 7 which stipulates: 
“All lands granted by this arrangement to the concessionaire, or that may be acquired by 
him in the manner provided in Articles 3 and 4 of these agreements, and also all products 
exported, shall be free of all custom duties and taxes during the term of concession. All 
material and apparatuses necessary for the exploration, working and development of the 
deposits, and for the construction and development of the pipelines, shall enter Persia 
free of all taxes and Custom House duties.” 
The tax-free status given to the Concession’s operations is remarkable, specially 
considering the amount of taxes that could have been injected into the economy from a 
technologically massive operation such as the exploitation of a new field. One could note, 
however, that the Persian Government  was to inherit all the equipment and structures 
build in the course of the operations; but considering the 60-year length of the concession, 
it would have been unlikely that the equipment could still be used to find viable oil 
deposits in the exploited area.
190
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In June 1901, just one month after the original concession was granted, the Shah issued a 
royal decree to be added to the original concession, “further developing the perception 
that due to foreign pressure, Persia was giving away its natural resources for free”: 
“Pursuant to the concession granted to Mr. William Knox D’Arcy, as a result of the 
particularly friendly relation which united powerful Great Britain and Persia, it is 
accorded and guaranteed to the Engineer William D’Arcy, and to all of his heirs and 
assigns and friend, full power and unlimited liberty for a period of 60 years, to probe, 
pierce and drill at their will the depths of Persian soil; in consequence of which, all the 
subsoil products wrought of him without exception will remain the property of D’Arcy. 
We declare that all the officials of this blessed Kingdom and our heirs and successors will 
do their best to help and assist the honourable D’Arcy, who enjoys the favour of our 
splendid court.”191 
The “flattering and ornate” language use in the addendum to the Concession proves the 
extent of British influence on the process of decision-making in Persia, particularly with 
regard to granted concessions.
192
 
After oil was discovered in 1908, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC)
193
 was 
established for the development of oil resources. It was a foreign company in which the 
British Government held 51 percent of the shares. 
194
The British Government had a strong 
influence over the company and made substantial tax revenue from the company’s 
operation to the extent that it was believed that Britain earned more money from Persian 
oil than Iran ever did.
195
 The British Government also had a strong grip of the company’s 
management as it had the right to appoint two directors on the managing board who 
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would have the power of veto on any issue in relation to British national interest.
196
 The 
British Government’s strong involvement in D’Arcy concession was predominantly due 
to the fact that the development of oilfields in Iran coincided with the decision of the 
British Admiralty to substitute coal with oil, as the means of fuelling their warships.  
The exploitive approach of the British Government and unfair clauses of the concession 
caused serious political disputes between the Iranian and British Governments. Reza 
Shah, who deposed the Qajari Shah in 1925, made it clear from the outset that Iran was 
no longer willing to give away its natural resources practically for free. To curtail the 
expansion of foreign influence and secure more profits for Iran, he called for 
renegotiation of the terms of the concession and announced in a public speech that “no 
more can Iran tolerate the enormous profits from its oil going into pockets of foreigners 
while at the same time being dispossessed of its oil wealth.”197  
Since then for over two decades, the Iranian Government, being aware of its rights and 
entitlement to a greater share of its own natural resources, continued expressing its 
dissatisfaction by urging renegotiation and modification of the terms of the concession 
contracts.  
Negotiations to secure better terms for Iran continued until 1931. During that year, Iran’s 
oil revenue plummeted dramatically and the blame for the fall of the revenue was 
attributed by the company to a global recession. Reza Shah was dissatisfied with the 
length of the negotiations and the continuous company excuses and issued an order to his 
ministers to annul the D’Arcy Concession.198 The British Government strongly 
condemned the annulment and filed a complaint in the League of Nations and sent several 
warships to the Persian Gulf. The Security Council did not issue any resolution on the 
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matter and advised the parties to seek a solution through negotiation, the result of which 
was the 1933 Concession.  
The most important provisions of the new concession were as follows:  
“The Government grants to the company, on the terms of this concession, the exclusive 
right, within the territory encompassed by the Concession, to look for and extract 
petroleum as well as to refine or treat in any other way and render suitable for commerce 
the petroleum obtained through this process.”199  
Additionally, permission to conduct various logistical operations has also been granted. 
“...the company is permitted to procure, without special license, all imports necessary for 
the exclusive needs of its employees, subject to the payment of the Custom duties and 
other duties and taxes in force at the time of importation...”200 
The effect of this contract was an alteration in the business procedure, namely instituting 
an annual royalty per each ton of petroleum sold, setting a minimum annual payment to 
the Government and obligating the foreign companies to pay 20 percent of dividends 
earned from distribution. The agreement also provided Iran with the right to investigate 
the oil company in certain areas, which was part of an effort to ensure that the previous 
difficulties with ensuring the fair distribution of profits would not reoccur.  
Notwithstanding the new favourable provisions, there were critics that the conditions 
were by no means fair to domestic interests.  Firstly, the company had the right to 
terminate the concession, whereas such the Iranian Government  had no such power; 
secondly the Government  remained uncompensated for the decreasing value of the 
pound sterling, attributable to the use of official gold prices rather than market gold 
prices, as used by the Company, in calculations of currency rates; thirdly, payments to the 
Government  were made after British Income Tax had been deducted;  and last but not 
least, the British Government  had unjustly limited the share of Iranian distributed 
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profits.
201
 The sale of petroleum at low prices to the British Navy and British Air Forces 
was also seen by many as prejudicial, as it lowered the company’s distributable profits 
shared by Iran. Further, the company often dodged custom duties and charges having 
equivalent effect on several imported commodities. Tax was not levied on the allied 
forces, amounting to losses for the Iranian Government of up to US$18 million
202
. The 
conditions of employment of Iranian workers were poor, and unions were banned. For all 
these reasons, Iranians held a substantial grudge against the concession, and the company, 
in particular.
203
    
An equally important historical event which added to Iran’s petroleum sector sensitivity 
was the country’s occupation by allied forces during the World War II.204 The War 
proved the significance of secure access to oil, as the allied air forces operating in the Far 
East, Europe and Middle East were highly dependent on the Abadan refinery for fuel. 
Hence, the war brought allied powers to the country to defend the Persian oilfields from a 
possible German takeover, among other reasons.
205
 Following this invasion, Reza Shah, 
who had connections to Axis interest, abdicated and his son Mohammad Reza Shah took 
his father’s position and adopted a pro-Allies policy. 
After World War II, the preceding events, particularly the mounting political competition 
between global powers to acquire a larger share of Iranian oil resources and the 
resentment among the Iranians caused by the occupation of their homeland and 
opposition to the terms of the concession, gradually built up and culminated in the 
nationalisation of the oil industry in March 1951.
206
 This was also coupled with “the 
disappointing experience of attempting to renegotiate contracts perceived by the domestic 
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public and the authorities as being unbalanced, only to be contractually bound as the 
result of foreign pressure, to further unfair terms.”207 As a result, a radical transformation 
occurred in the 1950, changing the landscape of the Iranian oil industry. The 1951 
Nationalisation did not occur in a historical vacuum, but instead was a logical progression 
of outside forces intervening in Iran’s political and economic development.208 The 
movement behind the nationalisation of the oil industry was greatly strengthened by Dr. 
Mohammad Mussadeq, the Iranian popular Prime Minister, who had strongly proclaimed 
that “nationalisation of oil would abolish poverty in Iran at one stroke.”209 The 
Government’s initiative to nationalise the oil industry received strong support from the 
Parliament, passing a proposal to take over all the installations of ‘the late Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company’ without compensation immediately. The single-article bill enacted by the 
Parliament in 1951 stipulates:  
“For the happiness and prosperity of the Iranian nation and for the purpose of securing 
world peace, it is hereby resolved that the oil industry through all part of the country, 
without exception, be nationalised, that is to say, all operation of exploration, extraction 
and exploitation shall be carried out by the Government”210 
The first immediate consequence of nationalisation was a worldwide embargo on the 
purchase of the Iranian oil, the freezing of Iran’s sterling assets and banning export of 
goods to the country.
211
 The company and British Government were of the opinion that 
nationalisation of the oil industry was unlawful, and appealed to the International Court 
of Justice, “declaring that it would protect British property and assets in Iran.”212 The 
Court issued an order for the protection of both parties’ respective rights, to be taken by 
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interim measures.
213
 The Iranian Government refused to accept the Court’s jurisdiction, 
causing Britain to initiate measures compelling Iran to respect the Court’s order for 
interim measures. Mussadegh represented Iran himself at the Court, arguing that 
nationalisation of the oil industry, being a purely domestic matter, was out of the Court’s 
jurisdiction, or that of any foreign state. After the hearings, the Court reached the ruling 
that the Court’s jurisdiction was limited to treaties and conventions only, and that the 
1933 Agreement was a concessionary contract to which the British Government was not 
party, and that accordingly, the Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter 
referred to it by the British Government in 1951.
214
 
The oil embargo and pending deficits accumulated throughout the earlier years led to an 
economic crisis, resulting from the loss of foreign exchange and oil revenues. The 
deteriorating economic conditions triggered a move against the reform-minded Mussadeq 
Government which drove initiatives to abolish the Parliament and depose the Shah.
215
 
However, as the British were seeking to undermine Mussadegh’s Government and 
replace it with one that would be more receptive to their oil interest, the so-called 1953 
coup d’ etat planned by the British MI6 and backed by the U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency (Operation Boot) caused the fall of the Mussadeq Government and created an 
international oil consortium in Iran in 1954, where American companies were the leading 
partners.
216
 The nationalisation of the oil industry which was initiated to demonstrate a 
nation’s practice of self-determination led to a situation in which national sovereignty 
was undermined. The overthrow of the first democratically elected Government has left 
deep sentiments throughout the country, and significantly changed the way Iranians 
viewed the western world. Therefore, it can be argued that the current suspicions 
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regarding the outcome of foreign investment in the petroleum industry is 
“understandable”.217 
In the 1960s, Iran and the consortium planned to substantially develop Iran’s petroleum 
sector and to increase oil production to 8 million bbl/d by the late 1970s, and construction 
of the required infrastructure to reach such a target was well under way. In the early 
1970s, Iran began to accumulate capital from oil rent at an accelerated pace and 
developed an awareness of its own economic potential.
218
 In 1973, being aware of 
shortcomings of the 1954 Agreement in which, according to the Shah, Iran’s long-term 
interests were not preserved, he gave an ultimatum to the oil consortium that unless a new 
arrangement was agreed upon, Iran would not extend the Agreement beyond 1979 and 
that the consortium members would then be treated as ordinary buyers of Iranian oil. The 
vastly complex and thriving petroleum industry resulting from western companies’ 
participation had significant influence almost on every aspect of the Iranian economy and 
society, and any loss or damage to the system would have profound consequences.
219
 The 
capitulation of the Shah to foreign interests sowed the seeds for the Revolution, which “it 
is almost reasonable to assume could have been avoided had the oil interests of the British 
Government, who were exercising an almost colonial rule over Iran, not been the first 
concern of their Foreign Office.”220   
The Islamic Revolution and the fall of the Shah to a large extent also reinforced the 
sensitivity of the petroleum sector. The Iranian transformation unleashed an Islamic 
fundamentalist Revolution that had an immediate and significant impact within the region 
and the foreign policies of western countries, particularly, the U.S.
221
 Following the 
                                                          
217
 Kakhki, M.Hedayati. "A Critical Analysis of Iranian Buy-Back Transactions in the Context of 
International Petroleum Contractual Systems." May 2008, p.114 
218
 Ehteshami, A., "The Foreign Policy of Iran." In The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 
edited by Lynne Rienner: Boulder & Co, 2002, p.286 
219
 Nadimi, F. "The Role of Oil in the Outcome of the Iran-Iraq War" In The Iran-Iraq War: New 
International Perspectives, 2013, p.79 
220
 Kakhki, M.Hedayati. "A Critical Analysis of Iranian Buy-Back Transactions in the Context of 
International Petroleum Contractual Systems." May 2008, p.114 
221
 Randall, S.J. United States Foreign Oil Policy since World War I: For Profits and Security: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005, p. 295 
84 
 
Revolution, NIOC annulled all Iranian petroleum contracts concluded with foreign firms 
before the Revolution, promoting the idea of preserving natural resources for future 
generations and preventing sales of national wealth at compromised prices to Westerners. 
As part of this policy, it was decided to lower the oil production rate and cancel gas 
export contracts. As a result, Iran was subjected to costly and prolonged litigation over 
the cancellation damages.
222
 The U.S. Embassy crisis in Tehran also accelerated the 
departure of major oil companies from the Iranian oil sector. In order to avoid further 
interruption in the flow of oil, Iranian officials took over the fields, as they were 
sufficiently experienced to conduct such operations on their own.  
The initiative for independent development of the petroleum resources was hard hit by the 
start of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980. Since discovery of huge petroleum 
resources, the Persian Gulf region has always been considered a strategic location, and 
superpowers tend to claim it as their sphere of influence and their right to interfere 
whenever they felt their interests were threatened.
223
 Iran, a revolutionary state, rejected 
this hegemonic attitude and opposed such interference. The country’s foreign policy after 
the Islamic Revolution has been based on rejection of all forms of foreign domination and 
preservation of the independence of the country from foreign intervention.
224
 In the 
context of the Islamic Republic’s guiding principles of maintaining territorial and Muslim 
integrity and independence, the West in general and the U.S. in particular, have been 
considered as “enemies of Islam and Iran”.225 Hence, as a measure to combat Iran’s anti-
western policy, the U.S. indirectly supported the Iraqi Government’s war against Iran 
which heavily targeted Iran’s most vital sector, i.e. the hydrocarbon sector.  
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The entire Iranian economy was highly dependent on export of the crude oil.
226
 As a 
result, Iraqi military planners favoured targeting oil and gas facilities, whether production 
and processing, refining, transportation, import/export and distribution networks.
227
 By 
the start of the war, oil, petrochemical and gas infrastructure became the target for heavy 
Iraqi air and ground attacks. The destruction of the important Abadan refinery in 1980 
(which produced an average of 628,000 bbl/d of refined oil product), the bombing of 
refineries and shuttle tankers, and the continued embargo on purchases of Iranian oil by 
Japan, the U.S., and major European countries contributed to the crisis. The Iraqi 
initiative of interrupting Iran’s oil export supply first took place in February 1984, when 
Iraq attacked tankers shuttling between Khark and Sirri islands. Within a short period, 
Iranian production dropped from an average 1.8 million bbl/d to 350,000 bbl/d, 
representing a drop of roughly one sixth of total OPEC production.
228
 Since then, heavy 
damages to refineries and pipelines, factories, and industrial sites limited oil production to 
the point where in November 1987, Iranian oil exports were estimated at 1 million bbl/d 
down from an estimated 1.9 million bbl/d in the previous month.
229
  
After the war, Iran was left in a “serious and multifaceted” crisis: negative economic 
growth, high unemployment, low productivity and underutilisation of capacity as well as 
shortages of investment capital and high import dependency.
230
 In the absence of foreign 
investment and other immediately available and accessible resources, Iran’s economic 
difficulties reinforced the country’s dependence on oil and the need to generate 
investment capital, technology and industrial expertise from the West.
231
 During the post-
war reconstruction period, President Rafsanjani took a moderate path and encouraged 
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attraction of foreign investment and stronger economic relations with the West. The 
policy, however, encountered the Clinton Administration’s economic sanctions policy, 
targeting Iran’s most vital sector of the economy, namely the oil and gas sector. Being 
aware of Iran’s extensive dependence on oil and gas revenues, the U.S and later in the 
mid 2000s, European countries tightened their economic pressures on Iran, bringing 
under sanctions sales of Iranian oil and gas and any investment activities for the 
development its petroleum sector. Taking advantage of Iran’s dependence on its 
hydrocarbon sector and imposing sanctions with the aim of weakening the country’s 
economy as a political tool has been interpreted as an ‘indirect’ intervention of western 
states in the country’s interior affairs, reaffirming the sensitivity of the petroleum 
industry. 
3.2.2. Politicisation: A Consequence of the Petroleum Sector’s Sensitivity  
The direct and indirect foreign interference in the petroleum sector which caused 
nationalisation, de facto denationalisation, re-nationalisation, revolution and a major war, 
caused tremendous lack of trust both within the Shah’s and post-revolution eras.232 Before 
the Revolution, NIOC was established to end the Iranian oil contracts signed with foreign 
companies, in order to reduce the significance of foreign players in Iran’s oil industry.233  
NIOC was only a business-oriented company and did not directly engage in foreign 
political activities and diplomacy-related policies and decisions.
234
 The industry’s policies 
and the politics affecting it were entirely in the hands of the Shah, who personally 
“handled most major foreign and international issues relating to Iran’s oil diplomacy, 
from decisions in OPEC to relations with foreign companies and Governments.”235 With 
the overthrow of the Shah and coming into power of an ideologically anti-western, 
revolutionary regime, the politicisation of the industry intensified dramatically. There 
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were criticisms that the Shah’s extensive reliance on foreign powers had led to cheap 
sales of Iran’ national wealth to western companies. Hence during the Revolution, 
national distribution of the Iranian oil and gas was central to the revolutionary motto 
based on which Ayatoullah Khomeini, the Revolution’s leader, promised the nation that, 
upon success of the Revolution, he “will bring the oil money to families’ dinner 
tables.”236  
Initially started by a direct order of Ayatoullah Khomeini cancelling all oil and gas 
development contracts concluded with foreign companies, the politicisation process 
extended to establishment of the Ministry of Petroleum which its management team was 
directly elected by the Government among political figures and was strictly supervised by 
the Iranian Parliament, Majlis. 237 The Ministry of Petroleum was founded not only to 
enable Petroleum Minister to attend the OPEC Ministerial Conferences, but also “to 
establish a routine and more active presence of the hydrocarbon sector in the Cabinet and 
the country’s political scene.”238 Lack of trust resulting from chronic fear of foreign 
intervention, has caused multiple domestic political interventions in the petroleum 
industry. As a result, identification of the decision-making body in the Iranian petroleum 
sector is not easy, as there are many organs claiming the final say over the industry. This 
includes  the President, Ministry of Petroleum, Ministry of Energy, the Parliament, the 
Expediency Council,
239
 the Council of Guardians
240
 as well as NIOC, NIGC and last but 
not least NIGEC.
241
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NIOC, as the sole executive body in charge of the development of Iranian petroleum 
resources, originally designed to be purely commercial, is highly influenced by its major 
shareholder, namely the Iranian Government  through the Ministry of Petroleum, which 
plays an extensive role in its policy making process.242 As a result, “decisions tend to be 
influenced by political wills, and possibly to the detriment of commercial 
considerations.”243 The appointment of four petroleum ministers during the 
Ahmadinejad administration is an example of how political will overrules long-term 
commercial interests in Iran’s petroleum sector, in addition to causing serious 
reputational damage to the industry.  
Other organs, such as the Parliament and Council of Guardians, also play their own 
legislative and supervisory roles over petroleum industry. They often exert their influence 
through opposing the implementation of oil and gas development contracts, or accusing 
the authorities involved in negotiations of investment contracts of corruption, or refusing 
to ratify investment bills presented by the Government in the basis of their inconsistency 
with national interests or the provisions of the Constitution. Additionally, the national 
petroleum companies’ budgets, once approved by the Ministry of Petroleum, must be 
approved by the Ministry of Planning and the Parliament; and once the Parliament gets 
involved, the Council of Guardians also intervene as it has the right to question the 
budget -- as a legislation of the Parliament -- and to check whether it is consistent with 
the Constitution and Shari’a law.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
240
 Twelve jurists comprise the Council of Guardians, six of whom are appointed by the Supreme 
Leader. The head of the judiciary recommends the remaining six, which are officially appointed by 
the Parliament. The Council of Guardians is vested with the authority to interpret the Constitution 
and determines if the laws passed by the Parliament are compatible with Shari’a (Islamic law). 
Hence the council can exercise veto power over Parliament. If a law passed by the Parliament is 
deemed incompatible with the Constitution or Shari’a, it is referred back to the Parliament for 
revision”. 
241
 Naficy, H. "Resource Depletion, Dependence and Development- Country Commentary Iran.", 
2008 
242 Marcel, V., Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2006 
243 ibid 
89 
 
In the policy implementation stage, the same problem of parallel exertion of power has 
caused confusion over the executive body in the oil and gas industry.
244
 The Ministry of 
Petroleum which, for instance, should be the policy maker of the hydrocarbon sector, is 
still “involved with the day-to-day running of this sector, making it commercially 
ineffective and highly political.”245 The Ministry has also failed to prepare and adopt a 
coherent long-term strategic vision and action plan for its energy sector and its natural gas 
sector in particular.  
There are also three national companies, i.e. NIOC, NIGC and NIGEC each handling 
extensive overlapping responsibilities. While NIOC is in charge of all oil and gas 
resources exploration, exploitation and development activities (upstream), NIGC is 
responsible for domestic transmission, distribution and sales of natural gas (downstream). 
The situation became even more complex when in 2003 NIGEC was established to 
handle natural gas export projects (see Section 2.4). The confusion mostly arises when 
stakeholders are required to deal with responsibilities that are spread throughout different 
companies. This is particularly challenging in gas export projects where NIGEC is 
responsible for provision of research, studies and planning, NIOC’s International Affairs 
Division is in charge of negotiations and NIGC is responsible for downstream operational 
and technical activities.
246
 Dealing with this triangular structure, IOCs often complained 
about confusion over which body they should approach for different stages of 
development projects. Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 2, in July 2012, NIOC 
dissolved NIGEC as one of its subsidiaries, not surprisingly, for political reasons.
247
 
There were reportedly concerns among the NIOC officials over a prospective 
amalgamation of NIGC and NIGEC which were suspected might reduce NIOC’s power 
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and influence over the natural gas sector. Hence, in a pre-emptive strike, NIOC 
announced the dissolution of NIGEC, a decision which reaffirmed the influence of 
political considerations rather than commercial matters in decision-making processes in 
the Iranian petroleum industry.
248
  
The anti-western dominance policy has also been reflected in the Iranian revolutionary 
Constitution, prohibiting any foreign entities’ (individual or companies) participation in 
the oil and gas sector.
249
  A few years after the Iran-Iraq war when the country was 
extensively in need of capital for the reconstruction and development of its petroleum 
sector, the Parliament approved opening of Iran’s industry to foreign investment, using 
the buyback formula. Despite taking a more moderate stance towards foreign 
participation in the petroleum industry, fears of outside intervention manifested in 
adopting the buy-back contractual regime which according to some commentators 
maintained the country’s harsh attitude towards foreign investors. 
The Iranian negotiating behaviour has also been highly affected by the fear of being 
exploited or deceived by foreign partners or concerns over being accused of 
compromising national interests.
250
 Some international executives that have negotiated 
with Iran say that Iran insists on deals that leave little profit and that the country 
frequently seeks to renegotiate provisions of a contract after it is ratified.
251
 Some sources 
even believe the impact of domestic political factors on the industry is as destructive as 
international sanctions. The U.S. administrations have reportedly claimed that even 
without actually imposing sanctions on Iran, the mere threat of imposing sanctions 
coupled with “Iran’s reputedly difficult negotiating behaviour have combined to slow the 
development of Iran’s energy sector.”252  
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The politicised mind-set over development of the petroleum sector has also affected the 
management structure of the industry. After the Revolution, almost the entire cadre of 
senior and mid-level management of the industry were either “expelled, forced into exile 
or were given early retirement” for the fear of their ideological attachment to the 
monarchy regime and consequently being potential interested to have interactions with 
western countries.
253
 The new appointees have been mostly chosen on the basis of 
political considerations; in other words, Islamic and revolutionary credentials were given 
greater priority over technical competence and work experience.
254
 As a result, any 
fundamental changes in the management of the industry would face fierce resistance both 
from within the industry and more generally from the various political bodies. 
Constant intervention from different segments of power and attempts to accommodate 
their different views on the petroleum industry has also prevented the country from 
designing and implementing a comprehensive energy resource development plan which is 
undoubtedly necessary for a country like Iran with huge energy resources.
255
 The 
disagreement between politicians is particularly intense in the natural gas sector where 
there have been prolonged debates over giving priority to gas export projects, or its 
allocation to domestic markets.
256. While during Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005), gas 
export projects were pursued more actively, during the Ahmadinejad administration there 
was explicit reluctance to allow such projects to proceed. Not surprisingly, frequently 
changing policies towards the natural gas sector have, for example, resulted in the 
notoriously unstable gas export contract with Turkey which not only led to numerous 
rows over the price and delivery but also reputational damages (see Section 2.9.1.1). 
Unstable policies also affected secure and sufficient supply of gas to the domestic market 
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particularly for oilfield re-injection, negatively impacting the country’s oil production and 
revenue (see Section 6.3.2). 
Politicisation has also restricted the flow of information between the industry and 
Government’s planning authorities on one hand and research and academic institutions on 
the other.
257
 The tendency to consider all information about the oil and gas industry as 
secret, stems from the same political concerns over foreign dominance when the real oil 
data were kept away from producing countries during the concession period.
258
 Treating 
the industry’s information and contracts as extremely confidential has created a growing 
institutional corruption, a good example of which is the controversial Crescent gas deal 
which, in addition to disputes over the pricing mechanism and political conflicts between 
Iran and the UAE, failed as a result of severe opposition from members of the Parliament, 
accusing the Government’s authorities of taking bribes for conclusion of the export deal. 
Another startling case of corruption allegations at the exploration-production award phase 
involved the Norwegian national oil company, Statoil, which is said to have paid 
“substantial consultancy fee” to Iranian officials to assist Statoil in obtaining contracts to 
develop phase 3 of the South Pars and open doors for additional projects in the Iranian oil 
and gas exploration industry.
259
 Additionally, international sanctions and active presence 
of public commercial entities which have been fully supported by the regime, particularly 
during the Ahmadinejad administration, have substantially intensified institutional 
corruption as there were justifications for suppression of any public inquiry and 
investigation, in the light of country’s critical economic and political conditions. Limited 
channels of trade as a result of international sanctions have also assisted Iranian political 
hardliners to attain a tighter grip on Iran’s economy. The sanctions and resulting 
economic difficulties have helped politicians to use sanctions as an excuse for domestic 
economic mismanagement. More effectively, this has brought about justifications for 
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extensive involvement of public and Governmental institutions in the country’s trade and 
economic activities, and expulsion of the private sector from major development projects. 
Without any supervisory body to monitor the activities of these giant public commercial-
military entities, most notably the commercial arm of the revolutionary guard, Khatam-al-
Anbiya Base, and in the light of wide-spread administrative corruption, little room has 
remained for establishment and growth of private enterprise.
260
  
3.3. International Sanctions against Iran  
Since the mid 1990s, the Iranian petroleum industry has been subject to extensive unilateral, 
multilateral and international sanctions. Initiated by the U.S. Government in 1996, sanctions 
were broadened later on both in terms of their coverage and international support, aiming at 
forcing the Iranian Government to change its allegedly hostile foreign policies and halt the 
development of its nuclear program. 
3.3.1. The United States’ Unilateral Sanctions  
In the decades since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the U.S. has tried to isolate Iran 
diplomatically, militarily and economically, relying on wide-ranging unilateral sanctions. 
After the overthrow of the Shah, U.S.- Iranian relations deteriorated sharply following the 
1979-80 Tehran hostage crisis in which 52 U.S. diplomats were held hostage for 444 days 
by a group of Islamist students.
261
 To punish Tehran and to force it to change its hostile 
policies, President Carter administration imposed the first series of economic sanctions 
against the country.
262 
Even after the hostage crisis, the U.S. Government did not hesitate 
to deploy the same punitive measures against Iran “to alter what it regarded as the 
unacceptable political and military behaviour of Iran.”263  
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Since its inception as an anti-hegemonic regime, the Iranian Government has persistently 
challenged US foreign policies in the Middle East region. For the U.S. Government 
maintaining its domination in the Persian Gulf region has been of strategic importance 
due to the region’s massive oil and gas resources. Hence, sanctions have been 
predominantly deployed by the U.S. Government as a means to promote its foreign policy 
objectives. During the Reagan administration, sanctions continued to blacklist Iran from 
receiving arms under the U.S. Arms Export Control Act
264
 and to prohibit imports of 
Iranian crude oil and all other Iranian imports to U.S. markets.
265
 U.S. unilateral sanctions 
were further expanded by the Clinton administration where two Executive Orders banned 
all U.S. firms’ participation in the development of the Iranian petroleum sector, and 
broadened the scope of sanctions to encompass a total trade and investment embargo on 
the country.
266
 Sanctions, however, did not prevent European and Asian companies from 
filling the gap left by U.S. companies in the petroleum sector. The resulting ‘loop hole’ 
which notably undermined the effectiveness of the U.S. unilateral sanctions, caused the 
U.S. Congress to expand the coverage of sanctions to include foreign companies 
investing in Iran’s energy sector.267 The forthcoming section reviews major and most 
effective U.S. sanctions against Iran.  
3.3.1.1. The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) 
When Iran opened its petroleum sector to foreign investment in 1995, the Iran Sanctions 
Act (ISA) was introduced by the U.S. Government as the core of its sanctions, targeting 
and threatening foreign firms investing in Iran’s energy sector.268 ISA followed an earlier 
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March 1995 Executive Order, barring U.S. companies’ investment in the Iranian energy 
industry. The Act originated from ‘Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act’, proposed by Senator 
Alfonse D’Amato in 1995 to sanction foreign firms’ export to Iran of energy 
technology.
269
 A revised version instead passed the Senate in December 1995 sanctioning 
investment in Iran’s energy sector.270. Being aware of Iran’s needs for attracting 
substantial foreign investments for the development of its old oilfields and the already 
under-developed natural gas sector, the Act was designed to prohibit foreign entities 
(companies and individuals) from investing more than US$20 million in one year in 
Iran’s energy sector. The non-compliance of the legislations entailed drastic financial 
penalties for violating companies.
271
 The definition of ‘investment’ in ISA includes not 
only equity and royalty arrangement, but also any contract that includes responsibility for 
the development of the Iranian petroleum sector.
272
    
In the late 1990s, ISA was heavily criticised for its ‘extra-territorial’ characteristics, 
authorising U.S. penalties against foreign firms incorporated outside U.S. territory.
273
 The 
EU, for example, opposed ISA when it was first enacted and threatened to file a formal 
complaint against the U.S. Government before the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
However, in April 1997, the U.S. and EU agreed to avoid a trade confrontation over ISA, 
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with the EU committing not to file any complaint with the WTO and the Clinton 
administration waiving sanctions on the first project which was determined to be in 
violation of the Act’s provisions, namely Total SA, Gazprom and Petronas consortium to 
develop phases 2 and 3 of the South Pars gas field.  
In the early 2000s and during the George W. Bush administration, sanctions were eased 
mostly as a result of the U.S. policy to support the reformist Government of Mohammad 
Khatami, a moderate cleric, who had promised to implement political and economic 
reforms in Iran.
274
 Foreign policy under Khatami was mainly focused on reintegrating 
Iran into the international system and enhancing the country’s global economic position 
through the expansion of trade and diplomatic dialogue.
275
 Khatami succeeded in 
improving relations with the EU, while benefiting from the US-EU compromise on the 
U.S. extraterritorial sanctions and growing opposition in the U.S. oil industry. Within its 
limits, the Khatami administration promoted foreign investment and economic reform as 
a solution to further economic development. 
However coming to power of President Ahmadinejad had dramatic political and 
economic implications for Iran. His foreign policy has been based on finding and creating 
external threats, which have helped him rally support.
276
 Fiery rhetoric and the 
development of the nuclear program helped to increase the dependency of Iranian society 
on the state due to the greater isolation and the tightening sanctions against Iran, which in 
turn reinforced the Government’s position. As Duero argues, Ahmadinejad “actively 
pursued a hardline, conservative foreign policy in order to increase Iran’s international 
isolation as well as to raw threats from the U.S. and Israel to unify the domestic 
population against a common cause and deflect their attention away from internal 
economic and social problems. If the rising global demand for oil and gas and the 
increasingly confrontational Iranian nuclear issue is an indication, the theocratic regime 
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in Tehran for the conceivable future can only be strengthened in light of the international 
community’s short-sighted policy of isolation and containment.”277 Thus, the more 
Ahmadinejad administration, through its foreign policy deteriorates the country’s 
relations with the international community, the more it can gain control over the 
petroleum sector and have access to the rentier system. As such, and with the support of 
the Revolutionary Guard and the parallel structures and security apparatus, Ahmadinejad 
had the “necessary capacity to suppress internal unrest or to appease the masses.”278 Not 
surprisingly, his foreign policy created mounting international pressure on the country, 
leading to the imposition of further stringent sanctions on the country. 
3.3.1.2. The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act 
(CISADA) 
Ahmadinejad’s hostile foreign policy and further progress in the development of nuclear 
capabilities made the Obama administration and the U.S. Congress increase the scope of 
U.S. unilateral sanctions. Administered by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC), the Congress passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability 
and Divestment Act (CISADA) in 2010, expanding the authorities of ISA to deter sales 
by foreign companies of gasoline to Iran. It also makes sanctionable: 
- sales to Iran of over US$1 million worth (or US$5 million in a one year period) of 
gasoline and related aviation and other fuels and; 
- sales to Iran of equipments or services (same dollar threshold as above) which 
would help Iran produce or import gasoline (including sales of equipment and services 
that Iran can use to construct or maintain its oil refineries).
279
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CISADA also amends the definition of investment in ISA to include pipelines to or 
through Iran and contracts to construct, upgrade, or expansion of energy projects.
280
 The 
Act also stipulates that sanctions’ provisions are applicable from the beginning of 
pipeline construction, and not from the start of oil or gas flow through a finished 
project.
281
 Furthermore, it eliminates exemptions from sanctions the sales of energy 
related equipments as it has structured such sales to be “investments or on-going profit-
earning ventures rather than simple sales transitions.”282  
3.3.1.3. The Executive Order 13590 
 In November 2011, following a report from the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) indicating that Iran might have worked on nuclear explosive technology, the U.S. 
Government  issued the Executive Order 13590 which expanded the authorities of ISA to 
impose at least one of the available ISA sanctions on foreign firms that: 
- provide to Iran US$1 million or more (or US$5 million in a one year period) worth 
of goods or services that Iran could use to maintain or enhance its oil and gas sector;
283
 
- provide to Iran US$250,000 (or US$1 million in a one year period) worth of goods 
or services that Iran could use to maintain or expand its production of petrochemical 
products.
284
 
To increase the pressure on Iran, the U.S. Department of the Treasury further 
strengthened sanctions regulations in February 2012 and expanded their provisions to 
“foreign financial institutions that knowingly conduct or facilitate certain significant 
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financial transactions with the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) or a U.S.-designated Iranian 
financial institution.”285   
3.3.2. The United Nations Sanctions 
Iran’s failure to cooperate with the international community over its nuclear programme 
made the IAEA refer its case to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2006.  
Since then, the UN has passed seven resolutions on Iran, four of which have imposed 
sanctions.
286
 The UN sanctions on Iran do not place restrictions on the country’s energy 
industry but mostly focus on prohibition of provision of sensitive and dual purpose 
technologies which can possibly be utilised in its nuclear activities.  
The first round of the UN sanctions imposed in 2006 included freezing the financial 
assets and other economic resources of individual and entities designated by the UNSC as 
having ties with Iran’s nuclear programme.287 In March 2007, the UNSC passed more 
sanctions banning arms export from Iran, restraining member states from sales to Iran of 
certain categories of heavy conventional arms and expanding the list of individual and 
entities subject to asset freeze requirements. 
288
 The third round of the UN sanctions came 
into force in 2008 strengthening travel and financial restrictions on designated Iranian 
individual and companies. To further add to the pressures against Iran, the last round of 
UN sanctions was implemented in 2010 imposing a complete arms embargo on Iran, 
banning the country from any activities related to ballistic missiles and targeting the 
assets of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping 
Lines.
289
  
Applicability of UN decisions to all its member states has made these so-called 
‘international sanctions’, as opposed to U.S. unilateral sanctions legally less controversial 
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and practically more effective.
290
 In other words, UN sanctions brought about a consensus 
among the international community over potential security threats from Iran’s nuclear 
programme. The UN member states’ commitments to comply with the Security Council’s 
resolutions were unified to undertake concrete measures in confining Iran’s access to any 
resources, indirectly including revenues gained from the sale of its oil and gas resources 
to hinder the country’s ability to fund its acquisition of prohibited items and terrorism-
related activities.  Thus, UN sanctions have indirectly enhanced the international 
acceptance and credibility of U.S. sanctions and provided leverage to increase pressures 
on Iran.
291
  
3.3.3. The European Union Sanctions 
Being concerned about the implications of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the EU took the first 
steps in July 2010 to impose sanctions on Iran, which exceeded those mandated under the 
Security Council resolutions.
292
 EU sanctions include a comprehensive package of 
restrictive measures in areas of trade, financial services, energy, transport as well as 
additional designations for visa ban and asset freeze.
293
 The EU, however, made it clear 
that these sanctions did not then prohibit importation of Iranian oil and gas, nor did they 
ban exports of gasoline to Iran.
294
  
However, a year and a half later, in December 2011, following the failure in nuclear 
negotiations with Iran, and the orchestrated attack to the British Embassy in Tehran in 
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November of the same year, the EU announced tighter sanctions on Iran.
295
 An initiative 
led by France and Britain, the EU embargo prohibits the purchase, transport, and import 
of the Iranian crude oil, the export of major equipments and technologies used by the oil 
sector, as well as related financial deals including banning insurance for shipping oil and 
petrochemicals from Iran.
296
 To minimise the impact on those European countries with 
most reliance on Iran’s crude oil, the EU allowed the contracts which already existed to 
continue until 1
st
 of July 2012 as there were concerns over the impact of sanctions on oil 
prices and the economic crisis in some European countries.
297
 Additionally, the new EU 
round of sanctions covers freezing the assets of the Iran’s Central Bank in Europe, and 
bans the trade of gold and other materials between European states and the Iranian 
Central Bank, causing dramatic volatility in Iran’s foreign exchange market.298 In October 
2012, EU member states approved one of the toughest sets of sanctions yet on Iran, 
banning import of Iranian natural gas into Europe and prohibiting financial transactions 
between the European and Iranian Banks. These sanctions are reportedly direct response 
to Iran’s continued refusal to take effective steps to address international community’s 
concerns over its nuclear programme. 
3.4. The Impact of Sanctions on Iran 
The exact impact of sanctions on Iran’s economy is neither clear nor being ever 
thoroughly assessed by any U.S. or international organisations;
299
 hence, it is very 
difficult to draw a clear line over their actual impact on different segments of Iran’s 
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economy. But it is clear that sanctions have slowed down the development of Iran’s oil 
and gas resources and the maintenance of, or increase in, its production and export 
capacity.
300
  
The overall effects of sanctions on Iran vary depending on the timing of their imposition. 
In the period between 1995 and 2007 when sanctions were imposed unilaterally by the 
U.S., their impact remained manageable as there were always alternatives for the Iranian 
Government to take recourse to for development of its economy. Iran’s global trade ties 
and leading role in energy production made it difficult for the U.S. to isolate Iran. This 
period also coincided with rising oil prices which provided the Government with 
immense exchange revenue, minimising to a large extent the adverse impact of sanctions.  
It was in the second period, namely from 2007 onwards, that sanctions began to bite when 
the international efforts triggered by the UN and EU sanctions intensified international 
trade and investment restrictions on Iran.
301
  
3.4.1. Overall Economic Effects 
The first immediate impact of sanctions was that they curtailed Iran’s access to 
international financial institutions and state-of-art technologies which were badly needed 
for development of oil and gas resources.  A chronic impact of sanctions since their 
inception was the effect it placed on the country’s oil production capacity. Lack of 
adequate investment and modern technologies delayed or made impossible the 
maintenance of oil production, though these effects were to some extent offset by higher 
oil prices and discovery of new reserves. Rising oil prices since 2006 gave Iran enormous 
economic and political leverage and cushioned the extent to which its economy has been 
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affected by international sanctions.
302
 But increasing concerns over the reduction of the 
country’s oil production capacity remained. In 2008, a report published by the Parliament 
Research Centre showed that Iran’s oil production capacity has been experiencing an 
annual decline rate of 6-8 percent which within a 10-year prospect could dramatically 
reduce country’s production and export capacity with a drastic impact on its oil 
revenue.
303
  
In the international trade domain, sanctions made Iran strategically change its trading 
patterns and re-align them to available partners with whom it could sustain its trade and 
investment relations. In the period between 1995 and 2007, when Iran actively negotiated 
and concluded major investment deals with European and Asian partners, losses incurred 
by the Iranian economy as a result of sanctions were mostly manifested in higher prices 
that the country was forced to pay for the involvement of foreign investors in country’s 
major projects. Limited access to the international banking, shipping, and insurance 
systems added to operational and investment costs in Iran. Had sanctions not been in 
place, Iran would have been able to attract investments with greater success and security 
and more importantly, on better terms.
304
  
Unprecedented sanctions imposed in late 2011 and early 2012, led by the EU and 
followed by the U.S., targeted key sectors of the Iranian economy, i.e. Iran’s oil sales and 
Central Bank transactions, had a substantial impact on inflation rates and the stability of 
the foreign exchange market.
305 
 
Contradictory reports have been released as to the actual rate of inflation since the 
imposition of the new round of sanctions. Based on monthly reports from the Central 
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Bank of Iran, in the period between April and December 2011, the inflation rate 
fluctuated between 20 percent and 22 percent. But, in January 2012, immediately after 
imposition of the new round international sanctions, the growing rate of inflation 
accelerated, reaching 23.9 percent in April 2012.
306
 Restraining from releasing data on 
inflation in May and June 2012, the Central Bank announced inflation rates of 22.9 
percent and 23.5 percent in July and August 2012, respectively.
307
 This researcher’s field 
studies, however, showed an average inflation rate of 63 percent,
308
 almost compatible 
with the result of a report released by the Research Centre of the Parliament predicting an 
inflation rate of 60 percent.
309
 A major concern over the rising inflation rate is its impact 
on deteriorating the value of the national currency reducing the ability of the population 
to cope with rising prices of staple commodities.
310
  
The inflation rate has also been affected by the subsidies reform plan (see Section 5.4). 
The national cash payments as a compensatory measure, and the rise in energy prices 
escalated the market liquidity and rising production costs which consequently affected the 
unemployment rate and nation’s purchasing power, causing widespread economic 
insecurity. Interestingly, the implementation of the long-desired subsidies reform 
programme was partly encouraged as a result of sanctions, as they have had a “silver 
lining” in determining the Government to launch the plan.311 Hoping that the subsidies 
reform would counteract the impact of sanctions, President Ahmadinejad managed to 
                                                          
306
 Central Bank of Iran, April 2012 
307
 Central Bank of Iran, July & August 2012 
308
 The field study was conducted in Tehran for a two-month period between May to June 2012. 
Average price increase for some staple foods, comparing to the same period in the last years, was 
52 percent increase for meat, 65 percent for chicken, 81 percent for dairy products, 83 percent for 
vegetables and 67 percent for eggs.  
309
 Iranian Students' News Agency (ISNA),, “movafeghan va mokhalefan-e hadafmandi 
(Proponents and Opponents to Targeted Subsidies Act) ." 7 May 2012 
310
 Hassanzadeh, E. "Recent Developments in Iran's Subsidies Reform: Lessons and 
Recommendations." Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) of the International Institute of Sustainable 
Development (IISD), October 2012 
311
 Slavin, B. "Iran Sanctions: Preferable to War but No Silver Bullet." June 2011 
105 
 
convince the Parliament that passing the Subsidy Reform Act was urgent if the country 
was to parry the effect of intensifying sanctions.
312
  
The Iranian foreign exchange market also experienced a drastic instability immediately 
after imposition of the new round of sanctions in January 2012, causing a 250 percent 
increase in the value of the U.S. dollar against the Iranian rial in October 2012. The 
Government tried to control the sharp devaluation of the Iranian rial by introducing an 
official exchange rate of IRR 12,260 in place of the free floating exchange rate of around 
IRR 35,000 as of January 2013.  
Figure 3.1- The Price of US Dollar in Iran’s Foreign Exchange Market (1981-2012) 
 
Source: Iranian Central Bank (1980-2012) and author’s data collection 
Despite the Government’s assertion over availability of adequate gold and foreign 
exchange reserves, there is unlikely to be any improvement in the country’s foreign 
exchange market and its economy as a whole as long as the country is under immense 
international political and economic pressures. This is mostly due to the fact that the 
country is firstly unable to sell a large portion of its oil and secondly receive payments for 
the portion that it can sell due to restricted access to the international banking system.  
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3.4.2. The Impact on Development of Iran’s Energy Sector  
The sanctions’ primary impact has been on the petroleum industry and financing its 
development projects. As the petroleum sector is heavily capital intensive, substantial 
investments are required to expand the sector. Inadequate sources of domestic funding 
and the country’s inability to receive loans from international financial institutions have 
significantly delayed the development of petroleum projects.
313
  
In the mid 1990s, and despite U.S. sanctions, the first major petroleum contract was 
signed with the U.S. Conoco company, a subsidiary of the Dupont Cooperation, for 
development of two offshore oil and gas fields in Persian Gulf worth US$600 million. 
Following the enactment of ILSA and possible criminal liability for conducting business 
with Iran, Conoco withdrew from the Sirri A and E oil and gas fields projects. When 
Conoco withdrew from Sirri project, Total and Petronas replaced it and the companies 
were never held in violation of ILSA, despite investment of US$600 million in the 
project.
314
   
Since their imposition, U.S. unilateral sanctions received much opposition from other 
states particularly in the EU. In November 1996, for instance, the EU, through the 
Resolution 2271, declared that European companies are capable of non-compliance with 
ILSA. It was later followed by a waiver under Section 9 (c) of ILSA by the U.S. 
Secretary of State, Albright, over the TotalFinaElf, Gazprom and Petronas consortium in 
development of the South Pars field. Italian Eni’s US$3.8 billion investment for the 
development of the South Pars gas field also progressed despite the U.S. threat over 
considering sanctions against Eni. The company continued further and signed a five-year 
buyback contract for the development of Darkhoven oilfield worth around US$1 billion. 
Notwithstanding its failed attempts, the U.S. continued threatening companies such as 
BHP Billiton Ltd and Canadian Sheer Energy Company with imposition of sanctions 
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when speculations aroused over their involvement in the development of Foroozan –
Esfandiar and Balal oilfields.  
U.S. and international sanctions, beyond concerns over their actual implementation, have 
caused reluctance in major firms to investment and operate in Iran’s energy sector as a 
result of rising political risks, and operational costs compared with other petroleum rich 
countries which offer more attractive conditions to foreign investors.
315
 Following the 
intensification of sanctions in the mid 2000s, key international oil companies, such as 
major European firms, i.e. Repsol, Royal Dutch Shell and Total, pulled out from some of 
Iran’s major petroleum projects and declined to make further investments or resold their 
investments to other companies.
316
 In July 2008, Total and Petronas, the original South 
Pars investors, withdrew from an LNG export project at phase 11 of the South Pars, 
announcing that investing in Iran at a time of growing international pressure over its 
nuclear programme is “too risky”.317 The Japanese firms also reduced their participation 
in the development of Iran’s massive Azadegan oilfield and later in 2010 completely 
withdrew from the country.
318
 The CISADA legislation also has significant impact on 
Iran’s petroleum industry as it forced the western, Japanese and South Korean energy 
firms to put on halt sale of gasoline to Iran and investment in Iran’s energy sector. The 
new round of sanctions imposed in 2012 has also made the financial transactions with the 
Iranian banks almost impossible. Such restrictions are considered the main reasons 
behind the Western oil companies’ decision to wind up their businesses.  
In response to major IOCs withdrawal from the country’s energy projects, Iran took 
recourse to eastern firms, including state-owned India Oil Corp., China’s Sinopec, and 
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Russia’s Gazprom to fill the gap in the development of its oil and gas sector.319 But in 
2012, the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) reported that activities from these 
sources had also been on decline due to “logistical difficulties experienced as a result of 
sanctions on technology and financial transactions.”320 In the absence of western 
companies, China became the largest investor in Iran’s energy sector. According to John 
W. Garver, China committed investment of US$30 billion only in 2009 (see Figure 3-
2).
321
  Policy makers and energy experts are sceptical about technical sophistication and 
experiences of Chinese companies, particularly in technologically complicated projects 
such as LNG trains, through which Iran had planned to emerge as a major gas exporter.
322
  
Figure 3.2- Investment in Iranian Oil and Gas Sector, 1999-2009 (US$ billions) 
 
Source: Garver, John. W (2010) 
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The Chinese companies’ policies over compliance with international sanctions are not 
clear. While making announcement over their interest for further investment in Iran’s 
energy industry, China has made long delays in its previously committed projects, such as 
development of North Pars, South Azadegan and Yadavaran. In August 2012, the Chinese 
CNPC company withdrew from a project for development of phase 11 of South Pars, 
suspending a US$5 billion development contract.
323
After long denial of any impact from 
sanctions on the economy, the Iranian authorities have admitted sanctions’ dramatic 
affects following the imposition of the new round of sanctions by the EU and U.S. in 
2012. In a rare declaration before the Parliament in the late 2011, President Ahmadinejad 
stated that the current sanctions against Iran were “the heaviest economic onslaught on a 
nation in history”, adding “every day, all our banking and trade activities and our 
agreements are being monitored and blocked.”324 A few years before there were hopes 
that if Iran modified its foreign investment regime, the country could minimise the impact 
of sanctions, hence gaining more opportunities to develop its petroleum sector. Today, 
however, experts at key energy fields in Iran report that there is little evidence of foreign 
investment and development activities in Iran, including at the South Pars gas field.
325
 At 
the same time, the country is running short of funding to develop the projects itself as the 
major source of country’s revenue, namely the oil sale, is also under sanction.326 This is a 
result of 2012 round of sanctions which drastically affected Iran’s oil export capacity. 
Based on a report from the IEA and OPEC, since the new round of sanctions, Iran’s oil 
production has dropped from 3.706 million bbl/d in 2010 to 2.817 million bbl/d as of July 
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2012, reducing its export capacity from 1.9 million bbl/d to 900 thousand bbl/d.
327
 In 
October 2012, IEA also reported that Iran’s crude oil deliveries has further fallen to an 
estimated 860 thousand bbl/d, highlighting the continuing decline in the Iranian oil 
exports as a result of the intensification of international sanctions.
328
 
Table 3-1- Energy Firms Ending Business with Iran (2009-2010) 
Country Company Action 
France Total Ended investments in Iran  
 
Germany 
 
Linde Stopped all businesses 
 Schlumberger Will exit Iran in 2013 
India Reliance  Stopped sales of refined 
products; will not import 
crude oil from Iran 
Italy Eni SpA Ended investment in Iran 
Japan Inpex Corp. Exited from the Azadegan oil 
field 
Kuwait Independent petroleum 
Group 
Stopped sales of refined 
products 
Malaysia  Petronas Stopped sales of refined 
products 
Netherlands Royal Dutch Shell Ended investment in Iran 
Norway Statoil Ended investment in Iran 
Spain 
 
Switzerland 
 
 
 
Turkey 
 
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International 
Repsol 
 
Vitol 
 
Glencore 
 
Tupras 
 
 
BP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline 
Abandoned negotiations over 
development of phases 13 and 
14 of the South Pars gas field 
Committed to not supply 
refined petroleum products to 
Iran 
Committed not to supply 
refined petroleum products to 
Iran 
Cancelled contracts to supply 
gasoline to Iran 
Stopped supplying jet fuel to 
Iran Air at Germany’s 
Hamburg airport; halted a 
BP-NIOC joint venture in the 
Rhum gas field 
The pipeline will not be used 
to transport Iranian gas to 
Europe 
Source: Katzman, Kenneth(July 2012) 
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Additionally, Iran’s access to the international banking system is strictly limited, causing 
many problems in receiving payments for the sale of petroleum products.
 329
 The U.S. 
officials have estimated that Iran has lost US$50 to US$60 billion in foreign investment, 
since 2010 partly as a result of CISADA and withdrawal of major international oil 
companies from the country’s energy development projects.330  It is therefore highly 
unlikely that Iran can attract US$145 billion new investment by 2015 as stipulated in the 
Fifth Development Plan.
331
  
            Table 3-2-Top Energy Buyers from Iran and Agreed Reductions 2011-2012 
(bbl/d) 
Country/Bloc                            2011                            2012(after cut pledges) 
   
European Union   
( particularly Italy, Spain and Greece) 
600.000 Negligible as of 1
st
July 
No Iranian oil has 
entered key Rotterdam 
refinery since February 
2012 
China 550,000 450,000 
Japan 327,000 261,000 (20 percent cut 
from 2011) 
India 310,000 276,000 (11 percent cut 
from 2011) 
South Korea 228,000 194,000 (15 percent 
cut) 
Turkey 196,000 157,000 (20 percent 
cut) 
South Africa 80,000 64,000(20 percent cut) 
Malaysia 55,000 44,000 (20 percent cut) 
Sri Lanka 36,000 29,000 (20 percent cut) 
Taiwan 35,000 28,000 ( 20 percent 
cut) 
Singapore  
Other 
20,000 
60,000 
15,000 (20 percent cut) 
Cuts unclear  
Total 2.50 million 
bbl/d 
1.5 million bbl/d  
(40 percent lower 
than 2011) 
Source: IEA & CRC calculations (June 2012) 
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Petroleum exports are a key part of the country’s national economy and its Government’s 
key source of revenue. In 2010, Iran received some US$73 billion in petroleum export 
revenues as the only major source of hard currency compared with earnings of US$80 
billion for all exports, highlighting the country’s great reliance on oil export revenue.332 
Although there are arguments over compensating the declining rate of the oil production 
by increasing natural gas production, it is highly unlikely that the already under-
developed natural gas sector can adequately contribute to filling the gap in declining oil 
production.
333
  
Natural gas exports, whether through pipeline or LNG, have also been affected by U.S 
and international sanctions. The famous Peace Pipeline to export Iranian natural gas to 
Pakistan and India faced great opposition from the U.S. Government. Although failure to 
finalise the export deal can be to some extent attributed to concerns over the security of 
the pipeline, the pricing mechanism and India and Pakistan’s inability to finance or attract 
financing for the project (see Chapter 2), the U.S. Government’s pressure on these two 
countries to halt any further development of the project has also played a key role. 
Iran has also been excluded from gas export projects to Europe under the political 
pressure from the U.S. administrations, despite the possibility of making Europe less 
dependent on Russian gas supply. International pressures on other gas export pipelines, 
including, the controversial Nabucco pipeline for which Iran was considered as a 
potential supplier, finally caused investors to exclude Iranian gas from consideration.
334
 
There was also a preliminary agreement to build a second Iran-Turkey pipeline through 
which the Iranian gas would flow to Europe which has also been put on halt.
335
 The 
exception is, however, the Iran-Turkey gas export deal. Despite the U.S objections, no 
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sanctions were imposed on Turkey due to several reasons: first, when the pipeline was 
constructed, each country was responsible for the construction of its part of the pipeline, 
hence, the deal was not considered as ‘investment’;336 secondly, the U.S. State 
Department did not impose sanctions on the basis that Turkey would import gas from 
Turkmenistan that would transit through Iran;
337
 and finally there were considerations 
about Turkey’s energy security and reducing its reliance on Russian gas.338 In CISADA 
which passed the U.S. Senate in 2010, a few years after the start of Iran-Turkey gas deal, 
the investment, construction, expansion and upgrading natural gas export pipeline from 
Iran is strictly banned, which makes it highly unlikely that such U.S. concessions would 
be granted to any other countries interested in importing Iranian gas. In a recent attempt 
by the EU in November 2012, even the sustainability of the current export capacity has 
come under scrutiny in the light of the EU ban on import of Iranian natural gas to 
European markets. Although Iran has never directly exported gas to the EU, there is 
speculation that Turkey mixes Iranian gas with the gas from other exporting countries and 
delivers it to the European markets through its transit pipelines.  
International sanctions have also rendered Iran unable to develop its LNG projects. The 
impact of sanctions on LNG projects has been considerably greater for pipeline projects. 
Although the original version of ISA did not apply to the development of LNG projects, 
the newly enforced CISADA specifically includes LNG projects in the definition of 
petroleum resources, thereby making investment in LNG projects (or supply of LNG 
tankers or pipelines) sanctionable.
339
 Since the withdrawal of major IOCs, Iran’s LNG 
projects have been marginally developed, with at least one project, namely Persian LNG, 
being completely cancelled. The country’s national firms and some Chinese companies’ 
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efforts to bring on stream Iran’s LNG projects have reportedly failed, as the LNG 
technology is patented by U.S. and European firms, the access which is strictly prohibited 
and practically impossible.  
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4. Chapter 4- Legal Challenges: The Iranian Investment Framework 
in the Petroleum Sector 
4.1. Introduction 
Iran possesses massive natural resources which require substantial investments for their 
development. According to the country’s 20-Year Development Prospect, by 2020, Iran 
invests around US$140 billion for development of its natural resources.  
Although the country has been unsuccessful in attracting the required amount of 
investment, mainly as a result of U.S. and international sanctions (see Chapter 3), some 
commentators believe that had Iran offered a more attractive legal and fiscal framework 
for the foreign investment, it could have been effectively more successful in 
circumventing sanctions and attracting foreign investors.  
This Chapter therefore proceeds by reviewing the Iranian contractual regime for 
development of its petroleum resources. It starts with a brief review of expectations 
overriding the foreign investor-host states relations. It then focuses on the Iranian foreign 
investment regime and highlights the background and origin of buyback contracts and 
reviews the legal and fiscal structure of the buybacks. It also narrates the critiques of the 
buyback contracts from IOCs’ point of view and as they are perceived by NIOC and some 
of Iranian energy commentators. The Chapter continues to analyse Iran’s investment 
environment and tries to shed some light on the argument over its “unattractiveness”. The 
final section is intended to discuss the role of law in the development of natural resources 
and economic development in a larger context, and offers additional thoughts on a 
generally perceived idea that importing the law of ‘successful’ gas producing countries 
would bring about the same development outcomes for Iran.  
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4.2. General Remarks on Foreign Investor-Host State Relations  
In a broad spectrum, when assessing the effectiveness of a country’s investment 
environment, due regard should be given to the fact that in a petroleum exploration and 
development project, the two parties, namely the IOC and the state concerned, pursue 
different objectives. Whereas the IOC’s primary objective is to have access to investment 
opportunities, the state wants access to the IOC’s know-how and capital; the state is 
concerned to maintain its ownership and control over its reserves and production, while 
the IOC is eager to have bookable reserves and control over the cash flow from the 
operation. 
In order to reconcile these differences, the parties should reach a mutual level of 
understanding. Foreign investors should appreciate that a country’s energy sector is 
“closely linked to the matter of national sovereignty over its natural resources and energy 
security.”340 They should also understand that protection of the national economy and the 
interest of the local population, raising revenue for the state budget, providing energy 
services to the population and protection of the strategic sectors of the economy are 
considered some of the major concerns of the host states when they consider the 
involvement of a foreign investor in development projects.
341
  
In return host states should understand the immense risks that are involved in investing in 
the energy sector, entitling the investors to receive adequate protection and remuneration. 
The substantial up-front investment and usually long pay-back period, in addition to a 
complex and inflexible project chain and in many cases an unstable political and 
economic condition in host states require Governments to adopt certain protective 
measures to encourage and sustain the flow of investment which is particularly needed in 
the MENA region. Most Governments have now recognised the critical role that the 
technology and capital of foreign investors can play in the economic development of 
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developing resource-rich countries. To borrow from John Kinna, “Governments are now 
very conscious of their reputations for stability in the international commercial 
community and loath to interfere with existing agreements without good cause.”342 The 
stability which is of outmost importance for foreign investors does not lie in fixed and 
rigid contractual clauses nor essentially in guarantees, arbitration clauses or re-negotiation 
clauses. ‘Good law’ may facilitate investment and reduce legal risks involved in 
investment transactions; however, in terms of contractual relations, the most important 
lever to obtain contract compliance is trust and reputation; there is a strong notion among 
investors that “confidence-building” in transnational business activities plays a crucial 
role; this is also the case for reputation. As Orr and Ulen state: 
“A Government  that credibly commits itself to upholding rights of property and contract 
enforcement not only provides a basis whereby partners in economic transactions can 
trust each other; it also reinforces the hope that the Government  itself can be trusted to 
transact honorably and to meet its contractual obligations.”343 
Whether Iran has been able to adopt such a ‘good’ investment framework in order to 
build confidence and reduce investment risks in the country is a subject for a thorough 
analysis which will be followed in the next sections. 
4.3. The Iranian Petroleum Contractual Framework 
Contracting for the exploration and development of oil and gas fields in Iran can be traced 
back for a century. The first contractual arrangements were concluded on a ‘concession’ 
basis- the well-known D’Arcy concession- based on which the exploration and 
development of petroleum resources were fully controlled by a foreign petroleum 
company, possessing capital, know-how and expertise. The foreign company had an 
extensive and exclusive right to control the resources in the area covered by the 
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concession agreement against a royalty and/or tax paid to the Government. The 
Government's role in these projects and consequently its share in the profits was quite 
insignificant. Hence, the D’Arcy concession marked the beginning of a period of heavy 
British influence over Iran’s petroleum which led to years of growing demands for 
nationalisation of the oil industry.
344
  
Following the nationalization of the oil industry in 1951 and enactment of the 1957 
Petroleum Law, Iran concluded various contracts with foreign companies, including 
production sharing agreements and service contracts in order to secure a larger share of 
profit for itself. The 1957 Petroleum Act granted the required authority to NIOC to enter 
into agreements with domestic and foreign companies “with a view to extending as 
rapidly as possible the operation of research, exploration, and extraction of petroleum 
throughout the country and the continental shelf.”345 Therefore, the deteriorating 
economic and political conditions resulting from taking an extreme stand against foreign 
companies after the nationalisation of the oil industry, forced the Government to adopt a 
more moderate approach in which private foreign investment was encouraged while 
opportunities were also provided for a more pro-active role for NIOC.
346
  
In 1974, a new petroleum law was passed by the Parliament imposing significant 
limitations on the participation of international oil companies in upstream oil and gas 
operations. According to the 1974 Act, “service contracts” were introduced as the 
prevailing contractual regime in the Iranian hydrocarbon sector.
347
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The Act prohibited contracts or ventures that would offer reserve ownership rights to 
foreign entities. Article 3 of the Act also emphasized the nationalization of the petroleum 
resources and sanctioned that any activities in respect of exploration, development, 
production and operation must be exclusively carried out by NIOC. As a result, the 
Government was no longer authorized to engage in production sharing agreements and 
for the first time in Iran’s history the provisions of the 1974 Petroleum Act gave birth to 
Iran’s first risk-service contracts.348 
After the 1979 Revolution, all existing oil and gas agreements were revoked and the 
revolutionary Government assumed full responsibility for controlling and developing 
Iran’s oil industry. Following the Revolution, Iran followed an ideologically isolationist 
path that emphasised self-sufficiency and independence from foreign investment.
349
 The 
Iranian Government actively took part in shaping the country’s overall economic policy 
through a legal framework in which the prohibition of foreigners’ presence in the 
country’s petroleum sector was explicit.350 After the Iran-Iraq war which imposed 
substantial damage on the country’s petroleum facilities and infrastructure, the Iranian 
Government faced a dire situation in which it urgently needed capital investment and 
technology to reconstruct its petroleum industry and keep up the flow of Government 
revenue through exports of oil. As there was strong legal opposition to foreign investment 
both in the revolutionary Constitution and the new Petroleum Act of 1987,
351
 the Ministry 
of Petroleum and NIOC had to present a solution which, while being in full compliance 
with the provisions of the law, would provide a sufficiently attractive contractual 
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framework in order to enable and promote foreign investment in the petroleum sector; the 
solution presented was buyback contracts.   
4.3.1. Origin and Background of the Iranian Buyback Contracts 
The legal and contractual regime in the Iranian petroleum sector is highly influenced by 
the country’s history. The agonizing experience of foreigners’ dominance over the 
country’s natural resources (see Chapter 3) led to adoption of strict measures in relation 
to the presence of foreign companies and investors in the petroleum industry.
352
 Shari’a 
law also played a major role in the establishment of post-revolution regulatory system 
where the sovereignty, in terms of ownership, control and management of mineral and 
petroleum rights, have been all governed by the Shari’a principles.353 Also, as reaffirmed 
by the Ja’afari school of Islamic law354, private property in minerals is not lawful, and 
neither is “extraction to be anything other than a part of the state’s commercial 
activity.”355 The theory stems from a broader Islamic belief that recognition of private 
ownership of the natural resources will be against public interest as “it will lead to 
corruption and unfair distribution of such wealth.”356 These provisions have been also 
explicitly reflected in various articles of the Constitution and the Petroleum Act 1987. 
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4.3.1.1. The Constitution 
The restrictive provisions concerning the involvement of foreigners in the development of 
the hydrocarbon sector are spread through various articles of the Constitution.  As a 
matter of general economic and financial principle, Article 43 of the Constitution bans 
foreign economic “domination” over the country’s economy. Article 45 stipulates that the 
disposition of public wealth and property, such as ‘mineral deposits’, should be solely in 
the hands of the Iranian Government. Most notably, Article 44 of the Constitution assigns 
ownership of all large-scale and “mother industries” to the state.357 A general 
interpretation of these articles implies that oil and gas reserves are state-owned and only 
the Government can and should administer public assets and cannot delegate such 
authority to other entities.
358
 Based on Article 44 and according to Islamic criteria, the 
private sector is granted a supplementary role in the economic activities of the state and 
cooperative sectors which include companies and enterprises concerned with production 
and distribution in urban and rural areas.
359
 
The issue of involvement of foreigners in the economic activities of the country is more 
specifically addressed in Articles 81, 82 and 153. Article 81 clearly provides that 
“granting concessions to foreigners for the formation of companies or institutions dealing 
with commerce, industry, agriculture, services or mineral extraction, is absolutely 
forbidden.” But the Article, according to an advisory opinion requested by the 
Government and rendered by the Council of Experts, does not restrict establishment of 
foreign companies’ branches in Iran. Furthermore, following the ratification of the 
Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act (FIPPA), any restrictions on 
registration and incorporation of the foreign companies in Iran have been abolished and 
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the formation of branches of foreign companies with one hundred percent foreign 
ownership has been allowed and is currently implemented.
360
  
Most controversies over participation of foreign investors in the development of the 
Iranian petroleum sector come from the provisions of Article 153 which put a total ban on 
the conclusion of agreements that would result in foreign control over natural resources, 
economic resources, military affairs, and other strategic sectors; hence, by implication, 
the Article means that, for example, in the petroleum sector there is no equity right or 
bookable reserves for IOCs- a restriction  from which most criticisms of the buyback 
regime arise.
361
 
Other restrictive provisions may be found in Article 82 which forbids the employment of 
“foreign experts except in cases of necessity”, and only then subject to Parliamentary 
approval. Article 83 also requires the same approval condition for the transfer of property 
to foreigners without which such transfer is prohibited.  
As Iran is also a gas importer, it should be clarified that the Constitution provisions do not 
apply to the import activities, mainly due to the absence of the reasons for which the 
regulators imposed restrictions on foreign involvement in the country’s petroleum sector. 
As discussed above, the concern over foreigners’ dominance on the country’s most vital 
sector through investment and potential ownership of the any segments of the sector 
caused the revolutionary regulators to impose a ban on direct involvement of foreign 
investors in the upstream segment of the petroleum sector development in Iran. In gas 
import, however, there is no such a concern over foreign dominance. Most importantly as 
gas import is considered as a downstream activity, the regulations permit involvement of 
foreign entities, in this case, foreign gas for fulfilment of the country’s energy needs.  
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4.3.1.2. The Petroleum Act 1987 
The Petroleum Act 1987 was ratified by the Parliament when the country was involved in 
the war with Iraq and there was a growing sensitivity about foreign investment in 
economic activities in Iran. Consequently, the new petroleum law placed major 
restrictions on involvement of foreign companies in the country’s petroleum industry. 
Article 2 of the Act reaffirms the provisions of the Constitution by providing that 
“petroleum resources are part of the public domain, which belongs to the Iranian people, 
and remains at the disposal and control of the Government.”362 The Act banned any form 
of direct foreign investment in the oil and gas sector and provided that all petroleum 
activities should be carried out under the control and supervision of the Ministry of 
Petroleum. The involvement of local and foreign individuals and companies in the 
petroleum sector was only permitted according to Article 5, provided that they enter into 
contracts with the Ministry of Petroleum or its affiliated companies. Article 6 envisages 
that all capital investment required for petroleum projects should be proposed by the 
Ministry of Petroleum and be included in the annual budget. This Article, in practice, put 
major restrictions on the amount of capital to be invested in the petroleum sector.  
4.3.1.3. The Budget Acts and the Five-Year Development Plans  
Buyback contracts, as the only contractual framework which allows foreign investment in 
Iran, was first introduced in the 1993 Budget Act and the Second Five-Year Development 
Plan (1993-98). According to the Budget Act, NIOC was authorised to enter into 
contracts with IOCs up to the value of US$2.6 billion, provided that:
363
 
- No equity shall be granted to the contracting party to the oil whether produced or 
in the ground; 
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- Instalments shall be paid exclusively from exports of resultant outputs of the 
project, and therefore no guarantee shall be provided in terms of any shortfall in 
production; 
- Utilisation of Iran’s existing potential in designing, engineering, construction and 
installation shall be maximised; 
- Transfer of technology shall be accomplished through joint-venture agreements 
between local and foreign companies; and 
- A minimum of 30 percent of Iranian content shall be achieved. 
In order to demonstrate buyback contracts’ compliance with the provisions of the 
Constitution, the Budget Act remained reluctant to envisage any guarantee by the Iranian 
banks or state enterprises for recovery of costs and profits in the event of production 
decline or decrease of oil and gas prices.
364
 Although the concept of a buyback contract 
was first created in the Budget Act 1993, it was not until the Budget Act 1994 that the 
term “buyback” was first mentioned, authorising NIOC to conclude up to US$3.5 billion 
worth of development contracts for the Asalooyeh gas refinery and South Pars gas 
field.
365
 The permission granted for foreign investment in oil and gas projects through 
buyback contracts was also extended in the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Five-Year 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Development Plans.
366
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4.3.2. The Structure of Buyback Contracts 
Buyback contracts were introduced in the early 1990s in order to circumvent a ban by the 
Iranian Constitution on granting mineral concessions to foreign firms. The first buyback 
contract was signed with the American based Conoco Oil Company which was cancelled 
later as a result of the implementation of the Iran-Libya Sanction Act (ILSA) (see Section 
3.3.1.1).
367
 The French company, Total, subsequently replaced Conoco and entered into 
an agreement with NIOC for development of the Sirri A and E offshore oilfield with 
expected rates of return of 20 and 23 percent respectively.
368
 The Iranian authorities’ first 
orchestrated attempt to introduce buyback contracts to the international investment 
market was during a specially held conference in London in July 1998, at which Iran 
offered more than 40 onshore and offshore fields under the buyback formula to foreign 
oil and gas companies.
369
 The Iranian buyback contract is categorised more as a “risk-
service contract”, the legal and fiscal terms of which are explained in more detail 
below.
370
  
In addition to oil resources, buyback contracts are also offered for development of non-
associated natural gas resources. In such contracts, the fiscal terms are designed based on 
the volume of condensate recovered alongside natural gas production. In other word, the 
foreign investors are reimbursed through either the sale of condensate by themselves or 
sale to a third party and then reimburse them from the cash received. 
4.3.2.1. The Definition of Buyback Contracts  
In the international investment domain, a buyback contract is generally considered a 
counter-trade transaction mainly used where, for any reason, direct investment or regular 
methods of payment is restricted.
371
 In order to overcome the same prevailing restrictions 
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during and after the Cold War, counter-trade transactions flourished internationally 
between the politically divided East and West. The first counter-trade agreement, which 
was a kind of “barter contract”,372 was signed in 1969 between an Austrian and a German 
metallurgical company on one side and the Soviet Union on the other, based on which the 
Soviet contractor committed to supply (export) a certain volume of natural gas in return 
for the import of pipeline.
373
  
A buyback contract is generally referred to as a transaction in which one party supplies a 
production facility, and the parties agree that the supplier of the facility, or a person 
designated by the supplier, will buy the products resulting from that production facility.
374
 
The UNCITRAL Legal Guide also provides a definition for a buyback contract, 
according to which a buyback is “a transaction in which the supplier of the facility often 
provides technology and training and sometimes component parts or materials to be used 
in the production. The supply of a production facility usually requires bank financing.”375 
In simple terms, buyback contracts in the Iranian petroleum sector are defined as 
contracts between NIOC and an IOC, in which the IOC agrees to develop an oil or natural 
gas field and then to hand the field over to NIOC once production starts.
376
 The IOC in 
return will be repaid based on certain percentages of the production of the field and an 
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agreed-upon rate of return.
377
 In addition, based on the Iranian buyback model, once the 
contractor is being repaid, it no longer shares in the project’s profit.  
4.3.2.2. The Legal and Fiscal Terms  
The Iranian buyback framework has undergone an evolutionary process since its 
inception in mid 1990s. In early buyback contracts, before a buyback was signed for 
development of a field, exploratory activities had already been carried out and the 
economic viability of the project was proven. IOCs were then invited to tender and 
provide a Master Development Plan (MDP)
378
 based on the data and information which 
had been collected during the exploration stage. 
In 2003, Section 21 (f) of the Budget Act 2003 authorised NIOC to enter into buyback 
contracts, in which IOCs would pay for exploration and development of the oil and gas 
fields, except those in the Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and in four oil-rich provinces in 
the south of Iran, including Khuzestan, Bushehr, Kohkilouyeh and Ilma. Accordingly and 
depending on a project development stage, NIOC would decide to offer buyback 
contracts in three different forms: Exploration Service Contract (ESC), Development 
Service Contract (DSC), and Exploration and Development Service Contract (EDSC). In 
the ESC stage, in the event of a commercial discovery, the IOC is entitled to full cost 
recovery; however, in the absence of a commercial discovery, the IOC bears all financial 
losses. The DSC resembles the conventional buyback contracts where exploration 
activities have already been conducted and the contract is offered for the development of 
the fields. The third scheme, namely EDSC, differs from the other two schemes for 
various reasons:
379
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- When contracting an EDSC, the parties are not yet able to agree on an MDP in 
order to define the scope of the work for developing the field, as the field has not yet been 
discovered;  
- A capital expenses ceiling for the development stage should be agreed upon once a 
commercial field is discovered;  
- The percentage of oil and gas to be allocated to the IOC for the purpose of cost-
recovery and remuneration fee- though very important to determine the project’s 
viability- will be agreed upon after a commercial field is discovered; and 
- The IOC, in addition to the risks involved in the development project, should bear 
the risks of non-discovery of a commercial field. 
For each stage an MDP should be presented by the IOC and upon approval of NIOC the 
next stage can commence. A preliminary advantage of such approach is that the 
contractor enters into a concrete contractual framework before starting the initial 
development activities. But the privilege is not very promising as the contractor still 
needs the NIOC’s approval for award of the major phase, namely the development phase 
despite having a priority right over the other potential contractors to implement the 
development operation.  
Generally, in buyback contracts, the contractor’s recovery of petroleum costs and 
remuneration is ascertained through a long-term export oil sales agreement (LTEOSA). 
Under the agreement, the contractor “buys” a certain portion of the oil - known as 
“repayment oil”- produced from the developed field at the market price. The term of the 
LTEOSA continues until the contractor is reimbursed for all its petroleum costs and 
remuneration.  
The fiscal structure of buyback contracts features different stages of expenditure which 
include: Capital cost (Capex), Non-capital cost (non-Capex), Operating cost (Opex) and 
Bank charges.  
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Capital costs include the direct cost of development operations and are recoverable up to 
the agreed-upon ceiling. Thus, any costs incurred by the IOC which go beyond the ceiling 
will not be reimbursed. Indirect costs are the funds paid by the IOC to the Government 
for projected taxes, social security charges, customs duties and other levies. Operational 
costs cover the IOC’s expenses during the project operation and before handing it over to 
NIOC. For Opex, no cap is placed; hence, all Opex costs are recoverable. Finally, bank 
charges include the cost of financing the project. The bank charges are calculated based 
on London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) plus an extra agreed upon interest 
percentage.
380
 All these costs are recoverable provided that, firstly, the objectives of the 
contract as stipulated under the MDP materialise, secondly, the authenticity of the costs 
are verified by NIOC or an international auditor, and thirdly, costs should be correctly 
categorised in accordance with the accounting procedure annexed to the contract.
381
  
In addition to costs, a remuneration fee is also envisaged in buyback contracts which is 
generally a fixed amount agreed upon by the parties to be paid to the IOC as a reward for 
its investment and the risks taken.
382
 The remuneration fee will be paid if the objectives of 
the contract and MDP are fully met and the project is successfully handed over to 
NIOC.
383
 The fees recoverable by the IOC are paid through allocation of a certain portion 
of outputs of the projects, which is usually around 50-60 percent. Since the IOC does not 
have any right to the oil or gas in place, or the oil at the wellhead and export point, NIOC 
either sells the oil and gas to the IOC itself or to a third party.
 384
   
The buyback provisions also provide for a requirement that the acquired lands and 
purchased assets for the purpose of a project development should be the sole property of 
NIOC. The operating company is also obliged to use at least 51 percent local content to 
                                                          
380
 Mohammad, N. "The New Face of Iranian Buyback Contract: Any Hope for Foreign 
Investment?" Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence (April 2009), p.11 
381
Shiravi, A., and Ebrahimi, S.N. "Exploration and Development of Iran's Oilfields through 
Buyback.", 2006, p.202 
382
 ibid 
383
 ibid 
384
 Ebrahimi, S.N., and Shiroui Khouzani, A. ‘The Contractual Form of Iran's Buy-Back Contracts 
in Comparison with Production Sharing and Service Contract’, June 2003 
130 
 
give the local companies a competitive advantage. In comparison with other petroleum 
development contracts, the conventional buyback contracts have a shorter life - about 7-
10 years- with a possible extension for an additional 5 years as an ‘investment recovery 
period’. 
Buyback contracts are reportedly more popular for the production of oil than gas which is 
a more challenging commodity to commercialise.
385
 In buyback contracts for the 
development of natural gas resources, normally there is no specific price per unit in the 
buyback contract and it only stipulates the agreed upon remuneration and internal rate of 
return.
386
 Also, as natural gas development is different from oil in a sense that it requires 
an integrated value chain from production to the end-users, there are uncertainties over 
the possibility and indeed the necessity of extension of the contracts to downstream 
segments of gas production activities, particularly LNG production.  
4.3.3. The Critiques of Buyback Contracts  
Since its introduction as Iran’s contractual regime for the development of its oil and gas 
sector, buyback contracts have received many criticisms from both IOCs and the NIOC’s 
officials.  These critiques are reviewed in more detail in the following section.  
4.3.3.1. Risks of Buyback Contracts as Perceived by IOCs  
No equity right and unbookable reserves- one of the IOCs’ major complaints is that as 
a contractor under buyback contracts, they should only supply capital and technology and 
hand over the project to NIOC after it is fully developed without having the right to add 
the reserves to their portfolio. Granting equity stakes to IOCs is almost excluded in most 
large resource–rich countries in the region. The public in many countries of the Persian 
Gulf are unlikely to accept “foreign control of the prized oil reserves, as the legacy of the 
                                                          
385
 Roberts, P, and Jackson, J. "The Iranian Buyback Concession: The Principle and the 
Prospects." 2001 
386
 Groenendaal, W. J. H van, and Mazraati, M. "A Critical Review of Iran's Buyback Contracts" 
Energy Policy 34, (2006): 3709-18, p.3713 
131 
 
pre-nationalisation days of the Seven Sisters
387
 lingers.”388In the case of Iran, the Iranian 
negotiators explain that the IOCs’ request for oil price exposure-that is to own the oil 
reserves- has been denied because they are concerned that the foreign companies could 
claim a value for future oil in an event of compensation. In other words, in the event of 
expropriation, Iran would have to compensate what ‘could have been’ produced in the 
future.
389
 
Fixed rate of return- the other major critique made against buyback contracts is the 
fixed rate of return of 10-12 percent and the inflexible expenditure ceiling, exposing IOCs 
at the risk of non-compensation in case of an overestimation of revenues or 
underestimation of costs.
390
 Also, an IOC is not compensated for the postponement of 
payments or for necessary expenditures above the amount agreed upon in the contract.
391
  
The IOCs argue that the fixed rate of return does not provide them with the required 
incentives to the improve total return from the project, such as discovery of additional 
reserves, employing enhanced oil recovery techniques as well as introducing cost saving 
measures below the contract specifications and optimising production target.
392
 NIOC 
officials however make a counter-argument that in a buyback contract IOCs receive a fair 
return on their investment as they bear no price and technological (exploration and 
exploitation) risks.
393
  
Short life of buybacks- according to IOCs, the relatively short duration of buyback 
contracts undermines their long-term investment planning and profitability. They argue 
                                                          
387
 The Seven Sisters consist of Standard Oil of New Jersey (American, future Exxon Corp.), 
Royal Dutch-Shell (Anglo-Dutch), The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later British Petroleum), 
Texaco (American), Socony-Mobil Oil (American), Gulf (American) and SOCAL-Standard Oil of 
California (American) (Gulf, SOCAL and then Texaco later merged to create Chevron).  
388
Marcel, V., Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East, 2006  
389
 ibid, p.4 
390
 Groenendaal, W. J. H van, and Mazraati, M. "A Critical Review of Iran's Buyback Contracts." 
2006, p. 3715 
391
 ibid, p.3709 
392Farnejad, H. ‘Strategic Approach & Legal Implications of Investment in Geopolitically 
Sensitive Iran’ University of Dundee, 2006 
393
Groenendaal, W. J. H van, and Mazraati, M. "A Critical Review of Iran's Buyback Contracts." 
2006, p.3709 
132 
 
that the short-term of buyback contracts might well suit the development of the low risk 
and short-term projects; but it is less suitable for complex projects and reservoirs with 
higher risks and longer duration of dependence of value on long term field 
performance.
394
 
Oil price risk- although the oil price risk is fully borne by the Iranian Government , IOCs 
are concerned that if the international prices of oil and gas drop to lower than the level 
agreed upon, the reimbursement of the capital expenditure, bank charges and 
remuneration may be postponed.  
4.3.3.2. Critiques of Buyback Contracts from the NIOC’s Perspective  
Some NIOC officials and Iranian energy specialists also criticise buyback contracts for 
not serving the long-term interests of the country. They argue that the buyback contracts’ 
requirement for transfer of the fields’ operation to NIOC would damage their long-term 
development as NIOC lacks the required technology and expertise to cope with the 
reservoir behaviour over time, resulting in a failure to maintain and enhance production. 
Iranian economists also denounce the buyback contract, for giving a “hefty return” on the 
IOCs’ investment (London Interbank Offered Rate plus 1 percent; i.e. 15-20 percent 
profit according to Amuzegar) without bearing any geological or financial risks as oil and 
gas fields are already discovered and all potential decline risks in oil prices are borne by 
NIOC.
395
  
In general, experts argue that buyback contracts expose NIOC to many risks, including: 
- Potential failure to optimally achieve the high production profile at the early stage 
of production; 
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- IOCs’ sub-optimal production in the early stage in order to assure the sufficient 
revenue during early production;
 396
  
- Overestimation of capital expenditure (Capex) in order to increase remuneration 
and bank charges;  
- The fixed rate of return would place all financial risks on NIOC, if prices fluctuate; 
- Short life of buybacks does not oblige IOCs to transfer the required technologies 
throughout the operation phase of the project; it is particularly important during the 
decline phase of the project when the application of new technologies is most needed. 
A case-study conducted by Ghandi and Lin in 2012 on Soroosh and Nowrooz oil fields 
showed that NIOC’s production after taking over the developed field has been notably 
inefficient.
397
 They argue that NIOC has failed to achieve its own objective of 
maximising cumulative production which can partially be attributed to the contract’s 
terms of NIOC operatorship. Concerns over continuation of decline in the production rate 
have reportedly forced NIOC officials to propose amendments in future buyback 
contracts, requiring IOCs to train NIOC’s personnel during the development phase, so as 
to enable them to effectively handle the operation afterwards. Ghandi and Lin conclude 
that the new amendment suggests that “NIOC acknowledges its failure in the operation of 
the developed fields, including Soroosh and Nowrooz.”398 
4.3.4. Recent Developments in Iranian Buyback Contracts 
Growing criticisms against buyback contracts and their allegedly ‘unattractiveness’ for 
foreign investors, combined with the Iranian Government ’s determination to improve the 
country’s investment climate, have brought about creeping changes in the buybacks’ legal 
and fiscal structure. In December 2009, Iran signed a buyback contract with Chinese 
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Sinopec whose terms were perceived by many as surprising.
399
 The contract was signed 
for development of Yadavaran field and offered better terms of investment, including:  
 A better payback period which was reduced to around 4 years almost half that of 
earlier buyback contracts; 
 The rate of return was increased to 14.98 ( from its previous 10-12 percent) with 
no risk, embedding a premium of 3 percent comparing to older contracts; 
 For the first time, flexibility towards potential cost escalation was envisaged in the 
contract which significantly reduced investment risks.
400
 
One of the major changes in the new model is a more flexible and realistic approach 
toward projects’ costs calculation.  The new model encompasses provisions which state: 
 “capital costs ceiling for the development operations of Phase 1 [exploration] shall be 
determined by the Parties in accordance with the call for tender process and principles, 
procedures and the costs break-down items … within the schedule period of …. as 
envisaged in the MDP. It is understood and agreed that the same call for tender process 
and the details of principles, procedures and costs break down items will be utilized for 
the determination of capital costs ceiling for the Development Operations of Phase 2 
[field development.]”401 
Although the aforementioned clause is considered a break-through in a buyback contract, 
there are concerns that the actual authorities’ practice, and the clauses in the final draft of 
buyback contracts, may not reflect the flexibility intended by the above-mentioned 
provisions.
402
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A set of incentives are also introduced in the new buyback models to encourage better 
performance by the IOCs. These incentives include: 
- An alternative ceiling on the rate of return if actual quarterly production exceeds 
the production profile envisaged in the MDP; and 
- Payment of additional percentages of the remuneration fee, if the IOC increases the 
Iranian content beyond the mandatory percentage.
403
 
More significantly, the new model envisages the possibility of extending the terms of the 
contract for contractor’s full recovery (possibly to 12-15 years). Such provisions provide 
great relief for contractors who have been facing the risk of expiry of the contract before 
making complete cost recovery as this was the case in the old model where amortisation 
could not continue beyond the expiry of the contract.
404
 
The new buyback model additionally envisages the continuation of the existence of the 
Joint Management Committee (JMC) from the project’s inception and beyond, in order to 
have the IOCs’ managerial expertise onboard throughout the life of the contract. It also 
requires the establishment of sub-committees for technical, administrative, financial and 
legal matters affecting the development of the project in different stages of exploration, 
appraisal and development which enable both IOCs and NIOC to better evaluate the 
project’s optimal development.405 
IOCs’ reactions to buyback contracts vary; while there were dissatisfactions among larger 
IOCs, including Shell, Total and Eni with regard to efficiency of buyback contracts, 
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smaller hence less influential companies such as Norwegian Statoil announced their 
general satisfaction with the buyback regime, suggesting “certain amendments that would 
improve future deals.”406 The new contractual and fiscal terms introduced in the buyback 
contracts have not been yet included in any new development contracts with western 
IOCs as a result of international sanctions and lack of interests from investors to 
participate in development of Iran’s petroleum sector; but it is likely that the new terms 
will be received more openly by IOCs if international political pressures on Iran ease.  
4.4 The Iranian Foreign Investment Regime  
Despite all the criticisms against buyback contracts and before the country being hard hit 
by international sanctions, Iranian buyback contracts were relatively successful in 
attracting foreign investment to the country’s hydrocarbon sector. According to Katzman, 
in the early stage of opening-up its petroleum sector to foreign investors in late 1990s, 
Iran attracted more than US$8 billion worth of foreign investments in its oil and gas 
sector. Also as shown in Table 4.1 below, the aggregate value of Iran’s investment 
contracts with international companies since 1999 is worth over US$70 billion.  
Table 4-1- Major Proposed Investments in Iran’s Energy Sector (1999-2011) 
Date Field/Project Investors Value 
Feb 1999 Doroud (oil) Total/ENI US$1 billion 
Apr 1999 Balal (oil) Total/Bow 
Valley/ENI 
US$300 
million 
Nov 1999 Soroush and 
Nowruz (oil) 
 
Royal Dutch 
Shell/Japex 
US$800 
million 
Apr 2000 Anaran Bloc (oil) Norsk Hydro & 
Statoil/ Gazprom & 
Lukoil 
US$105 
million 
Jul 2000 Phases 4 & 5, 
South Pars 
ENI US$1.9 
billion 
Mar 2001 Caspian Sea oil 
Exploration 
GVA Consultants US$225 
million 
Jun 2001 Darkhovin (oil) 
Eni told CRS in 
ENI US$1 billion 
                                                          
406
 Iran Daily. [www.irandaily.ir/1384/2274/html/focus.htm] cited from Kakhki, M.Hedayati. "A 
Critical Analysis of Iranian Buy-Back Transactions in the Context of International Petroleum 
Contractual Systems." May 2008 
137 
 
April 2010 it would 
close out all Iran 
operation by 2013 
May 
2002 
Masjid-e-
Soleyman (oil) 
Sheer 
Energy/CNPN 
US$80 
million 
Sept 
2002 
Phases 9 & 10, 
South Pars 
LG  Engineering 
and Construction 
US$1.6 
billion 
Oct 2002 Phases 6-8, South 
Pars 
Statoil exempted 
from sanctions in 
2010 after pledge 
to exit Iran 
Statoil US$750 
million 
Jan 2004 Azadegan (oil) 
Investor pulled out 
Inpex 10 percent 
stake. CNPC agreed 
to develop north 
Azadegan 
US$200 
million ( 
Inpex stake); 
China 
US$1.76 
billion 
Aug 2004 Tusan Block 
Oil found in 2009, 
but not in 
commercial 
quantity 
Petrobras US$178 
million 
Oct 2004 Yadavaran (oil) 
delayed  
Sinopec  US$2 billion 
Dec 2006 North Pars Gas 
Field  
Work crews 
reportedly pulled 
from the project in 
early 2011 
China National 
Offshore Oil Co 
US$16 billion 
Feb 2007 LNG tanks at 
Tombak Port 
Daelim ( S. Korea) US$320 
million 
Feb 2007 Phases 13 & 14, 
South Pars 
Investors pulled 
out  
Royal Dutch Shell/ 
Repsol  
US$4.3 
billion 
Jul 2007 Phases 22-24, 
South Pars 
Contract not 
finalised  
Turkish Petroleum 
Company (TPAO) 
US$12 billion 
Dec 2007 Golshan and 
Ferdows onshore 
and off-shore gas 
fields and LNG 
plant 
SKS Ventures, 
Petrofield 
Subsidiary 
(Malaysia) 
US$15 billion 
2007 Jofeir Field (oil) 
Contractors 
sanctioned under 
ISA in 2010 and 
2011 
Belarusneft/ 
Naftiran 
US$500 
million 
Feb 2008 Lavan Field PGNiG (Poland) US$2 billion 
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Delay caused Iran 
to void PGNiG 
contract 
Apr 2008 Kish gas field Oman US$7 billion 
June 
2008 
Resalat oil field 
 
Amona (Malaysia), 
joined by CNOOC 
and COSL 
US$1.5 
billion 
Jan 2009 North Azadegan CNPC US$1.75 
billion 
Mar 2009 Phase 12, South 
Pars 
Project stalled due 
to sanctions 
Indian firms 
(ONGC, Oil India 
Ltd, Hinduja and 
Petronet);Sonanagol 
(Angola) and 
PDVSA (Venezuela) 
US$8 billion 
Oct 2009 South Pars– 
Phases 6-8 gas 
sweetening plant 
Contract abrogated 
by S. Korean firm 
G and S 
Engineering and 
Construction ( 
S.Korea) 
US$1.4 
billion 
Nov 2009 South Pars: phase 
12, part 2 and 3 
Daelim (part 2) and 
Tecnimont (part 3) 
US$4 billion 
Feb 2010 Phase 11, South 
Pars 
CNPC pulled out in 
October 2011 
CNPC US$4.7 
billion 
Dec 2011 Zaagheh oil field 
Preliminary deal 
signed 
Tatneft (Russia) US$1 billion 
Source: Katzman (2012) 
However, intensifying international sanctions since 2006-7 made almost all major IOCs 
pull out from their projects in Iran or decline to make further investments. As a result, 
Iran lost around US$70 billion in investment for which it had entered into agreements 
with foreign investors. Although some of the investment voids were “backfilled” by 
Asian firms, such as those from China, Malaysia, Vietnam and countries in Eastern 
Europe, as shown in Table 4.1, many such “backfilled” deals remain in preliminary 
stages, due to unfavourable terms or the technical incapability of the investor or stalled as 
investors have reconsidered whether to risk U.S sanctions.
407
  
Therefore, one may conclude that the contractual regime has not been as powerful as 
international sanctions in depriving Iran of substantial attraction of foreign investment. 
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Conclusion of over US$70 billion worth of investment under buyback contracts proves 
IOCs’ interest to invest in the Iranian hydrocarbon sector, weakening the argument over 
buybacks’ “unattractiveness”. Since late 1990s, the Iranian Government and the regulator 
have also significantly modified the Iranian investment regulatory system, providing a 
safe and low-risk investment climate for investors. Although there is huge potential for 
further improvement in the country’s investment regime, new laws and regulations, as 
will be reviewed below, can play an important role in building trust and improving 
investors’ confidence in the Iranian investment regulatory and contractual framework. 
4.4.1. The Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act (FIPPA) 
The Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act (FIPPA) is considered as a 
remarkable move made by the reformist Government of President Khatami, aiming at 
reforming and improving the old and inefficient investment framework of Iran and its 
supporting regulatory regime.  
FIPPA came into force in 2002 after a long disagreement between the Parliament and the 
Council of Experts over its ratification. As explained in Chapter 3, the lawmaking process 
in Iran is complicated, as the legislative process requires all approved Parliamentary bills 
to be verified by another clerical body –The Council of Experts- based on the provisions 
of Shari’a and the Constitution. In the case of rejection of the bill by the Council of 
Experts and the Parliament’s insistence on the bill’s final ratification, a third body, known 
as the Expediency Council, is created to adjudicate between them.
408
 The latter body has 
the ultimate authority to approve provisions which have already been considered 
unconstitutional by the Council of Experts for the sake of the national “Maslahat”. The 
concept of “Maslahat” which is generally translated to ‘expediency’ is a political 
manoeuvring tool employed to deem certain actions legal for the sake of overall national 
interest, despite being officially illegal. The Expediency Council is the sole authoritative 
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body in Iran who can resort to “Maslahat” to overcome deadlocks on key policy issues 
which are recognised as unconstitutional or against Shari’a law. Therefore, the approval 
of FIPPA, though recognised as unconstitutional, has created precedence in favour of the 
possibility of future changes in the Iranian legal framework if the national interest so 
requires.  
FIPPA maintains most of the provisions of its predecessor, the 1956 Law for the 
Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment (LAPFI). However, it goes beyond and 
provides protection for investment schemes not covered under the latter. FIPPA virtually 
provides for all activities by foreign investors, whether in the form of direct investment or 
through non-equity participation and also provides protection for civil partnership; build, 
operate and transfer (BOT) schemes and service contracts, such as buyback 
agreements.
409
  
Despite its modern provisions for protection of foreign investors, FIPPA has been 
criticised for having a strict reading of the Constitution.
410
 It is argued that according to 
Article 3 (a), direct foreign investment is only allowed in the fields where activities and 
operations by the private sector are authorised, opening a limited portion of the economy 
to the private sector. However, the Act’s permission for foreign investment within the 
framework of “civil partnership” and “buy-back” arrangements in all sectors is in direct 
conflict with the Constitutional provisions which strictly prohibit involvement of private 
sector in the strategic industries, such as oil and gas sector and the related exploitation, 
exploration and export activities.
411
 The provisions of FIPPA not only permit foreign 
participation in the Iranian strategic industries, but it also removes all restrictions on the 
percentage of foreign shareholdings (Article 2.b.1.2), and consequently by implication, 
solves the problem of foreign ownership restriction by indicating that so long as a foreign 
investment project does not place more than a certain percentage of the relevant economic 
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sector under control, foreign capital ownership in a single project is admissible.
412
 The 
interpretation of Article 44 of the Constitution by the Expediency Council in 2004 also 
supports the provisions of FIPPA and permits the private sector to participate in 
downstream oil and gas activities but excludes the direct participation of the private 
sector in upstream activities.  
Although FIPPA has been criticised for its failure to provide a clear dispute settlement 
method and introduce international regulations for governing competitive tenders, it is 
widely endorsed as a modern and efficient legal framework for investment promotion and 
investors’ protection. It has simplified the procedure for admission of foreign investors by 
obtaining an ‘investment license’ from the Organisation for Investment and Economic 
and Technical Assistance in Iran (OIETAI). FIPPA has also envisaged that the investors’ 
capital and profits are convertible and transferable creating a strong sense of security and 
assurance. In addition, it has shortened the bureaucratic processes involved in admission 
of foreign investment and improved transparency and business planning.
413
 It has also 
provided for strong safeguards against expropriation and the political risk of adverse 
legislation.  
4.4.2. The Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
International investors are increasingly concerned that in the event of a dispute with the 
host state, the dispute will be referred to domestic courts with the risk of rendering biased 
and unfair judgement. Therefore, inclusion of an arbitration clause in the investment 
agreement is of outmost importance for the investors. At the same time, host states are 
reluctant to confer to a foreign tribunal the right to adjudicate over the country’s domestic 
affairs, particularly, the sensitive issues relating to the development of the oil and gas 
sector which are generally considered as a matter of sovereignty and national security.  
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The Iranian Government is no exception to such a trend. According to Article 139 of the 
Constitution “settlement of claims related to public and state property or referring such 
claims to arbitration in any case shall be subject to the Council of Ministers’ approval 
and must be notified to the Parliament. In cases where the other party of dispute is 
foreigner and in significant domestic issues the ratification of the Parliament is also 
mandatory. The law will ascertain significant issues.” 
Accordingly, as it is also envisaged in the draft of buyback contracts, the settlement of 
any disputes arising from the investment in the petroleum sector may be referred to 
arbitration. The problem arises when prior approval is required from the Council of 
Ministers and the Parliament for referral of a dispute to an arbitration tribunal. In practice, 
if a dispute arises between NIOC and an IOC, the latter may refer the case to arbitration 
while NIOC is seeking approval from the Parliament and Council of Ministers which in 
case of rejection may abort the dispute settlement process. Although referral of a dispute 
by IOCs against NIOC to an arbitral tribunal or a domestic court has rarely occurred, 
there are concerns that it may impose considerable risks upon foreign investors when 
negotiating and concluding investment deals with NIOC.   
To improve dispute settlement and reduce the uncertainties over the practice of the 
Iranian Government in the case of a dispute, the Government adopted legislation on 
international arbitration known as ‘The Law on International Commercial Arbitration’ 
(LICA) in 1997. Although there are shortcomings in the provisions of the law, it closely 
follows the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.
414
 The Law provides for 
establishment of arbitral tribunal based on widely adopted international procedural codes.  
In addition, FIPPA, though criticised for not taking a concrete stand in the vital issue of 
dispute resolution, has reaffirmed the possibility of recourse to arbitration if there exists a 
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Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) between Iran and the investor’s respective state. 
Article 19 of FIPPA provides “If the disputes and differences, between the Government  
of Iran and foreign investors, arising out of mutual undertakings and liabilities within the 
limits of investments mentioned in the instant Law, shall not be settled amicably through 
negotiations, such disputes shall be examined by domestic courts of law, unless in the law 
concerning the mutual investment agreement to be entered into with the respective 
Government  of foreign investor, a method other than the above for settlement of disputes 
shall be mentioned.” 
Iran has signed more than 60 BITs during the last two decades, including with almost all 
European countries and respective states of the major IOCs.
415
 Iran’s BITs provide for 
settlement of disputes through arbitration, meaning that if a different method of dispute 
settlement is provided for in a BIT between Iran and the home country of the foreign 
investor, that method should be followed. The BITs that Iran has signed include a dispute 
settlement clause for arbitration under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or arbitration at the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). To further 
strengthen the country’s international investment dispute mechanism, Iran joined the New 
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) 
in 2001,
416
 guaranteeing recognition and enforcement of the awards in Iran and virtually 
all over the world.  
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4.4.3. Other Regulations  
Registration and Operation of Foreign Firms in Iran- As a result of Article 81 of the 
Constitution which strictly forbids “granting the concession on formation of companies 
and institutes to foreigners in the fields of commerce, industry, agriculture, mining and 
services”, there was a general perception that establishment of Iranian companies by 
foreigners, as well as the registration of branches and representative offices of foreign 
companies was impossible. The resulting uncertainty, made the then Prime Minister Rajai 
submitted an inquiry to the Council of Experts requesting a legal interpretation. The 
Council clarified that:  
"Foreign companies that have concluded legal contracts with Iranian Government  
organizations may register the branches of their companies in Iran according to Article 3 
of the Act of Registration of Companies in order to carry out their legal obligations and 
conduct their businesses within the limits set forth in the contracts concluded by them and 
such registration shall not be in contravention  
of the provisions of the Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution."
417
 
The Government subsequently presented a bill to the Parliament for permitting 
registration of branches and representative offices of foreign companies, giving due 
consideration to ‘international trends’ and “the wish by foreign companies to operate in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran”.418 As a result, the Parliament ratified the Law on 
Registration and Operation of Foreign Firms which was later approved by the Council of 
Experts in 1997. 
In 2008, a new directive came into force allowing the Tehran Company Registration 
Bureau to register up to 100 percent foreign controlled companies in mainland Iran 
without any need to obtain a foreign investment license. Prior to the new directive, the 
                                                          
417
 April 2, 1981, The Council Experts  Archives 
418
 "The Law on Registration of Branches and Representatives of Foreign Companies " In. (10 
December 1997). 
145 
 
operation of foreign companies in Iran was only possible through a joint partnership with 
an Iranian entity and a maximum 49 percent share for the foreign partner.  
Patents, Industrial Designs and Trademarks- IOCs’ concern over protection of their 
technologies’ patents in the process of technology transfer to Iran was addressed in 2008 
by ratification of the Law on Registration of Patent, Industrial Designs and Trademarks. 
The law replaced the Trademarks and Patents Registration Act of 1932 and is considered 
the most important regulation with respect to protection of trademarks and industrial 
property rights in Iran. The law envisages a full protection of the IP rights and prohibits 
any unauthorised use of invention, trademark or industrial design by anyone other than 
the owner of the right. With regards to the trademarks, the exclusivity right also extends 
to use of marks that resemble the registered trademarks and could lead to public 
misleading or deception.
419
 The law, however, envisages an exception to the exclusivity 
of the patents where the Government, “for the sake of national security, health, and 
economy” may seek to use a patented invention.420 As the scope of such an exception is 
not clearly defined by the regulator, it can be considered a serious loophole in the law 
through which the Government can, based on its own interpretation of the national 
security and economic considerations, infringe an investor’s right to a patent. 
Free Economic Zones- the Law on the Administration of Free Trade Zones (FTZ) passed 
the Parliament in 1993, granting special rights to foreign investors in the FTZs. Iranian 
FTZs seek to attract capital investment through offering special economic incentives and 
facilities. Article 12 of the Law envisages exemptions for foreign investors from the 
requirements of the Labour Law, the payment of the social security and insurance 
premium, the issuance of residence and work permits and taxation of investment income. 
With the approval of the Board of Ministers, the importation of goods produced in the 
free zones to the mainland are also exempted from payment of all or part of customs 
duties and commercial profit tax. There are also special provisions which grant credit 
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guarantee and reassure repatriation of the investors’ capital. The initiative was also 
followed up through setting up ‘Special Economic Zones’ to facilitate goods transit and 
improve supply and distribution networks in the country through granting the same 
special benefits, including exemption from levies and import export taxes.
421
 
4.5. Moving Forward 
In most of the literature reviewed, extensive discussions have been presented urging the 
Iranian Government to adopt a more investor-friendly legal framework and abandon 
buyback contracts in favour of Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs).
422
 Their 
argument is based on the transplantation of legal and contractual frameworks of those 
petroleum producing countries successful in substantial attraction of foreign investment, 
concluding that such an approach will certainly attract more investment to Iran’s 
hydrocarbon sector, hence further development. But, a review of Iran’s history of 
importing foreign countries’ legal systems, for example, implementing French judicial 
system during Qajari dynasty, shows that legal transplantation has not been always 
successful in Iran.
423
 Thus, prior to making such recommendations, attempts should be 
made to identify the role that law plays in a country’s economic growth and to examine 
whether the legal transplant is an effective and efficient approach to implement reforms in 
a given country’s legal system. This is particularly important in resource-rich countries 
like Iran where there are high expectations towards hydrocarbon sector for accelerating 
overall economic development.   
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4.5.1. The Role of Law in Economic Development: Is the Legal Transplant the 
Solution? 
The rule of law has long been proposed by some scholars as a solution to the world’s 
challenges, including economic development.
424
 Academic interest in the relationship 
between law and development has a long history, when for example in 18
th
, 19
th
 and 20
th
 
centuries, scholars such as Montesquieu, Maine, and Weber extensively worked in 
various aspects of this relationship in the European context.
425
 Moreover, since the 19
th
 
century scholars from developing countries have been deeply interested about the role 
that law could play in their countries’ social and economic development, and rigorously 
started reviewing legal frameworks of western countries with the aim of importing such 
frameworks to legal system of their own countries.   
Despite these early developments, the best known optimistic perspective on law and 
development emerged in the United States in the 1960s and early 1970s when an 
initiative, known as ‘the law and development movement’, commenced as a response to 
the post-World War II period. The movement “witnessed increase in the number of 
scholars and policymakers interested in the poor nations of the world”, and how 
development of the rule of law could lead to their economic growth.
426
 The theorists of 
the movement generally identified traditional political, social and cultural structures as 
main reasons behind a society’s underdevelopments. They were advised that in order to 
advance, these societies would have to undergo the same process of evolution from 
traditionalism to modernity previously experienced by more developed societies.  
In the period between the mid 1970s and the mid 1990s, American legal scholars turned 
their back on development studies after they lost faith in the ability of law to substantially 
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contribute to economic development.
427
 During this period economic development issues 
were reviewed and analysed as the proper domain of economists and political scientists. 
However, as the political and economic situation improved in the post-Cold War era and 
capitalist economies started growing at a rapid pace, both legal and economic academics 
and practitioners have become attuned to the potential economic functions of legal 
institutions. Their interests in the subject have led to a consensus that the overall “quality” 
of legal institution is an important determinant of development.
428
 
The core theoretical insight linking law to economic development
429
 stems from two 
distinct but closely related legal “institutions”, namely property rights and contracts and 
their effects on investment and trade development.
430
 Protection of property rights is one 
of the most paradigmatic examples of growth-enhancing institutions.  In simple words, 
the logic that links protection of property rights to economic development is that investors 
in new capital projects expect to have the required freedom to use and make profit from 
them. If investors believe that their capital may be expropriated or stolen, they will not 
make the investment in the first place; as North and Weingast put it, “the more likely it is 
that the sovereign will alter property rights for his or her own benefit, the lower the 
expected returns from investment and the lower in turn the incentive to invest.”431 
Comparative law and economic scholars argue that the more well-developed property 
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rights and the more secure the enforceability of a contract are, the greater incentives 
individuals have to invest.  
But, as “there is neither a standard energy policy nor a universal regulation model for all 
countries to follow”,432 one may pose a question on the identification of the benchmark 
against which one can evaluate the effectiveness and investor-friendliness of a given legal 
system.  An immediate answer is presented by many commentators on how to improve 
the Iranian legal system and that is through importing laws from ‘successful’ petroleum 
producing countries, particularly Qatar.
 433
 Such an approach may look convincing; 
however, an inherent risk that this approach embraces is that proposed legal changes 
derived from these grown out of local culture laws, although having the advantage of 
being tested already, may not take root when transplanted, due to influential historical, 
political, economic and cultural settings in which the importing state functions.
434
 Kanda 
and Milhaupt give the example of the inclusion in the Japanese Commercial Code in 1950 
of the “duty of loyalty”, taken directly from the United States for assuring good corporate 
governance: “For almost forty years after it was transplanted, the duty of loyalty was 
never separately applied by the Japanese courts, and played little role in Japanese 
corporate law and governance.”435 Therefore, to ensure these legal changes would bring 
about the same development results, as they did in their original countries, they should be 
evaluated within the context of the importing country’s political, economic, historical and 
cultural environment. 
In a new line of literature, developed by Cooter, the microeconomic foundations of the 
sources of the rules that allow the law and its enforcement mechanisms to adapt to a 
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modern economy and, by adapting, foster economic growth is studied.
436
 Cooter argues 
that efficiency and effectiveness are enhanced by a ‘bottom up’ process of capturing 
social norms that are already in place as ‘informally’ relevant in human interactions.437 In 
the comparative law and economic literature, two methods of “up bottom” and “bottom 
up” lawmaking are introduced where the latter encourages the regulator to apply the 
norms of the community, whether derived from social, cultural or historical backgrounds, 
to its lawmaking decisions. Thus, in practical terms, any reform or improvements in the 
laws, regulations and enforcement mechanism of a country, should embed in itself the 
legal, cultural, historical and social traditions of each country in order to enable the 
enhancement of economic efficiency and improvement of equity.  
Although legal reform and its role in promoting development has been supported by 
optimistic views, in the world of ideas such views have come under attack from a variety 
of directions. These attacks essentially challenge the assumption that law plays a 
significant causal role in development.
438
 In a wider context, scholars argue that 
implementing reforms in the legal system of a country, for example in case of Iran, does 
not necessarily bring about desired developments. As an empirical study by Perry shows, 
in the context of international economic activities, such as foreign direct investments, 
although neo-institutional economic theory predicts that foreign investors will be 
attracted to states with “effective” (i.e. stable, accessible, predictable and clear) legal 
systems, “ there is little empirical evidence to suggest that they are so attracted.”439  
Here, a distinction should be made between substantive and institutional law. In his book, 
The Law Growth Nexus, Dam strongly rejects any correlation between substantive law 
and improvement of the rule of law and maintains that “no degree of improvement in 
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substantial law-even world “best practice” substantial law- will bring the rule of law to a 
country that does not have effective enforcement.”440 The late Prof. Thomas Wälde also 
argued that there is no evidence proving that a developed and effective legal framework 
can be considered a necessary condition neither for economic development nor for a 
growth in international investments.
441
 He rejects the general assumption that very large 
investment projects, like those typical in oil and gas industry, would be carried out “on 
the basis of a developed, comprehensive, favourable and stable system of law.”442 Wälde 
presents the Persian Gulf region as an example where the world’s most massive oil and 
gas investments have been carried out, “without any basis in a developed system of law, 
but mainly on the basis of legally problematic state-investor agreements.”443 He continues 
even further and maintains that large investors are even less interested in the legal system 
as they have the skill, staying power and resources to implant themselves firmly in a host 
state setting; therefore, they rather “operate on the basis of their political-economic 
leverage than on the basis of law-and the restrictive tendencies often found in host state 
economic regulations.”444 Therefore, there are other non-legal factors which exert their 
influence on the economic development of a country.  
In the light of above, the over-estimated role that has been conferred to the law in 
development of the Iranian hydrocarbon sector should be carefully reassessed. In the area 
of foreign investment in the development of natural resources, policy would certainly 
play a stronger role and generate more pressure upon law. As Sir Elihu Lauterpacht puts 
it, “ scale, complexity and duration of the [oil and gas development] projects, coupled 
with the fact that they relate to a resource that is often a major, if not the major, element 
in the host country’s economic situation, means that mineral development is among the 
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most sensitive target of Governmental or public concern.”445 The role that the law plays is 
that it is interconnected to social, political, historical and economic factors, in a sense that 
the states’ choice of policy with regards to these factors will often be reflected in ‘positive 
law’;446 hence, law is essential to materialise these policies, but not sufficient. For 
example, during Khatami presidency, his reformist Government adopted the policy of 
promotion of foreign investment, hence adopted the FIPPA provisions in order to 
materialise the policy. 
Policy making in Iran is a challenging process. As explained in Chapter 3, politicisation 
and exertion of influence by multitude bodies of power, which is highly influenced by the 
history, has created serious confusion and uncertainty and made the country’s investment 
environment extremely unpredictable. In Iran, sceptical perceptions towards foreign 
investors have their roots in the country’s social and cultural norms, and are created and 
evolve by historical events. Therefore, unless changes are made in the decision makers 
and politicians’ perception towards foreign investors, any attempt to change in the legal 
system will be of little or no avail. In addition, the attraction and protection of foreign 
investors requires efficient and effective governance institutions which in Iran as a result 
of the syndrome of politicisation, such institutions have weakened and creating 
mismanagement and resulting corruption.  
4.5.2. The Role of Governance Institutions  
In a report published by the World Bank in 2012, Iran was ranked 150 out of 180 
countries in protecting investors.
447
 The report has taken into account criteria, such as 
property protection and contract enforcement, to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the bureaucratic and institutional governance of the examined countries.  
                                                          
445
 Lauterpacht, E. "Law and Policy in International Resource Development." Journal of Energy & 
Natural Resources Law 145, (1993): 145-54, p.146 
446
 Ohnesorge, K.M. "Developing Development Theory: Law and Development Orthodoxies and 
the Northeast Asian Experience." Journal of International Economic Law 28, no. 2 (2007), p.226 
447
 In the World Bank ranking Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq and the UAE are ranked 16, 100, 128 and 
128, respectively. ‘Doing Business-Iran, Islamic Republic.’, The World Bank, 2012 
153 
 
The protection of property rights and the enforcement of contracts, as identified before as 
two major elements of economic development, are endogenous to underlying political 
bargains and institutions.
448
 Governance institutions are identified by some scholars as a 
leading element in any country’s investment climate. Jorgenson and Aysan and et al 
explain that as investment decisions are mainly driven by profitability motives,
449
 and 
their forward looking nature,
450
 ‘good’ governance institutions can reduce the uncertainty 
and promote the efficiency required for improving bureaucratic performances and 
predictability and ultimately the cost of doing business.
451
  
In the majority of the resource-rich countries of the MENA region, including Iran, 
concerns and uncertainties related to the application of the rule of law as a result of 
discretionary power of the host state is more challenging than that of adopting a modern, 
investor-friendly legal framework. In the regulatory process what matters is the way the 
law works and not how it is formulated. The host state’s governance structure, including 
the judiciary system, must be reasonably stable, transparent and predictable and as Ulen 
puts it, it should not be “corrupt”.452 The lack of an efficient administrative and judicial 
capacity in most of the resource-rich countries of the region has caused significant 
transaction costs and corruption, creating a negative atmosphere over secure and 
profitable trade and investment in these countries.
453
 Corruption, widespread among these 
countries, weakens property rights, deprives investors of available compensation for risk-
taking and increases uncertainty about potential investment payoffs, directly impacting 
incentive to invest and in turn dampening economic growth.
454
 In 1995, Mauro, through 
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subjective indices based on surveys of investors, proved that higher corruption is 
associated with lower investment and growth.
455
 
In addition, consistent and non-discriminatory application of law is a crucial factor in 
creating trust. Property rights and security of contract constitute a powerful disciplinary 
constraints on the behaviour of both the host state and investor, “but only when they are 
consistently enforced.”456 A sound judiciary system is key to enforcement. The degree of 
judicial independence is correlated with economic growth. Better-performing courts have 
been shown to lead to more rapid growth of small firms as well as larger firms in the 
economy.
457
 As Haggard and et al put it a vicious circle of enforcement inefficiency will, 
first of all, make the judicial system to be a dependable institution diminishing investors’ 
confidence; secondly, it will cause an increase in production costs by diverting resources 
into rent-seeking process; and finally and most importantly, it will introduce distortion 
that constitute various barriers to long-run growth including “monopolies, restriction on 
entry, protectionism, misallocation of Government spending and private expropriation of 
assets through managerial malfeasance.”458  
The investment risks and uncertainties in Iran mostly stem from its weak, non-transparent 
and to a large extent corrupt governance institutions. Iran has a poor record in the just 
enforcement of contracts and fair protection of property rights which are of outmost 
importance to investors. Corruption and rent-seeking attitudes are widespread both in the 
judicial and administrative institutions particularly when dealing with the oil and gas-
related matters where financial interests at stake are enormous.
459
 Such weak and 
inefficient governance institutions will not certainly meet expectations of foreign 
investors in having the required level of protection. In other words, regardless of making 
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any reform in the country’s regulatory and contractual regime, so long as stable and 
effective enforcement bodies do not exist in Iran, once should not expect substantial 
development in attraction of foreign investment in Iran.  
4.6. Final Remarks  
This Chapter reviewed Iran’s legal and contractual framework for the development of its 
petroleum sector. It addressed the general presumption that had Iran adopted or 
transplanted the legal framework of ‘successful’ petroleum producing countries, it would 
have been in a better position to attract foreign capital and hence develop its natural 
resources. This Chapter, however, has challenged the validity of such general arguments. 
Some commentators’ opinions regarding the urgent need for major changes in the Iranian 
petroleum contractual regime lack the historical, cultural and social context within which 
Iran adopted these particular legal and contractual frameworks. Prior to making such 
prescriptions, due regard should be given to the applicability of a legal framework outside 
the cultural context in which it has been developed, bearing in mind the economic and 
political implications of using such law outside the cultural and social environment in 
which it has grown. Comparative law and economics scholars, including Mattei and 
Monti, recommend “approaching such fundamental and critical [issues] within a broad 
historical context in which present trends are not taken for granted and in which local 
specificities are fully appreciated in their political meaning.”460 
Given Iran’s prolonged scepticism towards the motivations of foreign investors and its 
concern about their influence over the country’s natural resources, it is very unlikely that 
the Iranian Government would abandon the buyback contracts and adopt PSAs or any 
other form of traditional contract for foreign investment in the petroleum sector.
461
  In 
addition, adopting other forms of contractual regimes would create severe judicial and 
                                                          
460
Mattei, U, and Monti, A. "Comparative Law and Economics: A Eauropean Perspective." 
Socierta italiana economia pubblica-Universita di Pavia, October 2003, p.18 
Shiravi, A., and S.N. Ebrahimi. "Exploration and Development of Iran's Oilfields through 
Buyback.", 2006; Energy Compass, “Iran Rules out Production-Sharing Deals." July, (2004); 
Otman, W.A. "The Iranian Petroleum Contracts: Past, Present and Future Perspectives."2007 
156 
 
political opposition in Iran. The Iranian courts, as a result of overwhelming and pre-
assumed prejudice and a harsh stand against foreigners -- as explained in Chapter 3 -- are 
likely to retain full jurisdiction over any such contracts signed with foreigners particularly 
where there is concern or even speculation that these may allow the latter to exploit 
Iranian national wealth. Thus, any drastic change in the contractual regime for the 
development of the country’s petroleum sector should be expected to face strong 
opposition from both the Parliament and the judicial system. Having said that, however, 
the fact that Iran does not want to, and will not, follow successful investment and 
contractual models for foreign investment in the petroleum sector (e.g. the Qatari model), 
due to its historical and cultural background, could mean that the country is depriving 
itself of investment and capital in its petroleum industry. 
However, as the evolutionary trend of buyback contracts since their inception shows, 
there are promising prospects that the Iranian Government will modify terms or adopt 
more favourable clauses in order to reduce investment risks for IOCs. Such an approach 
is also in line with the fact that the petroleum industry has changed significantly and IOCs 
are no longer in a position to threaten Iran’s sovereignty.462  
Foreign investors, including IOCs, can also play an important role in improving 
conditions of investment in Iran. They must strengthen their understanding of the 
historical, cultural and social background of the country which is particularly important in 
case of Iran, having bitter experiences of foreign participation in its hydrocarbon sector. 
Therefore, in order to reach a win-win situation, both parties should understand their 
differences and make efforts to address their concerns.  
In a broader spectrum, however, as long as Iran does not improve its governance 
institutions, and fails to offer confidence and certainty regarding the effective protection 
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of investors’ rights and just enforcement of their contracts, one should not expect 
significant positive changes in Iran’s foreign investment environment. 
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5. Chapter 5- Economic Challenges: Energy Subsidies and their 
Reform 
5.1. Introduction463   
As mentioned in Chapter 2, domestic consumption has had a remarkable growth rate in 
the last 30 years, reaching to 138bcm in 2011 (about 1400 percent increase).
464
 Low 
energy prices charged nationwide, due to Government’s subsidies, the requirement for 
natural gas reinjection to oilfields, population growth and industrial expansion are among 
some of the major reasons which make the country the 3
rd
 largest gas consumer in the 
world only after the U.S. and Russia.
465
 As we have seen in Chapter 2, except a relatively 
low export volume to Turkey which reached 8.4 bcm in 2011, almost all the gas produced 
in the country has been consumed domestically plus importing nearly 10bcm/yr from 
Turkmenistan to fill the domestic gas supply deficit. 
Iran, like most of the oil-exporting countries, has a long history of subsidising the 
consumption of petroleum products. In 2010, the IEA reported that Iran had the highest 
share of fossil fuel consumption subsidies in the world, amounting to nearly US$80 
billion, almost equivalent to 23 percent of the country’s GDP.466 Although political and 
social considerations, including public support and concerns over the disadvantaged 
groups, are usually put forward as reasons for subsidising energy consumption, subsidies 
are economically very costly and rarely serve the interest of the targeted groups.
467
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Subsidies have also had adverse impact on development of the natural gas sector; they not 
only encourage extensive and wasteful consumption of natural gas but also deter 
investment in the gas resources that are intended to supply domestic markets. The burden 
of losing profit through subsidising domestic consumption is weighting on the 
Government’s budget and the ability of NIOC to invest and develop the upstream sector. 
Moreover, very low domestic gas prices cause bias among the politicians in favour of 
export markets, undermining the economic and political benefits of prioritising the 
allocation of gas to the most economically beneficial enduse, be it domestic or 
international markets or potentially both.  
This Chapter aims to analyse the role of the Iranian subsidised natural gas market on 
development of the gas sector. It particularly addresses the energy subsidies reform 
process in Iran and tries to shed some light on the reform’s degree of success and its 
impact on development of the natural gas industry. The Chapter starts with a general 
overview of energy subsidies, their political and economic objectives and the justification 
for their reform. It continues with a brief review of the energy subsidies in Iran, including 
the history of subsidies and pricing mechanisms. In the last part, the Chapter elaborates 
on the recent energy reform plan and the impact of the reform on both the country’s 
overall economic status and development of its natural gas industry.  
5.2. An Overview of Energy Subsidies 
This section aims to provide a general background to energy subsidies and tries to set the 
stage for a more elaborate study of the Iranian energy subsidies. It therefore proceeds by 
reviewing the definition of energy subsidies presented by various stakeholders and then 
describes the Governments’ political and economic objectives for adopting the 
subsidisation policy. The section ends with enumerating the critiques to energy subsidies 
and reviewing the justifications for their reform. 
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5.2.1. Definition of Energy Subsidies                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
There is no universally agreed definition of subsidies,
468
 as the concept is described as 
‘too elusive’ to define.469 In simple terms, De Moor and Calamai define subsidies as “any 
measure that keeps prices for consumers below the market level or keeps prices for 
producers above the market level or that reduces costs for consumers and producers by 
giving direct or indirect support.”470 According to Fattouh and El-Katiri, this definition 
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(4) tax expenditures (e.g., tax exemptions, concessions, and deferrals); (5) below-market 
procurement prices, which act as a tax on producers and a subsidy for consumers; (6) equity 
participation in state-owned enterprises without an expectation of a market return or net lending to 
them at preferential interest rates; (7) regulations that alter market prices or restrict market access 
(regulatory subsidies); and (8) distribution of donor-provided commodities at below-market 
prices.” 
In addition, depending on the method of payment, subsidies can include direct payments to 
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services at above market price (procurement subsidies) and provision of goods and services at 
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which underlies the price-gap approach,
471
 “remains the most commonly used method for 
calculating subsidies due to its simplicity.”472 However, as the price-gap approach 
compares the actual price of a good or a service against a benchmark or reference price, 
reaching a universal agreement among international organisations over the choice of the 
reference price and consequently “a commonly agreed definition of subsidies has proven 
a major challenge in the G-20 context and countries have decided to adopt their own 
definition of energy subsidies.”473 
In a general context, the IEA defines an energy subsidy as “any Government action 
directed primarily at the energy sector that lowers the cost of energy production, raises 
the price received by energy producers or lowers the price paid by energy consumers.”474 
The IEA’s definition like other similar organisations, such as the World Bank’s approach 
towards subsidy estimation, is interpreted as a benchmark for evaluating the scale of 
subsidies based on differences between international and domestic markets prices.
475
 
However, such approach, has been criticised by OPEC, arguing that in energy resource 
well-endowed countries, the benchmark price to be used should be ‘the cost of 
production’;476 meaning that any Government  action which decreases the consumers’ 
prices lower than the cost of production should be considered as subsidy.  
The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) also provides 
a subsidy definition which is clearly based on a ‘production cost’ benchmark. Article 1 of 
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the Agreement stipulates that a “subsidy” exists when there is a “financial contribution" 
by a member state or public body that confers a "benefit".
477
 According to Article 1 of 
ASCM, a ‘benefit’ is granted when the ‘financial contribution’ is provided to “a recipient 
on terms that are more favorable than those that the recipient could have obtained from 
the market.”478 There is, however, an argument that based on the WTO definition of 
subsidies, as long as the consumers price is not below production costs, then it is difficult 
“to justify that a benefit had been conferred to domestic producers.”479 
Fattouh and El-Katiri argue that based on standard economic theory, “the most 
appropriate benchmark by which to compare domestic prices is the marginal cost which 
refers to the increment in total cost that results from a unit change in output.”480 Marginal 
cost alongside with the depletion premium constitutes the price for the “economic cost” of 
energy. In case of Iran, for example, where there is “gas surplus” and the gas reserves are 
expected to support the projected production for a long time, “the depletion premium 
becomes negligible and the gas price is close to the lower end of the range, i.e., the cost 
of supply.”481  
Given the existence of various benchmarks, in this study subsidies are defined as any 
Government’s measures which lower the prices of domestically consumed energy below 
its production cost; in other words, marginal cost benchmark is adopted to compare the 
prices of energy sold to domestic consumers with the cost of energy production 
throughout its entire supply chain; i.e. the investment and operating expenses, 
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transmission and distribution costs in order to determine the amount of conferred 
subsidies. As explained above, the forces for integration of domestic and international 
markets prices are stronger in importing countries where subsidisation of imports for 
domestic market inflicts heavy pressure on Governments’ budget.482 However such a 
price reference method has major limitations when dealing with the natural gas pricing in 
resource rich countries, like Iran. As mentioned above, energy experts at OPEC, are of 
the opinion that the reference price in such countries should be “based on their cost of 
production, rather than prices on international market.”483 This is mostly due to the fact 
that these countries use their resources to accelerate their general economic growth and 
that such an “approach more than offsets the notional loss of value by selling the resource 
internally at a price below the international price.”484 Moreover, in such countries, natural 
gas is extensively used as a substitute for oil which can be more easily exported in larger 
quantities; thus, a more logical price comparison would be between export prices for gas 
and export prices for oil.
485
  
5.2.2. The Political and Economic Objectives of Energy Subsidies 
Iran like many other major energy producing countries in the MENA region has been 
extensively subsidising fossil fuel consumption. As noted in Chapter 2, natural gas 
consumption has particularly had a rapid growth in the country’s domestic market as a 
result of upward economic growth, expansion of population, increase of gas utilisation in 
power generation as well as industrial diversification and development of energy-
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intensive industries.
 486
 Therefore, the objectives of subsidies vary, depending on social, 
economic and political considerations which encourage their implementation in a market 
economy.  
In social terms, energy subsidies are often used to alleviate energy poverty, promote 
economic development and create jobs by providing access to affordable energy services 
which ultimately result in enhancement of social welfare protection (social equity).
487
 
Subsidies are implemented as a method to protect the income of citizens, specially the 
vulnerable and the poor, from high fuel costs. Alternatively, Governments may provide 
subsidies to producers in order to reduce their production costs so the producers will then 
pass these lower costs on to end users by offering cheap consumer goods.
488
 
Subsidies may be used to improve access to modern forms of energy such as electricity. 
They can accelerate the expansion of necessary infrastructure, such as electricity grids 
into rural and remote areas, through direct producer subsidies that encourage investment 
in new infrastructure, or through consumer subsidies that reduce the cost of initial 
household connections to grids.
489
 
In industrial and production sectors, energy subsidies are put in place to support the 
development of industries and to boost employment. Energy intensive industries, such as 
cement, fertilisers and petrochemicals, are most likely to benefit from subsidies, as they 
cover a major portion of their intermediate cost. The rationale behind supply of cheap 
feedstock to such industries is to enable them to supply goods and services to consumers 
at affordable prices; to protect local industries against foreign competition; to increase 
their export competitiveness; and to enhance local employment.
490
 This is particularly 
important in case of Iran, as the country like many other petroleum-rich countries in the 
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region, is economically dependent on its hydrocarbon sector. The vulnerabilities, 
resulting from its exposure to the volatile international oil markets and its ‘rent-based 
political economy’, have forced the country to adopt economic diversification policy as a 
part of its larger development policies.
491
 Hence, providing domestically available raw 
materials, such as oil and natural gas at low prices are considered as a comparative 
advantage for leveraging economic growth.
492
 
Subsidies have also been used to offset temporary commodity price volatility by 
controlling energy prices. Subsidising domestic energy prices when prices in international 
markets are high “can smooth consumption in the face of highly volatile prices.”493 
Additionally, higher energy prices, where the nominal wages respond to increases in 
living costs, can stimulate inflation, posing concerns in Governments which already 
encounter inflationary pressures.
494
 Therefore, having subsidies in place, inflationary 
pressures can be to a large extent avoided. 
From a political point of view, the cheapest fuels are mostly provided by Governments 
that do not face “popular referenda”, a political move which is called “populist paradox”, 
by David Victor.
495
 Concerns over public unrest and instability, such as those seen across 
Arab world in 2011, have made these Governments to provide highly visible services at 
low costs to reduce political risks.
496
 Therefore, for them, artificially low prices are 
considered a rent distribution mechanism as a result of which “they voluntarily relinquish 
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the potential rent they would receive from gas exports at higher international prices, in 
favour of public and private-owned industries and household.”497 
5.2.3. Critiques of Energy Subsidies and Justifications for their Reform 
According to the IEA, subsidies that artificially reduce consumers’ prices for fossil fuels 
amounted to US$409 billion in 2010.
498
 Fossil-fuel subsidies, despite their initial 
designated objectives (see Section 5.2.2), “have proven to be an inefficient means of 
fulfilling those objectives, instead creating market distortions that encourage wasteful 
consumption and can lead to unintended negative consequences.”499 The subsidisation 
policy was less distorting in a low-oil price environment when prices were relatively 
stable and close to production costs. Rising prices of oil since the mid 2008 placed an 
onerous burden on Governments’ budget, making funding of subsidies insupportable to 
many countries, including both importing and exporting countries.
500
 In the case of Iran, 
further erosion of domestic energy prices vis-à-vis their international benchmarks 
happened in the light of rising domestic rates of inflation and subsequent exchange rate 
depreciations.
501
 The situation became even more challenging as the country has been 
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facing increasingly heavy sanctions, restricting the country’s access to financial resources 
(see Section 3.4.2).
502
 
Wasteful and inefficient consumption- cheap energy prices cause wasteful consumption 
mostly in the residential and commercial sectors as there are no incentives or pressure for 
efficient consumption of energy. Low prices also leave the industrial sectors with 
relatively no incentive to upgrade their old and inefficient capital stock with state-of-art 
technologies. In Iran, for example, gas-fired plants produce 3kWh of electricity for each 
standard cubic meter of gas, which comparing to international standards, a relatively large 
portion of the allocated gas is wasted.
503
 
Mistargeting- the major leakage of subsidies’ benefits to the top income groups of 
countries proves that “universal fuel subsidies are an extremely costly approach to 
protecting the welfare of poor households.”504 According to the Independent Evaluation 
Group (IEG) of the World Bank, the bottom 40 percent of the population in terms of 
income distribution receives only 15-20 percent of the fuel subsidies in developing 
countries.
505
 This would clearly make the lower income groups incur substantial welfare 
loss as their low initial consumption level would not absorb low energy prices to the same 
extent as high-income households.  
Threats to investment- fossil-fuel subsidies have an adverse impact on investment 
resources for development of energy infrastructure. In a subsidised energy market, 
investors are usually required to sell a portion of the gas at low prices to domestic 
markets which would substantially reduce the return on their investment. Hence, in the 
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absence of offsetting compensation payments to companies, fossil-fuel consumption 
subsidies reduce energy companies’ revenues, minimising their incentive for 
investment.
506
 In 2005, the IEA reported that “cheap gas prices in the Middle East and 
North Africa is considered as the main reason for lack of success in development of gas 
projects in the region”,507 causing lack of interests for capital investments.508 Valerie 
Marcel also argues that “to attract foreign investment, the first important step is to 
deregulate and eliminate the subsidised domestic energy market and to release more 
capital for investment in petroleum industry to enhance production.”509 Thus, the more 
subsidies for petroleum products the less money is available for capital investment for 
further development of the industry. 
Energy export capacity- the inefficient use of energy resulting from low prices hastens 
resource depletion and reduces the amount of energy available for export.
510
 Subsidies 
may even cause reduction of oil export capacity, directly affecting states’ vital source of 
revenue and indirectly jeopardising global energy security. In addition, low regulated 
prices and artificially high demand have made a few major oil exporting countries to rely 
on imports of refined petroleum products, or in case of Iran, on imports of natural gas. In 
countries with natural gas export commitments, domestic gas shortages resulting from 
cheap prices, may force Governments to response by curtailing or cutting-off exports (as 
has been the case in Iran-Turkey gas export deal). Taking such steps and defaulting on 
delivery obligations may inflict serious long-term costs for a gas exporting country, most 
importantly reputational damage.  
                                                          
506
Fattouh, B, and El-Katiri, L. "Energy and Arab Economic Development", Arab Human 
Development Report, 2013. p.17 
507
According to the IEA, MENA countries have the most subsidised markets in the world. "World 
Energy Outlook: Middle East and North Africa Insights,"  (Paris: International Energy Agency, 
2005). Also read "Betwixt petro-dollars and subsidies " In. (2008)  Surging energy consumption in 
the Middle East and North Africa States: International Energy Agency. 
508
 Marcel, V., Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East, 2006 
509
 Ibid, p. 152 
510
Laan, T. "The High Cost of Cheap Energy: Russia's Fossil-Fuel Subsidies Undermine 
Sustainable Development." In Bridges Trade BioRes: International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development 11 July 2011., p.7 
169 
 
Distortion of price signals- energy subsidies distort price signals, and by doing so, they 
distort the allocation of energy resources and may lead to “wasteful consumption and 
investment choices that do not reflect relative scarcities.”511 Clements et al argue that less 
distorted output prices will reduce deadweight losses in resource use, further boosting 
growth.
512
  
Environmental challenges- for many years subsidised fossil fuel consumption has been 
considered as an underlying cause of environmental problems, such as air pollution. In 
2006, the Energy-Environment Review (EER) estimated that only in Iran “without price 
reform and policy intervention, environmental damages cost would grow to US$12 
billion, or 6.6 percent of nominal GPD, by 2019.”513 Thus, phasing out subsidies of 
polluting substances would create incentives for conservation of energy, moderate 
increase of demand and most importantly encourage investment in energy efficient capital 
stock and development of renewable sources of energy.
514
  
Fuel smuggling- low energy prices also encourage fuel adulteration and smuggling 
across borders to neighbouring countries with higher fuel prices, which consequently 
promotes black market activities and corruption.
515
  
5.3. A Background to Iran’s Natural Gas Subsidies  
Low prices combined with delays in projects have caused a chronic shortage of natural 
gas to meet Iran’s domestic and international gas supply commitments.516According to 
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the IEA, just for 2010, energy consumption subsidies cost the Iranian Government US$80 
billion, of which around US$30 billion was the share of natural gas.
517
  
Figure 5.1- Economic Cost of Fossil-Fuel Consumption Subsidies (2010) 
 
Source: IEA (2010) 
Table 5-1- Share of Energy Subsidies in Selected Countries’ Natural Gas and the GDP 
(2010) 
 Total energy 
subsidies 
(US$ billions) 
Share of gas 
(percent) 
Total 
subsidies as  
percent of 
GDP 
Fiscal 
balance as  
percent of 
GDP 
Algeria 10.6 -- 6.6 -1.1 
Libya 4.2 6.2 5.7 8.7 
Egypt 20.3 11.8 9.3 -8.1 
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Saudi 
Arabia 
43.5 -- 9.8 6.7 
Qatar 4.2 34 3.2 2.9 
UAE 18.2 54.9 6 -1.1 
Iraq 11.3 2.5 13.8 -9.1 
Kuwait 7.6 11.8 5.8 22.6 
Iran 80.8 31.6 22.6 1.7 
Nigeria 2.9 -- 1.3 -8.5 
Angola 1.1 -- 1.3 7.7 
Source: IEA & IMF, cited in Darbouche (2012) 
A historical study of subsidies in Iran shows that, although they were initially introduced 
as an economic tool to support the poor and enhance social welfare, the Government later 
on faced major challenges as the result of their onerous economic and fiscal impact on its 
budget and overall economic development.  
5.3.1.  A Short History of Subsidies in Iran 
In Iran, subsidies have been considered an important means to protect the nation from 
domestic and international economic instabilities. Subsidies were in place as late as 
Safavi and Qajar dynasties, i.e. more than four centuries ago, when the ruling powers 
indirectly subsidised the food market by offering tax exemption or supplying free seeds to 
farmers.
518
 The first precedent of the Government’s direct intervention in the supply and 
demand trend of the food market goes back to 1932 when, following the enactment of a 
law, the Government, in order to combat famine, committed itself to buy cultivated wheat 
and store it in silos.
519
 Therefore, for many years, the Government tended to offer 
financial aid to the agricultural sector through either purchasing products at higher prices, 
if supply exceeded demand, or selling them cheaper to consumers in the event of surplus.  
Subsidisation, based on its current definition, was first introduced to Iran’s economy in 
the post World War II era, when the Government initiated subsidisation of energy and 
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stable foods consumption. By 1970s, the aggregate amount of subsidies that the 
Government paid for essential commodities was around IRR1668 million (equivalent to 
US$250 million).
520
 After the first oil price shock in 1975, the Government for the first 
time felt the heavy burden of the subsidies in the light of rising oil prices and 
continuously growing expectations of the population for rising living standards.  
After the Revolution, the Iranian Government, as a part of its ‘revolutionary social 
compact’, further developed the price control mechanism and subsidisation system.521 
Since the policy was applied nationwide, it was perceived as a basic right of national 
citizenship, “something that had been earned and deserved.”522 Soon after the Iran-Iraq 
war, to minimise economic hardship, the Government introduced rationing which was 
manifested in the form of subsidisation of energy, basic foods, medicine and utilities. The 
policy of population growth, which almost doubled the population from 34 million to 
around 60 million after the war, inflicted a heavy pressure both on the production sector 
and Government’s budget.523   
The challenges resulting from subsidies and their negative impact on the economy were 
first addressed after the war in the First Development Plan, enacted in 1989. According to 
the Plan, subsidisation of essential commodities shall target low-income groups with the 
aim of its gradual elimination. It was in the Third Development Plan (1999-2004) that the 
regulator explicitly highlighted the importance of targeting subsidies, particularly those 
for the energy carriers, with the aim of: 
- Rationalising consumption of subsidised products and preventing their smuggling; 
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- Promoting and encouraging investment and supporting domestic production of 
subsidised products; 
- Reducing the share of wealthy households and increasing the subsidies for low-
income families; and 
- Providing resources for development of infrastructure and creating jobs.524 
The issue of energy carriers’ subsidisation was also addressed in Article 3 of the 
amendment to the Fourth Development Plan (2005-2009), in which the Government was 
obliged to prepare and present to the Parliament a bill for revision of energy prices on 
annual basis.
525
 It was several years later that the Iranian Government took the required 
initiative to decisively address the issue of energy subsidies and the urgent requirement 
for their reform.  
5.3.2. An Overview of Domestic Natural Gas Pricing in Iran  
Domestic energy prices have historically been set ‘administratively’ in Iran. Since the 
penetration of natural gas in the country’s energy balance in early 1960s, the Government 
clearly pursued an incentive policy of natural gas domestic consumption. The history of 
Iran’s natural gas pricing dates back to 1960 when the first transmission pipeline was 
inaugurated, transferring Gachsaran natural gas to Shiraz.  In early 1961, the first natural 
gas consumer in Iran- Shiraz Namazi Hospital- received gas at IRR0.8/cm (around 
US$0.12), 20 percent below the price of the available alternative fuel, namely the fuel 
oil.
526
 In 1966, in order to promote consumption of natural gas in Shiraz industrial sector, 
the Government adopted a more encouraging policy based on the volume of consumption. 
Accordingly, consumers of more than 0.85mcm of gas (30 mcf) would benefit from a 
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special discounted rate which was IRR1/cm as oppose to IRR1.25/cm for consumption of 
any volume below the aforesaid threshold.
527
   
Following the expansion of natural gas consumption in Shiraz, the pricing for all sectors 
including households, commercial and Governmental premises, were all set below the 
‘general tariff’ category where prices for consumption of up to 1000cm per month of gas 
was IRR 2 (24.2 percent and 19.7 percent cheaper than kerosene and gas oil respectively), 
consumption of 1000-10000cm
 
per month was IRR 1.8 and any volume more than 
10000cm per month was charged IRR1.6.
528
 
In 1968, the natural gas pricing mechanism witnessed a significant change based on 
which three major criteria, namely geographical location, consumption volume, and 
consumption categories, i.e. public sector (including households, commercial and 
administrative premises), industrial sector and power plants, were taken into account for 
pricing natural gas.  
Table 5-2- Natural Gas Pricing based on Various Consumption Volumes and 
Categories (1968) 
Category  Consumption 
Rate (monthly) 
Tehran 
(IRR/cm) 
Public 
Sector 
(IRR/cm) 
Khouzestan
529
 
(IRR/cm) 
Public 0-1000 2.2 2 1.9 
1001-10000 2 1.8 1.7 
100001 &  
above 
1.8 1.6 1.5 
Industry 0-20000 1.2 1.1 0.8 
20001-200000 1.1 1 0.7 
200001-
2000000 
1 0.9 0.6 
2000000 & 
above 
0.9 0.8 0.6 
Power 
Generation 
-- 0.65 0.55 0.60 
Source: Nasr Esfahani, H (March-April 2009) 
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This pricing system remained unchanged until the Islamic Revolution when a new 
mechanism was adopted in which the only index for natural gas pricing was the 
consumers categories, i.e. households, commercial, industrial or power generation 
sectors. One of the advantages of this mechanism was that lower gas prices were 
designated for industrial and production sector in which due consideration was given to 
industrial growth and economic development. 
 
 
Table 5-3- Natural Gas Tariffs (1982-1990) 
 Category Gas Price ( IRR/cm) 
1 Household 5 
2 Commercial 5 
3 Industry 2 
4 Power Generation 2 
Source: Nasr Esfahani, H (March-April 2009) 
In the period 1990-96, the Government for the first time adopted a policy of increasing 
prices gradually. Concerns over growing consumption of gas in the household sector 
made the authorities to revise the mechanism and also include the level of consumption as 
a pricing index. To further control the household consumption trend, in 1997 a new 
pricing mechanism was introduced varying the pricing formula throughout the year. 
Depending on the level of consumption, for the first six months of the year, the prices 
varied between IRR12/ cm and IRR66/ cm and for higher than designated consumption 
rate, the prices were fixed through a new formula.
530
 For the second half of the year, i.e. 
autumn and winter based on the Iranian calendar, the same method was used with the 
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exception of the consumption level and tariff ceiling being increased to 1900 and IRR 
90/cm, respectively.
531
   
In 1998, a geographical index was also added to the formula and consequently the 
country was divided to 7 regions where gas tariffs fluctuated between IRR12/cm and 
IRR108/cm. The tariffs further increased in 2002 when for consumption of up to 600 cm 
of gas the price was set at IRR67/cm, and any amount between 600 cm and 2600 cm was 
charged based on a new formula.
532
 For consumption of more than 2600 cm, the tariff 
was fixed at IRR167/cm.
533
 Further changes were implemented in 2004 when tariffs for 
each category were fixed based on different months of the year. Two years later, in 2006, 
a new gas pricing mechanism was adopted based on a ‘consumption pattern’, meaning 
that depending on the region, the tariffs for consumption volume which was in line with 
the ‘pattern’ were fixed and any additional volume would attract an extra tariff.534  
Iranian Governments, both before and after the Revolution, tended to offer generous 
subsidies to stimulate energy and, in particular, natural gas consumption. It was not 
surprising that a few decades later, the emergence of a huge domestic market made the 
Iranian authorities adopt a reversal policy aiming at controlling, if not decreasing, the 
consumption rate.  
5.3.3. The Impact of Subsidies on Iran’s Natural Gas Development  
In addition to the harmful effects of the subsidies, the negative consequences of low gas 
prices on its natural gas industry have been further intensified in the light of the country’s 
insufficient production capacity and its expansive domestic market policies. The 
challenges resulting from low gas prices and the consequent huge domestic market are 
diverse, and impact substantially on every segment of the Iranian gas industry.  
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Since the early 1990s, the Government has pursued the policy of substituting natural gas 
in the industrial sector to free up more crude oil and petroleum products for export. It has 
also persistently expanded the domestic market by aggressively developing its national 
transmission and distribution network (see Sections 2.6 and 2.7). This policy created 
serious challenges for the Government in supplying adequate volume of gas for oilfields 
re-injection and export projects (see Chapter 6). The declining rate of oil recovery and the 
country’s notorious gas export to Turkey which has witnessed several cut-offs, 
particularly during high consumption period, are put forward by experts as some of the 
major impact of the growing domestic market (see Chapter 2). Shortage of gas has also 
forced power plants and gas-based petrochemical plants to either switch to other fuels, 
such as gasoline and fuel oil or lower or even temporarily cut off their gas utilisation 
during winter.
535
 Furthermore, low gas prices, combined with the international sanctions, 
have significantly curtailed the financial resources available for development of the 
natural gas production capacity, contributing to delays in bringing major projects 
onstream (see Section 3.4.2). 
The emergence of the unexpected title of Iran as a ‘net gas importer’ can partially be 
attributed to its massive domestic market. The Iran-Turkmenistan import gas project 
came on stream in 1997 in an anticipation of Iran’s inability to supply gas to the north and 
north-east parts of the country particularly in the light of the region’s poor transmission 
facilities (see Section 2.10)  
Low gas prices have also created a bias in favour of export projects, undermining the 
actual and potential needs of the domestic markets. In the absence of a clear price signal, 
the allocation of gas resources to various options, such as domestic market, oil field re-
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injection and export will be distorted and fail to efficiently reflect the maximum value of 
natural gas resources.
536
  
5.4. The Energy Subsidies Reform in Iran 
The urgent requirement for subsidy reform was a matter of absolute consensus among 
Iranian politicians as the status quo was agreed to be costly, wasteful, unfair, counter-
productive and altogether unsustainable.
537
 With around 1 percent of the world’s 
population, Iran consumed around 5 percent of the global gas produced in 2010 and was 
ranked as the 3
rd
 largest gas consumer in the world after the U.S. and Russia.
538
 Per 
capital natural gas consumption in Iran was 2.5 and 1.5 times bigger than the most 
populous countries in the world -India and China- and more than twice that of Germany, 
Europe’s most industrialised country.539 According to the IEA, during the sharp oil price 
increase of 2008, funding the growing bulk of subsidies cost the Iranian Government an 
unprecedented US$120 billion.
540
 A year later, the drastic, though short-lived, fall in oil 
prices also hard hit the country’s financial ability to support subsidies.541  
Table 5-4- Iran Fossil Fuel Consumption Subsidies (US$ billions)  
Fuel 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Oil 36.56 53.78 29.20 40.92 
Gas 18.78 32.03 24.12 25.49 
Coal 0 0 0 0 
Electricity 9.22 15.19 11.31 14.43 
Source:  IEA (2011) 
Iran has also been increasingly facing tighter economic sanctions, which by cutting off 
the country’s financial sector from the rest of the world, have effectively reduced the oil 
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revenues on which the budget largely depends.
542
 Not surprisingly, the resulting explicit 
and implicit fiscal costs to the Government’s budget were so immense that the 
Government felt it must act. These difficulties actually strengthened political willpower 
in Iran which played a key role in the initial success of the reform plan. In 2010, after 
several failed attempts by previous Governments, the Ahmadinejad administration 
undertook what the IMF called one of the boldest economic makeovers ever attempted in 
the oil-rich Middle East to reform energy subsidies.
543
  
5.4.1. The Targeted Subsidies Reform Act 
Noting their immense impact, Iranian politicians finally reached an agreement to phase 
out subsidies. The Government subsequently submitted the reform bill before the 
Parliament which included objectives, such as promotion of standards of living, equal 
distribution of wealth, control of fuel smuggling as well as enhancement of country’s oil 
and gas export capacity and reduction of waste and rationalisation of consumption.
544
 
Although there were some major disagreements between the Government and the 
members of the Parliament over some details of the Act, such as the price increase 
benchmark and Government’s aggregate revenue resulting from price increase, The 
Subsidies Reform Act was finally enacted in January 2010 with an expected 
implementation from the beginning of the Iranian New Year (21
st
 March 2010). However, 
concerns over political unrest, particularly during the aftermath of the controversial 
presidential election in June 2009, instability of the Iranian foreign exchange market and 
double-digit inflation rate, postponed the actual reform implementation until December 
2010. The reform was planned to be implemented within a five-year period overlapped 
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with the country’s Fifth Five-Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan 
from 2010 to 2015.
545
 
5.4.1.1. What does the Act Say? 
The Targeted Subsidies Reform Act (henceforth the Reform Act) calling for a gradual 
increase of energy prices within a five-year period (2010–2015). The retail prices of 
petrol, diesel, fuel oil, kerosene and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) are required to 
increase to no less than 90 percent of Persian Gulf free on board (FOB) prices. Natural 
gas retail prices are also envisaged to increase to at least 75 percent of average export 
prices after deducting transmission costs and export taxes. In order to manage future fuel 
price volatility, the Reform Act authorized the Government to absorb up to 25 percent of 
the FOB Persian Gulf prices increases (relative to FOB Persian Gulf prices of 2010 when 
the Reform Act came into force) through further subsidization without changing the 
consumer price. Furthermore, Note 3 of Article 2 envisages minimum and maximum 
revenue of IRR100 thousand billion and IRR200 thousand billion (approximately US$10 
and US$20 billion) from price increases in the first year of the reform.
546
 
As many citizens consider cheap energy prices as an entitlement, the Iranian Government 
faced some major challenges in countering potential social unrest. Thus, to compensate 
the nation for higher energy prices, the law has authorized payments of a maximum of 50 
percent of the fiscal revenue resulting from prices increase to the population in the form 
of:  
- In-cash and in-kind payments, bearing in mind each family’s level of income; and 
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- Social security system, including introduction of national health insurance, job 
creation and house mortgage loans.
547
  
The Reform Act has also designated payment of a 30 percent share of the income from 
prices increase to support industries and producers through interest subsidies on loans for 
the adoption of new energy-saving technologies and credit lines to reduce the impact of 
higher energy costs on cash-flow.
548
 The remaining 20 percent share has been allocated to 
the Government to cover subsequent increases in its costs and to improve its 
infrastructure.
549
 
5.4.1.2. Post-Reform Natural Gas Prices   
After the reform, natural gas prices were increased 100-300 percent depending on the 
sector. As shown in the Figure 5.2, the minimum price increase was implemented in the 
public sector, from IRR690 to IRR2000/cm, and the maximum price increase targeted the 
transportation sector from IRR 80/cm to IRR 2600/cm, respectively. 
Figure 5.2- Average Natural Gas Price Increase 2010 (IRR/cm)
 
 
Source: Ministry of Energy (2011) 
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In the household sector, which is one of the major gas consuming sector, a multi-tier tariff 
structure was adopted in which tariff rates varied based on consumption volume, 
geographical region and season (see Appendix 4).
550
  
The country was also divided into 5 geographical regions in which tariffs vary depending 
on the region’s overall temperature.551 The use of multi-tier tariffs mechanism played a 
significant role in moderating the impact of the price increase on small-users, particularly 
the poor.
552
 
5.4.1.3. The Actual Implementation of the Subsidies Reform Plan 
In the first year of the reform, the implementation of the reform plan was hailed as a 
success as it did not entail any significant public unrest or major inflationary impact.
553
 
As mentioned above, concerns over public unrest with limited the success of previous 
attempts at subsidy reform. Endorsed by the international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank and IMF, the reform plan surprisingly received an overall public acceptance. 
This has been reportedly due to the “excellent” communication strategy and extensive 
public relations’ campaign which educated and familiarised the nation with the reform 
process, including the negative impact of the subsidies, energy price rise and envisaged 
benefits.
554
 The cash payment policy to every citizen prior to the effective date of reform 
(though access to deposits was frozen until the day when energy prices were increased) 
has also been a decisive factor in successful launch of the plan.
555
 The application process 
was very simple and Iranians only needed to file applications to receive the 
compensation. The Iranian banking system was also swiftly upgraded to handle direct 
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cash payments to the beneficiaries’ accounts in addition to 16 million new accounts 
which were opened to handle the nationwide cash transfers. 
The actual timing of the reform also played a crucial role in the initial success of the plan. 
Consideration was given to the lowest energy consumption period of the year with less 
personal travel, air conditioning demand and completion of harvest season. The 
controversial presidential elections in 2009, during which the Iranian Government 
showed the public that it was willing to use force to put down unrest, also gave the 
Government more confidence to implement the reform. 
Before the start of the reform, and in order to control the inflation rate, the Iranian 
authorities adopted several policies to stabilise the exchange rate. The Central Bank’s 
governor frequently made public statements, reassuring people of the country’s strong 
international exchange and gold reserves and the growing trend of oil prices which could 
provide the treasury with sufficient inflows of foreign exchange.
556
 Moreover, 
administrative policies were adopted to prevent producers and retailers from increasing 
prices of staple commodities in the anticipation of the reform, in addition to publicly 
advertising measures for direct distribution of many of the basic staples and commodities 
to counter panic buying.
557
 
The Reform Act and the Government’s actual practice, however, received many 
criticisms both from the politicians and economists. In the Reform Act itself, many 
crucial points remained unclear including the level and frequency of price adjustments for 
fuels, the definition of those eligible for compensatory payments and the amount and 
duration of those payments. This left the door open for the Government to implement the 
Act based on its own interpretation which, in many respects, was not in compliance with 
the overall objectives of the plan.  
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As explained above, in order to control inflation and minimize the resulting economic 
pressure on the population, the Reform Act stipulated a gradual price increase to no less 
than 90 percent of the FOB Persian Gulf prices. It, however, failed to define a clear rate 
based on which prices should reach to their international market level within a five-year 
period. It also failed to address the issue of price volatility in international markets and 
the resulting challenges of how to pass the prices on to the population, should they 
increase substantially.  
The Iranian Government insisted that “the price increase had to be meaningful to be able 
to effectively reduce energy demand.”558 As a result, the Government took the “shock 
therapy” approach and substantially increased prices in order to counter the excessive 
energy consumption and to ensure an increase in real price of fuels in the light of the 
annual inflation rate, the increase in international prices and the exchange rate 
depreciation.
559
 Its approach, unsurprisingly, received oppositions from members of the 
Parliament, who were expecting a gradual price increase of 20 percent per year. The 
Parliament criticised the Government for creating an uncontrollable rate of inflation 
through such a sudden and dramatic price rise (for some energy products, such as diesel 
around 80 percent of their international prices- as of 201 - in one go).
560
 The rate at which 
the Government increased the prices in the first reform phase and its intention to further 
increase the prices in the second phase
561
 raised concerns among members of the 
Parliament over the Government exceeding the “no less than 90 percent of Persian Gulf 
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FOB price increase” provision as stipulated by the Reform Act.562 Hence, the Parliament 
in April 2012 amended the Act to place a cap on energy prices increase of “no more than 
90 percent of Persian Gulf FOB price.”563 
The Reform Act also authorized in-cash and in-kind payment of a maximum 50 percent 
of the revenue resulting from prices increase to families, giving consideration to their 
average income. Cash transfers allowed consumers choice while the cost to the budget 
was known with greater certainty than in the case of generalised subsidies and they were 
also aimed at low income families.
564
 The Act, however, did not establish a method or set 
a benchmark on which to evaluate families’ level of income, nor did it specify the exact 
amount of monthly cash payments. This left the Iranian Government with major 
difficulties in identifying the target groups. As Iran has never had an effective and 
systematic data-collection mechanism, the Government had to announce that all Iranians 
living in the country were eligible to receive monthly cash payments of IRR455,000 
(around US$45).  
In the first year of the reform, from December 2010 to December 2011, the cash payment 
to 73 million Iranians cost the Government IRR33,000 billion (equivalent to US$3 billon) 
every month. Despite the Government’s revenue of around IRR300,000 billion 
(equivalent to US$30 billion) from the price increases in the first year of the reforms, 
which far exceeded the total annual gain of US$10–20 billion as stipulated by the Act, the 
actual public cash payment in the corresponding year was approximately IRR450,000 
billion (equivalent to US$ 44 billion).
565
 In order to cover the IRR15,000 billion 
(equivalent to US US14 billion) deficit, the Government , in addition to taking loans from 
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the Central Bank,  distributed the 30 percent and 20 percent shares allocated for industries 
and the Government  itself; it also used tax revenues and the development funds of 
Ministries of Oil and Energy to pay for the monthly cash hand-outs.
566
  
5.5. The Impact of the Energy Subsidies Reform  
Since its implementation, subsidies reform plan has had diverse impacts on the Iranian 
economy as a whole. The reform process can be divided into two periods with different 
degrees of impact: the first period which overlaps with the first year of the reform with 
some degree of success, and the second period which started from January 2012 and 
onwards with drastic impacts on the economy, also intensified by the new round of 
international sanctions. 
5.5.1.  The Impact on Iran’s overall Economy 
One of the major concerns about eliminating the subsidies in Iran was the inflationary 
impact it might have on the economy. There was speculation that increasing energy prices 
can cause two kinds of inflationary effects. It could increase the direct energy expenditure 
of households and secondly, by raising the input prices of energy, it would increase the 
production cost of other goods and services.
567
 Also as the Government had planned to 
focus on universal cash-payments (as opposed to the potential in-kind compensation 
measures), there were concerns that the central bank’s money creation approach would 
increase the liquidity and further add to the inflation.    
In the first year of the reform, despite all the concerns and pessimisms, the plan started 
with no major political and social unrest thanks to the Government’s generous cash-
payments aiming at “alleviating all Iranians from poverty”.568 High oil prices also helped 
the Government to load the treasury with massive foreign-exchange reserves, preventing 
a sharp increase in the inflation rate as the Government artificially kept foreign exchange 
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rates low. As Iran’s economy is import-based, such a policy encouraged commodity 
imports and kept prices down.
569
 It also helped the industrial and producing sectors to 
import their raw materials at a competitive price. A few months into the reform however, 
increasing liquidity, subsequent increase of commodities’ prices as a result of the increase 
in the producers’ energy inputs, downgrade and bankruptcy of many businesses, rising 
unemployment and the Government’s failure to provide the industrial sector with the 
designated support package to a large extent offset the Government’s anti-inflationary 
policies. The situation became even more dire as the second year of the reform which 
coincided with the imposition of the hardest ever sanctions on Iran (see Section 3.4).  
As one of the motivations for reform was to minimise the impact of the international 
sanctions on the country’s treasury, the Government has apparently failed to consider the 
other side of the coin which was the potential detrimental impact that any new set of 
sanctions could have on the country’s economic stability. As explained in Chapter 3, 
sanctions created exchange rate instability causing a 250 percent depreciation of the 
currency and ramping up the inflation rate. Rising inflation reduced the value of the cash 
payments and the ability of the population to cope with the rising costs of commodities.
570
 
Also as the energy prices, according to the Reform Act, are linked and should be adjusted 
based on the FOB Persian Gulf prices, the depreciation of the Iranian currency has caused 
the return of a major part of the subsidies back into the energy market. The practical 
implication of the currency depreciations can be found in substantial increase of fuel, 
particularly diesel smuggling to the neighbouring countries.
571
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Inconsistent and contradictory evidence complicates assessment of the impact of energy 
subsidies reform on the industrial and producing sectors.
572
 The industrial sector in Iran 
was already at a competitive disadvantage because of high cost of labor, economic 
sanctions, old capital stock and an unstable foreign exchange market. The 30 percent 
share of Government revenue from price reform to support industries and producers was 
expected to be a significant stimulus to Iran’s domestic production and further 
diversification efforts.
573
 As illustrated in the Figure 5.2, the rise of energy prices in the 
industrial sector was among the highest in the recent price increases, causing high 
production costs. At the same time, for fear of triggering public unrest resulting from 
increase in commodity prices, Government authorities prohibited producers and retailers 
from increasing the prices of their products, conducting frequent inspections to enforce 
the policy.
574
 Facing, on the one hand, rising production costs and, on the other hand, 
strict price controls from the Government, industries found it very difficult to remain 
profitable. Based on reports from members of Parliament and chambers of commerce, 
this has caused many small- and medium-size businesses to go bankrupt or downgrade 
their businesses, adding to the country’s unemployment rate.575 At the same time, 
allocation of almost all acquired revenues from price increases to cash payments, in the 
absence of an active and productive industrial sector, has caused a significant rise in 
imports and loss of the revenues that were supposed to be reinvested in industries to 
create jobs and to encourage economic growth.  
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5.5.2. Implications for the Iranian Natural Gas Industry  
In the natural gas sector, like other energy sectors, there were expectations that potential 
savings from reduction of domestic consumption could increase to the country’s export 
capacity. It was also predicted that the revenue resulting from the export of energy 
products could support a “virtuous cycle of investment in the energy sector” that would 
further increase production and subsequently enhance export capacity.
576
 In practice, 
however, natural gas price increase did not have major downward impact on its domestic 
consumption. According to the NIGC annual report, in the first year of the reform, total 
gas consumption grew by 9 percent.
 577
 The exception was the household sector where 
consumption decreased by 1.5 percent. The reduction in the household consumption 
reportedly encouraged diversion of gas to the industrial sectors, particularly power 
generation, reducing the risk of power cuts and blackouts.
578
Also, in the second year of 
the reform, the consumption is estimated to have increased by 8 percent as a result of 
further expansion of the national grid (see Section 2.7).
579
 Hence, considering the 
growing rate of gas end-users in Iran, it is not surprising to find no major reduction in 
natural gas consumption despite substantial price increase.  
In terms of gas export capacity, although the export volume to Turkey almost doubled 
and reached to 9.1 bcm in the first year of the reform, the increase can hardly be 
attributed to the subsidies reform.
580
 An account of Iran’s production capacity in the same 
year shows that the 3.9-percent increase in the country’s production capacity (an 
additional 5bcm production) is to a large extent the main reason for increase of the 
country’s export capacity.  
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Furthermore, the country has not been successful in injecting the capital investment 
needed for development of the gas industry. Based on Iran’s Fifth Five-Year 
Development Plan, the country has aimed at producing 1.3 bcm/d of gas, which according 
to Owji, requires an investment of US$6 billion per year.
581
A major part of this 
investment was expected to come from subsidies elimination which was also put forward 
by the Government as one of the main incentives for reform plan. As mentioned above, 
out of US$30 billion revenue that the Government gained from the energy prices increase 
in the first year of reform, 30 percent (US$9 billion) was the share of the industrial sector, 
including natural gas development projects. As the Government has been very much 
concerned about potential social unrest, not only the industries’ share but also a portion of 
the funds allocated in the annual budget for petroleum projects, was redistributed among 
the population leaving the Government to support infrastructure projects, particularly 
those in the natural gas industry.
582
  
As a result of the Government’s malpractices in implementation of the reform plan 
combined with its policy of ‘aggressive’ expansion of the domestic gas market and its 
failure to increase the production capacity, the subsidies reform is unlikely to play a 
major role in substantial development of Iran’s natural gas industry at least in the short 
and possibly medium term- be it in consumption reduction or development of resources 
by re-investing the acquired revenues. Additionally, as consumption and production are 
growing almost at the same rate, the pre-reform challenges, including shortages of gas for 
oil field re-injection projects, the country’s dependence on gas imports and difficulties in 
meeting its export commitments, are likely to persist.
583
 
                                                          
581
 Owji, Javad. "Tahaghoghe Ahdafe San'ate Gaz( Materialisation of Gas Industry’s Objectives)." 
Shana, NIOC official news website (October 2012) 
582
 Guillaume, D, et.al. "Iran: The chronicle of the Subsidy Reform." 2011 
583
 On 27 November 2012, the NIOC’s official news website, Shana, quoted from Javad Owji that 
the Oil minister, Rostam Qasemi, has requested increase of importing gas volume to Iran 
following a visit to Turkmenistan.  Owji, Javad. "Tavafogh Jadid Iran Va Torkamanestan ( Iran-
Turkmenistan New Deal)." Shana, NIOC official news website (27 November 2012) 
191 
 
Drawing firm conclusions from Iran’s subsidy reforms, in the light of its unique 
economic situation, is a challenging task. Subsidies reform began at one of the most 
challenging times, politically and economically, since the 1979 Revolution.
584
 The 
Government’s failure in implementation of the reforms, combined with the harsh impact 
of international sanctions, caused dramatic economic consequences directly affecting its 
overall success of the reform. A sharp rise in inflation, inducing people to seek a “safe 
haven” (i.e. dumping the Iranian rial for gold and foreign currencies), causing widespread 
bankruptcies among industries and producers are some of these negative impacts.
585
  
The cash-transfer mechanism which was introduced to minimize the impacts of subsidy 
reform has evolved to help the population to cope with soaring inflation due to economic 
sanctions, currency depreciation and rising commodity prices. The Government has so far 
failed to maintain the macroeconomic stability of the economy, which was essential to 
prevent a rapid erosion of the benefits of the reform. There is speculation that the 
subsidies are at risk of creeping back as Government is increasing its control over 
prices.
586
 Therefore, Iranian subsidies reform plan can be criticised from various angles: 
Errors of inclusion- In Iran cash-handout to 73 million citizens left the country not only 
with no fiscal savings but also created a growing inflation rate which significantly 
undermined the actual value of the payment made to the population. Cash transfers were 
initially designed to exclude spill-over to better-off groups. Government failure to target 
the mitigation measures to low-income families undermined the equity and efficiency 
aims. Therefore, cash payment should have targeted poor households as opposed to 
universal subsidies.  
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Time-limits- Perpetual cash payment had not been the objective of the subsidies reform. 
A time-limited exit strategy for targeting subsidies and phasing out cash payments was 
required to be defined from the very beginning.  
Non-hostile international environment- Rapid reform required a favourable political 
and economic environment. As reviewed above, lack of such an environment created an 
unfavourable situation in which the resulting foreign exchange volatility and increasing 
inflation rate caused serious challenges over the future success of the plan.  
Transparency- Since the beginning of the reform and even during ratification of the 
Reform Act, chronic disagreements between the Iranian Parliament and Government have 
caused excessive division and rivalry among bodies of powers. This diminished 
cooperation and coordination between the Parliament and president causing expression 
and publication of inconsistent and contradictory reports and interpretations. It also made 
the task of scientific analysis of the reform very challenging.  
To sum up, long-term success of the reform requires the adaptation of some key policies, 
including: 
- Reducing the number of cash recipients in order to control liquidity and to free up 
funds for reinvestment in infrastructure projects; 
- Providing long-term, low interest financial support for industrial sectors to increase 
output and employment through increased efficiency; 
- Replacing cash payments with in-kind measures, such as health insurance, 
education, investment in public transport and creating pension funds, to minimise 
Government  borrowing from the central bank;  
- Improving international relations and enhancing cooperation between the 
Government and Parliament. 
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6. Chapter 6- Allocation Options: Gas for Export Markets or 
Domestic Consumption?  
6.1. Introduction   
In this Chapter, it is intended to examine and contrast the domestic and export options 
facing Iran in the utilisation of its gas. Lack of data makes this a very challenging task, 
but it is essential to at least attempt such an analysis in order to evaluate the different 
domestic views which have been expressed on the subject, and to highlight the issues 
which need to be taken into account to reach a robust conclusion in this regard.  
As we have seen in Chapters 2, 3 and 5, the expansion of gas production capacity has 
been increasingly constrained as various projects have been delayed, postponed or 
cancelled. Since 2010, mobilisation of capital, at large-scale for petroleum projects, had 
become almost impossible as a result of international sanctions. Low gas prices and 
political bias in favour of domestic consumption have inflated the size of the country’s 
gas market, reducing availability for exports, but at the same time, created strong 
economic arguments in favour of the latter. This has caused a prolonged debate between 
Iranian politicians and decision makers about overall economic, political and social 
benefits of allocating gas resources to export or domestic markets, which has contributed 
to further postponement or cancellation of projects. Since the commercialisation of its 
natural gas resources in the late 1960s, the country has adopted various, and in most cases 
contradictory, policies as to the best use of its gas resources. While in the pre-revolution 
era, priority was given to natural gas exports, domestic consumption was extensively 
pursued post 1979 by the revolutionary Government. Constant changes in natural gas 
resource allocation policy have received many criticisms from scholars about the 
country’s failure to optimally allocate its natural gas resources to different uses.587 
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The issue of optimal allocation of natural resources is very complicated as it requires an 
in-depth economic analysis of the maximisation of economic returns from allocation of 
resources to different options. Depending on the nature of resources, market conditions 
and a given country’s overall economic policy, optimal allocation options may vary. In 
case of Iran, where the country persistently follows multiple allocation policies, the 
availability of adequate gas supply is a fundamental priority. Scarcity is the major 
element in optimal resource allocation; meaning that when a resource is scarce and 
inadequate to meet the needs of all markets, optimal allocation analysis helps 
Governments to allocate resources to the most economically attractive end-users.  
The concept of ‘economic maximisation’ is also addressed in economic literature. The 
‘Neoclassical’ economic theory of optimal energy resource allocation underlies the basic 
logic for “maximisation of the present value of some stream of economic returns.”588 The 
fundamental assumption is that “economic actors are motivated to make choices by the 
goal of maximising some measures of economic return.”589 Therefore, according to the 
Neoclassical theory, the optimal allocation policy is selling the resources at “whatever 
price to those classes of customers willing to pay the most in excess of their cost of 
supply.”590 In other words, the relevant criterion is divergence between prices and costs of 
supply.
591
 Therefore, the most important issue which should be addressed in the optimal 
allocation discussion is the issue of pricing. Economic optimality requires that the gas 
prices are based on ‘economic cost’ and, according to Hotelling, reflect exhaustibility of 
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resources.
592
 The idea of ‘economic maximisation’ arises from gas prices which reflect 
opportunity cost. In case of domestically supplied gas, for example, the price should 
equal to the long-run marginal cost (LRMC) of gas supply and a depletion premium.  
Notwithstanding the importance of economic objectives in the allocation of resources, the 
issue of ‘distributional impact’ and ‘welfare maximisation’ inevitably offers challenges to 
mere economic analysis of the natural resource allocation. The growing population and 
economic development increase demand for depletable resources which could in return 
have a profound effect on the production level and the level of welfare in the future.
593
 
Within a social context, the allocation of resources is optimal if it is efficient and 
equitable.
594
 Efficiency and equity define social optimality as a necessary component for 
maximisation of society’s welfare.595 When allocating efficiently and equitably “it is 
impossible to make one member of the society better off without making some other 
worse off” and “the final distribution of goods and services is fair.”596 The distribution of 
natural resources wealth across the economy has important political-legal rationale as all 
citizens have an equal claim, and for this reason “they often have strong feelings of 
entitlement to their resources and the revenues they provide.”597 It is as a result of the 
same sense of entitlement to hydrocarbons that in hydrocarbon-rich countries, fuel 
subsidies are a common and very popular policy. 
Resource-rich countries of the MENA region have been remarkably dependent on energy 
resources for the economic development and the improvement of the national welfare. 
Abundant energy at low cost is fundamental for industrialisation and increasing of 
standards of living. In Iran, low prices in gas-based industries, such as petrochemical 
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plants, have offered competitive advantages to the domestic producers, created jobs and 
generated revenues for the Government. Natural resources constitute a significant portion 
of the Governments’ revenues. They are volatile and exhaustible and belong to all 
citizens of the country in which they are located. Resource revenues almost invariably 
flow through Government budgets on their way to citizens. But there are two features of 
natural resource revenues that are distinctive from general revenues. First of all, “their 
time profile is distinctive: revenues are volatile, driven largely by the volatility of 
commodity prices, and they are, in principle, temporary [...]; the second unique feature of 
resource revenues is their ownership: all citizens have an equal claim on them.”598 As a 
result, citizens of resource-rich countries generally have “a strong sense of entitlement to 
their resources, a sentiment sometimes known as ‘resource nationalism’.”599 This is a 
right which is also highlighted in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803. 
Although the resolution reaffirms the nations’ permanent sovereignty over their natural 
resources, it conditions the use of resources for “the well being of the peoples”. 600 A 
state’s sovereign right to freely explore, exploit and dispose of its natural resources, and 
the assertion that “the extent to which the peoples in a resource-rich State...are entitled to 
(extra) benefit from resource exploitation...is a matter of domestic policy”,601 meaning 
that the expansion of the concept of “well-being” or “beneficial use” of resources is 
connected to states’ sovereign right over natural resources.602 States shall operate in such 
a way to ensure that the well-being of their citizens is derived from [their] efficient 
allocation of the resources. Therefore, permanent sovereignty is “as much an issue of 
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state duties as it is one of state rights”603; that is the state’s duty of maximisation of 
national wealth to accelerate economic development. 
Nevertheless and as reviewed in Chapter 5, distributional objectives often lead to major 
economic and allocation distortions and inefficiencies. Therefore, striking a balance 
between economic efficiency and equity and as Allsopp and Stern put it “the transition 
from distorting to less distorting ways of meeting distributional objectives” is vital in the 
allocation of resources, though this has proved to be very difficult in nearly all 
countries.
604
 
It is clear that in order to conduct a thorough analysis on the subject of gas pricing and 
optimality of resource allocation, certain conditions should be met: first of all, the 
analysis can only be done through a quantitative framework, embracing extensive 
numerical and sensitivity analyses; it also requires econometric analysis, and ideally an 
economic model allowing the analysis of domestic and international energy markets. 
Finally and most importantly, this type of work requires access to reliable data for prices 
of natural gas and other fuels charged domestically and internationally, long-run average 
incremental cost (LRAIC), the price of oil, capital cost, investment data sets, 
development and production margin, transmission and distribution charges, as well as 
production capacity, market development and many other variables.  
The only comprehensive literature found on the optimal allocation of Iranian natural gas 
resources is a Doctoral Thesis conducted by Tooraj Dehghani at Rash University in Iran 
used the ‘Markowitz Optimal Portfolio’ theory.605 Not surprisingly, he concluded that due 
to lack of data, his analytical estimates are based on rough assumptions where the risk of 
error had been minimised, to the extent possible, by extensive computing analyses.
606
  
                                                          
603
 ibid 
604
 Allsopp, C, and Stern J.“The Future of Gas: What Are the Analytical Issues Relating to 
Pricing?”, 2012, p. 20 
605
 Tooraj Dehghan 2007 
606
 Dehghani, T,. Model Hadeaxar Sazi Manafe Eghtesadi Hasel AZakhayer Gazi Iran (a Model 
for Maximisation of Economic Benefits Resulting from Iran's Natural Gas Resources).2007, p.276 
199 
 
This Chapter does not pretend to provide an economic evaluation of allocating Iranian gas 
to different markets. Such an economic analysis is far beyond the scope of this research 
which is mainly concerned with political, legal and policy matters; and the data for such a 
comprehensive analysis either does not exist or is not readily accessible.
607
 Therefore, the 
scope of this Chapter remains confined to a descriptive analysis of social and economic 
benefits resulting from different uses of Iranian gas.   
The Chapter proceeds by reviewing the political debate between Iranian politicians over 
the allocation of gas to domestic or export markets and sets the stage for a discussion of 
the benefits of allocating gas to different markets. This is followed by an analysis of 
various allocation options, including domestic consumption of gas, re-injection into the 
oilfields and export of natural gas both through pipeline and LNG as well as added-value 
products.  It then aims to illuminate different social and economic benefits resulting from 
allocating gas to these options. Finally, the Chapter concludes by addressing the 
challenges of conflicting allocation priorities and offers thoughts on prioritisation of 
options in the current economic and political conditions.  
6.2. The Political Debate over Gas Export versus Domestic Consumption  
Since the recommencement of Iran’s gas export in the early 2000s, extensive opposition 
have been directed by members of the Parliament towards the Iranian Government and 
the Ministry of Petroleum, arguing that gas export policies do not serve the long-term 
interests of the country. Basing their arguments on rising oil prices, increasing decline 
rates of oilfield production and the growing needs for job-creation and revenue 
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generation, members of the Parliament, mainly from the Parliament Energy Committee, 
urge the allocation of Iran’s vast gas resources to domestic use through oilfields re-
injection and development of petrochemical and gas-based industries.
608
 This section 
aims to elaborate on this debate. 
The proponents of gas export believe that in the international political context, gas export, 
particularly through pipelines, is inextricably linked with Iran’s overall security 
arrangements, “regardless of the economic viability of export projects.”609 After the 
Revolution and despite the cancellation of Iran’s only gas export project, i.e. the export to 
the Soviet Union,
610
 Iran began “to recognize the strategic value of gas exports by 
pipeline and realize that an aggressive gas export policy was a very important tool in 
energy diplomacy.”611 Russia was observed as a successful case in promoting powerful 
energy diplomacy, convincing the Iranian policy makers that “creating a bilateral or 
multilateral dependence via gas pipelines could be regarded as an energy strategy that 
would promote Iran’s regional and multiregional political advancement.”612 In other 
words, the supporters of gas export believe that exporting pipeline gas will inevitably 
promote the national security by increasing Iran’s international bargaining power.  
Iran’s policy of taking political advantages from establishing natural gas export ties with 
regional and international markets came into existence in the early 1990s when the 
country had been facing increasing political and economic pressures from the U.S. 
Government. As the U.S Government tried to implement a stronger containment policy 
against Iran and weakened the Government by isolating it from the international political 
and economic arena, the Government increasingly used energy export to neutralise or 
minimise the impact of U.S. attempts to influence other countries’ positions vis-à-vis 
Iran. As highlighted by Nasser Soudani, a former member of the Parliament, natural gas 
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export is a “necessary” policy for Iran in the light of intensifying international sanctions 
against the country irrespective of its economic profits.
613
 Hence, many Iranian politicians 
believe that by making gas importing countries dependent on Iran’s gas supply, the 
country will gain the required capacity to dominate these countries in future negotiations 
and decision-making processes. Such a tactic which is generally known as bargaining 
power is widely believed to have been utilised by Russia vis-à-vis the European states to 
exercise monopolistic pricing or to have a certain political leverage.
614
 As a part of its 
foreign policy, Iran also planned to derive a direct influence from its role as an energy 
supplier. As one of OPEC’s largest supplier, Iran clearly relies on its ability to impact oil 
prices through its production levels, as it did in the 1970s. Also the expansion of the 
country’s natural gas trade ties with regional and international markets is perceived as an 
opportunity which provides the country with the potential to use gas supplies to influence 
the policies of its customers. Supporters of natural gas exports believe that, for example, 
Turkey’s rejection of the intensification of international sanctions, and unwillingness to 
cease cooperation is a result of its gas import reliance on Iran.
615
  
In addition to strengthening Iran’s bargaining power, the proponents of gas exports 
believe that gas exports, particularly through LNG, bring significant economic 
advantages, including the attraction of foreign investments, technology transfer and job 
creation. They argue that by diversifying market opportunities, gas export projects would 
boost revenue generation and improve the country’s participation in international 
markets.
616
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These views are also driven by Iran’s unique geo-political position in the region. The 
country is centrally located among the world’s major oil and gas producers, sharing land 
and sea borders with 15 neighbouring countries. It has a relatively strong economy with a 
large pool of skilled manpower and a well-developed infrastructure. Additionally, Iran is 
located strategically in the vicinity of Russia, the CIS countries and the Caucasus where 
the already existing infrastructure can be used to transfer Iran’s gas to international 
markets. It is also on the eastern border of Europe and western border of Asia which offer 
the country the required potential to export large quantities of natural gas both to EU 
markets in the west, and to the growing energy markets of East Asia and beyond. 
Therefore, given its strategic location, manpower and natural wealth, supporters of gas 
exports are convinced that Iran can emerge as a major supplier of natural gas to regional 
and international markets.  
Nevertheless, Iranian gas exports have also had serious opponents, arguing that given 
Iran’s limited production capacity, the priority should be given to the domestic 
consumption of natural gas. They base their argument on the fact that the consumption of 
gas in power generation plants frees up a large share of petroleum products for export; in 
addition, re-injection of gas into the old oilfields enhances the recovery rate and increases 
the production which, in the light of high oil prices, entails significantly higher economic 
returns than export of gas. They conclude that at current production rates and considering 
the prevailing requirements for fulfilment of Iran’s growing domestic market needs, Iran 
will not have enough gas to allocate to export markets.  
Despite the importance of economic analysis for allocation of the Iranian gas to export 
markets, the arguments of both proponents and opponents of natural gas exports lack such 
analysis to support their views. No substantial analysis of economic costs and benefits of 
exports versus domestic consumption has been presented by either side of this debate.  
203 
 
6.3. Different Uses of Iran’s Natural Gas  
The debate between Iranian politicians over the allocation of Iranian gas to export or 
domestic markets should be inclusive of an analysis about how to maximise economic 
rent and guarantee efficiency through designation of natural gas resources to different 
consuming options, while giving due consideration to the issue of welfare maximisation. 
The maximum wealth generation from natural gas resources can significantly contribute 
to the Government’s revenue and the country’s overall economic growth. It is particularly 
important, in the light of Iran’s limited production capacity and its multiple allocation 
options, to provide an analytical basis for the allocation of gas resources.   
This section will describe different uses of Iran’s natural gas and focus on the overall 
economic, social and political significance of allocating gas to different purposes, 
including domestic market, oilfield re-injection and export.    
6.3.1. Domestic Consumption 
There is a consensus among Iranian politicians over giving the priority to the secure and 
adequate supply of gas to the domestic market, which mainly consists of household, 
commercial and power generation sectors. These sectors, which combined constitute 
around 65 percent of the Iranian natural gas domestic consumption, i.e. around 90 bcm in 
2011,
617
 play a significant role in the country’s economic and social development. Energy 
plays an instrumental role in all key sectors of any country’s development- health, 
lighting, domestic heating, transport, agriculture and industrial production and etc.
618
 
Hence, it is not surprising that where energy resources are available, the fulfilment of 
domestic needs is given priority, as shortages would create poverty.
619
 Equally important 
is access to energy resources at low prices, particularly in the MENA regions, where 
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Governments are concerned that any upward changes in energy prices might trigger 
social unrest (see Chapter 5). 
Iran’s post-revolution gas policy predominately focused on the development of its 
domestic market. Expanding 300 fold since the Revolution, the country’s natural gas 
distribution grid supplied gas to more than 55 million Iranians in 2012.
620
 In addition, 
since the mid 1990s, the country has extensively encouraged the consumption of gas in 
power generation plants in order to keep oil available for export. Expansion of gas-fired 
power generations has also had significant environmental benefits as it has substantially 
improved air quality. For many years, the highly inefficient energy consumption pattern 
in Iran, mainly as a result of low energy prices, created a huge domestic market and 
caused extensive wasteful consumption (see Chapter 5).
621
 Despite the subsidies reform in 
Iran in 2010, the natural gas consumption still has a growing rate, though at a slower 
pace, mainly as a result of the Government’s domestic market expansion policy and 
depreciated technologies and capital stock in the industrial sector and power generation 
plants.  
Since 2010 and as a result of the subsidies reform plan, the energy pricing mechanism in 
Iran was modified in order to accommodate the expectation for increasing Government 
revenues, the sector profitability and preventing wasteful consumption. As a result, post-
reform gas prices increased substantially in 2010, reaching US$1.61 MMBtu for power 
generation plants -- 9-fold increase -- and US$4.61 MMBtu for commercial sector. In the 
same corresponding year, in the house-hold sector, a multi-tier system was introduced 
and the prices increased to an average US$2.74 MMBtu (see Appendix 4).  
Natural gas consumption in domestic markets requires extensive transmission and 
distribution grids which, combined with the exploration and development costs, require 
substantial up-front investments. In 2005, the IEA projected that in the period 2005-10, 
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exploration-development and transmission-distribution costs for production of 9 bcm of 
gas for future aggregate gas production of 109 bcm in Iran would reach US$6 billion and 
US$5.2 billion, respectively.
622
 The IEA’s estimation in 2005 showed that in the same 
period, the long-run average incremental cost (LRAIC) of gas supply would be US$0.73 
MMBtu at the city gate,
623
 which, taking into account the additional distribution cost 
involved in reaching customers, was significantly higher than the pre-reform average gas 
price of US$0.35 MMBtu.
624
 However, as gas prices significantly increased in 2010 and 
reached to average US$3 MMBtu in 2012, and considering the current growing rate of 
gas consumption in the household and commercial sectors and power generation plants, 
the investment for the development of the domestic market looks worthwhile. Also the 
cost of investments can be recouped in a shorter period of time, providing producers with 
greater incentives to invest. In fact, this was one of the subsidies reform plan’s objectives 
that the substantial increase in prices of natural gas could provide the state-owned gas 
production and supply companies, i.e. NIOC and NIGC with revenues to enable them to 
fully recover their costs and to reinvest the capital for the development of the gas sector. 
However, as the entire revenue gained from the prices increase has been redistributed 
among the nation as monthly cash payments, NIOC and NIGC are still struggling to fully 
recover their production and supply costs.
625
  
In terms of benefits of using gas in the domestic market, in 2009 a study conducted by 
Hossein Razavi, an energy economist in the World Bank, concluded that the domestic 
consumption of gas in sectors, where natural gas replaces LPG and oil fuels, offer high 
revenues, provided that there is a gas network in place or the gas volume is sufficiently 
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large to justify development of a network.
626
 He presents Iran as an example where due to 
its extensive gas network which has been developed over the course of last 40 years (see 
Sections 2.6 and 2.7), the netback value of gas use in the domestic sector is very high. His 
estimation in 2009 - almost a year before price reform in Iran- showed that for example 
the netback value of gas consumption in the residential sector is US$12 MMBtu. 
According to Razavi, the economic benefit or netback value of gas use is estimated based 
on the economic cost of the replaced fuel while adjustments are made to take account of 
differentials in many factors, including capital and operating costs, thermal efficiency, 
and cost of fuel processing and delivery.  
In addition to the high netback value derived from consuming gas domestically, the social 
consideration pertinent to consuming gas in domestic markets plays an important role in 
allocation policies. In almost all energy-rich countries in the MENA region, equity and 
distributional issues put on silent economic efficiency arguments over optimal natural gas 
resource allocation.
627
 Both in theory and practice, “trade-offs” exist between 
distributional and economic efficiency objectives for allocation of gas resources. Thus, it 
is not surprising that politicians and decision makers are under immense pressure to use 
their political power over gas pricing to meet distributional objectives.
628
  
6.3.2. Natural Gas Re-injection into Oilfields 
In Iran, natural gas re-injection into oilfields started in the mid 1970s as a technical 
method to enhance the oilfields’ rate of recovery. Each oil reservoir usually experiences 
three production periods during its life time: the early rising production, the plateau 
production and the decline period. In Chapter 2 it was shown that, the majority of Iranian 
oil fields are now at the end of the plateau production or beginning of the decline 
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period.
629
 Its current oil recovery rate is approximately 20–25 percent, meaning that 
approximately 20–25 percent of oil is recovered, with 75–80 percent remaining in the 
fields until enhanced oil recovery (EOR) methods are implemented. Although, no studies 
are available on the secondary recovery rate for the country’s oilfields, laboratory 
simulation shows an approximate rate of 5-7 percent.
630
 Comparing to other EOR 
methods, such as water injection,  NIOC’s reservoir engineers have suggested that gas re-
injection into fractured carbonate reservoirs– which account for approximately 90 percent 
of the country’s oilfields– is technically and economically more efficient.631  
Natural gas re-injection has been one of NIOC’s natural gas supply priorities. NIOC has 
duly acknowledged the importance of increasing the natural gas re-injection in order to: 
- Protect the rights of future generations in the hydrocarbon resources; 
- Preserve the national wealth which plays an important role in long-term  
investments in oil sector and strengthening country’s economic infrastructure; and 
- Fulfil the country’s dependence on revenues gained from crude oil exports.  
Table 6-1- Natural Gas Re-injection 1995-2012 (mcm/d) 
 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2011 2012 
Planned 
Injection 
101 130 90 137 145 149 150 190 
Actual 
Injection  
54.6 67.4 75.4 80.0 87.7 88.4 112 100 
Source: Iran’s Energy Balance (2011) & Petronet (2012) 
In the absence of a comprehensive analysis of the exact gas volume required for the re-
injection, inconsistent views have been expressed by experts as to how much and for how 
long gas is needed for re-injection purposes. According to a study conducted by Ranani 
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and et al in 2002, in order to compensate for losses resulting from the delay in natural gas 
re-injection and the decline in oilfields’ pressure, 350 mcm p/d of gas is required to be re-
injected in order to recover 45 billion barrels of oil throughout the production life of 
designated oilfields.
632
 The Fourth Five-Year Development Plan, however, presented a 
different figure, requiring an average re-injection of 149 mcm p/d of gas which actually 
never materialised (see Table 6.1). The actual average reinjection by the end of the Fourth 
Development Plan, i.e. 2009, was 88.40 mcm
 
p/d which was almost half the volume 
designated by the Plan. In the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan, the regulator once 
again put a great emphasis on the importance of enhancing the oilfields’ rate of recovery 
and obliged the Government to increase the recovery rate by 1 percent during the 
implementation period of the Plan, i.e. 2010-2015. As a result, a consortium consisting of 
Ministries of Petroleum and Science was established in March 2012 in order to conduct 
studies and implement solutions for the enhancement of the recovery rate of the oil 
reservoirs.
633
 As the Consortium was established two years after the beginning of the 
Plan, and during the last one year since its establishment it has not done any major tasks, 
it is unlikely that it can make effective contributions to solving re-injection challenges by 
the end of the Fifth Development Plan in 2015.    
6.3.2.1. Economic and Political Importance of Natural Gas Re-injection 
Iran’s economy is highly dependent on oil revenues and studies show that the crude oil 
consumption, both domestically and internationally, has had an upward trend during the 
last few years (with minor volatility during economic recession), strengthening the 
prospects for increasing the flow of revenue, particularly in the light of high oil prices.
634
 
Since the 1970s, Iran’s oil production rate witnessed many fluctuations; between 1976-
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77, its average oil production exceeded 5.5 million bbl/d with maximum production of 
more than 6 million bbl/d.
635
 But, since the 1979 Revolution, a combination of war, 
limited investments, international sanctions and a high rate of natural decline in Iran’s 
mature oilfields have prevented the return to those production levels. While the average 
production capacity of each of Iran’s 300 oil wells, drilled before the Revolution, was 
around 25 thousand bbl/d, after the Revolution and despite the coming on stream of more 
than 1000 oil wells, there was a dramatic decline in oil production: around 3 thousand 
bbl/d per well by 1998. According to some reports, an estimated 300,000-600,000 bbl/d 
of crude production is lost annually due to decline in the mature oilfields.
636
 
Figure 6.1- The Iranian Total Oil Production and Consumption (1977-2010) 
 
 Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2011) 
Although since the early 2000s Iran has maintained its oil production capacity as a result 
of coming on stream of major South Pars phases, which has increased the country’s 
condensate production, the gas re-injection is needed to prevent further reduction in 
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oilfields.
637
  Despite the availability of huge natural gas resources, country’s ambitious 
development policies both in domestic and international markets and the resulting 
growing demand have put great strain on natural gas supply for re-injection purposes.
638
 
In 2009, the Parliament Research Centre published a report, concluding that at the current 
depletion rate of oilfields, Iran will become an oil importer by 2015.
639
 In addition to the 
economic return, the oil export is considered a ‘strategic weapon’ which plays an 
effective role in the favour of Iran’s national security and a source of power for the 
leaders to maintain their position in international competitions (see section 6.2).
640 
Therefore, threats to its position as a key oil producer and exporter may substantially 
weaken the country’s energy diplomacy power. 641 The loss of its second rank in OPEC to 
Iraq in January 2013 caused many criticisms regarding the Iranian Government’s failure 
to effectively manage the impact of international sanctions. Therefore, natural gas re-
injection is the only remaining option to maintain oilfields production rate.  
According to NIGC, an estimated volume of 70 to 110 cm of gas is required to be re-
injected into the oilfields to add one barrel of oil to a reservoir production capacity.
642
 If 
the price of Iran’s natural gas export to Turkey in 2012 which was US$500 thousand 
cubic meter is set as a benchmark, the export of an average gas volume which is required 
for production of one barrel of oil, i.e. 90 cm would yield average revenue of US$45 cm. 
However, if re-injected into the oilfields, these volumes can generate income of US$100 
at current average oil prices. In other words, the reinjection of average 90 cm of gas 
yields US$100 per barrel worth of revenue which, even after deducting re-injection costs, 
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is more economic and profitable than exporting gas (although profitability also depends 
on investment requirements of these options which are discussed below).
643
  
The statistics over Iran’s oilfield annual decline rate are varied. While NIOC reports an 
average annual production decline of 4 percent,
1
 the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) has suggested a significantly higher average depletion rate of 10 
percent.
644
 A calculation based on NIOC average depletion rate of 4 percent presents an 
optimistic scenario where Iran loses 152 thousand bbl/d of its production capacity per 
year causing an aggregate export revenue loss of around US$5.5 billion per annum.
645
 
Based on the pessimistic scenario of the depletion rate of 10 percent, the aggregate 
production loss will be 380 thousand bbl/d, causing an annual export revenue reduction of 
US$13.8 billion. Additionally, as the country’s domestic oil consumption has an average 
annual growth rate of 5 percent (equivalent to 2 percent of the country’s current oil 
production), and taking into account the 4-10 percent decline in production mentioned 
above, an average 76 thousand bbl/d of the country’s production will be deducted from its 
export capacity per annum which combined with the losses resulting from the depletion 
rate, this can be translated to losing around minimum US$8.3 billion and maximum 
US$16.6 billion of Government’s annual revenue. In a comparison of the reinjection and 
gas export options, it is important to take into account the initial investment cost and 
operation and maintenance expenses. According to NIOC, the largest gas re-injection 
project in the Middle East, namely Agha-Jari oilfield re-injection, only cost US$300 
million which is significantly less than the cost of export projects, whether pipeline or 
LNG (see the next Section).
646
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6.3.3. Natural Gas Export 
6.3.3.1. Export through Pipeline and LNG 
Export projects particularly LNG are extremely costly. Capital-intensive, highly 
specialised equipment is involved in the processing and transportation of liquefied natural 
gas. Large LNG projects need long-term contracts in order to secure finance for building 
the liquefaction and regasification terminals and specialist and expensive tankers to ship 
LNG cargoes across the markets. Costs have been increasing steeply in the last few years, 
making it even harder to raise the investment. In the 1980s building a liquefaction plant 
cost around US$350 per tonne of LNG a year. By the 2000s the figure, in current terms, 
fell to US$200 as technology improved.
647
 However, in 2013, some LNG facilities are 
estimated to cost as much as US$3,200 per tonne.
648
 One reason is that the price of steel, 
which LNG projects use in large quantities, has increased dramatically during last few 
years. In 2005, the total investment for building an LNG plant in Iran was estimated 
around US$1.5 to US$2.5 billion, depending on the market needs and number of ships 
required. Today, it can cost the country as much as US$15-20 billion to build a 10 Mt/yr 
LNG plant.
649
  
Development of substantial export infrastructure, in the light of current changing 
dynamics of regional and international gas markets, and uncertainties among investors 
over natural gas market prices, is not easy and requires an in-depth analysis of the long-
term viability of such projects, particularly for a country which has to fulfil domestic 
market needs. The discovery and development of shale gas in the U.S. has changed many 
market equations; it has created a “glut of gas supply” in the North American market, 
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causing a plunge in gas prices and diversion of large volumes of gas to Asia-Pacific 
markets.
650
 As predicted by the IEA, the unconventional gas can put pressure on 
conventional gas suppliers and on traditional oil-linked pricing mechanisms for gas “by 
diversifying sources of supply, tempering demand for import (as in China) and fostering 
the emergence of new exporting countries (as in the United States).”651 This phenomenon 
has posed difficulties for leading LNG suppliers, such as Qatar, and forced them to look 
for alternative markets for the gas which is no longer profitable to deliver to the U.S. 
market and conclude long-term contracts with Asian markets which, in the light of 
availability of alternative suppliers (Australia, North America and East Africa), are 
unsurprisingly reluctant to accept previous JCC-linked prices.
652
 Therefore, more price 
flexibility may be expected from major gas exporters, particularly LNG sellers, with 
years of experience and strong positions in international markets. Coping with such 
conditions and making swift shifts between markets might be challenging for a country 
like Iran, which has no experience in LNG markets, and limited (relatively unsuccessful) 
gas pipeline exports.  
The construction and financing of export pipelines can be as expensive and challenging as 
LNG projects. In pipeline projects, as the amount of investment can be very high, a 
secure buyer should exist and be willing to sign a long-term sale and purchase agreement. 
The cost of project varies, depending on the production and transmission cost, the length 
of the pipeline, its capacity, transit countries’ charges and pipeline route specifications. 
The cost for construction of Iran’s export Peace Pipeline to Pakistan and India was 
initially estimated around US$4.5 billion, but as the construction delayed for several 
years, the cost is expected to reach US$7 billion.
653
 Another example is Iran’s latest 
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planned export project to Iraq and Syria which, according to NIGC, is estimated to cost 
around US$10 billion.
654
  
As shown in Section 6.2, the Iranian Government has essentially pursued political rather 
than commercial objectives from establishing long-term regional and international gas 
trade relations. After the Iran-Iraq war, the reconstruction challenges and the requirement 
for accelerating the social and economic development in order to meet a young 
population’ expectations, pushed the Iranian politicians towards expansion of foreign 
relations emphasising on expanding trade and attracting investments for the development 
of mutually beneficial state-to-state relations and integration into the global economy. In 
the field of energy, this was translated into recognising “the need for regional 
cooperation, not because of any increasing volume and intensity of interdependent 
relations among regional neighbours [...], but because of the artificially low level of such 
interdependence.”655 Regional and international gas trade was perceived by the Iranian 
authority as a means of diplomacy to leverage through international political challenges, 
particularly international sanctions. 
Today, however, in the current political and economic conditions surrounding Iran’s 
petroleum sector, even the political rationale behind gas export policies is relatively 
weak. First of all, Iran’s gas export initiative has not been successful in meeting the 
country’s geopolitical objectives. In the case of Peace Pipeline, for example, besides the 
prolonged political tension between India and Pakistan, the countries seem to be reluctant 
to embrace the economic and political risks of establishing long-term gas trade relations 
with Iran, in the light of increasing international sanctions, particularly from the U.S. 
Government. Even the most promising export project, namely Iran-Turkey export, is 
under threat from E.U. sanctions on import of Iranian gas, in addition to numerous 
disputes over the volume and prices of the exported gas (see Section 2.9). Additionally, 
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one should not expect significant economic and political benefits from markets of 
countries such as Armenia and Nakhchivan with limited expansion potential and also 
considered to be under the influence of Russia.
656
  
Furthermore, the development of Iran’s presence in international markets may be hard hit 
by, first of all, the active presence of competitors, such as Russia and Qatar, with a 
substantial share of international gas trade,
657
 and secondly opposition by Russia which 
clearly benefits from excluding Iran from becoming a major gas supplier to European 
markets. The policy of developing gas exports as a means for strengthening the country’s 
diplomacy and political leverage could have been effective, had Iran managed to 
successfully accomplish its gas export projects planned in the mid-1990s and establish 
itself as a strong market player. Back then, Iran’s current major rivals, namely Russia and 
Qatar were in much less strong positions. The break-up of the former Soviet Union in the 
early 1990s caused “immediate and continuing problems” in Russian gas trade where 
refusal and/or inability to pay resulted in the suppliers’ huge debts and periodic 
cutbacks.
658
 Qatar was also a new entrant where the development of its natural gas 
resources faced many problems, including the political challenges in the ruling family in 
the mid 1990s, and the second Gulf war which interrupted many development projects in 
the region, as well as technical and infrastructure problems. Therefore, had Iran moved 
ahead with its export market expansion policies of 1990s, it would by the 2010s have 
been in a stronger position in international gas trade, while also being potentially able to 
use its supply power as a means of political leverage. The policy, however, never 
materialised as a result of not just international sanctions but also domestic issues as 
reviewed in Chapters 3,4 and 5. Today, finding finance and investors for development of 
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Iranian pipeline and LNG projects in current conditions is almost impossible; so is access 
to required technologies which are subject to strict U.S. and EU sanctions.
659
  
6.3.3.2. Exports of Natural Gas Added-Value Products  
In the petroleum resource rich countries of the MENA region, using oil and gas as an 
input factor to develop value-chains is considered of great importance as they are 
expected to promote industrialisation and diversification.
660
 As will be explained below, 
using natural gas as a feedstock for development of petrochemical and other added-value 
products have been rigorously pursued by the Iranian Government  as a strong means for 
sustainable and independent economic growth.  
6.3.3.2.1. Petrochemical Industry  
Iran has 10 petrochemical plants across the country, 2 of which are located in Special 
Economic Zones. Development and operation of petrochemical facilities in Iran is 
assigned to the National Iranian Petrochemical Company (NIPC) which was founded in 
1964 and began its activities by operating a small fertiliser plant. In 2010, it was the 
second largest producer and exporter of petrochemical products in the Middle East.
661
  
With start of the South Pars gas field development in 2001, NIPC initiated planning for 
large gas-based petrochemicals plants, such as Amir Kabir Petrochemical Company in 
2006.
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 Figure 6.2- Petrochemical Export (1000 Tonnes)       
 
Source: NIPC Annual Report (2010) 
During the last few years, the Ahmadinejad administration with its inward looking 
approach,
662
 further encouraged expansion of the petrochemical industry. In 2010, Iran’s 
petrochemical industry’s nominal production capacity reached 51.1 million tonnes. Its 
final production capacity was 28.392 million tonnes, from which 10.5 thousand tonnes 
was consumed domestically (equivalent to US$6.870 million) and 17.860 thousand 
tonnes were exported accumulating an income of US$11.5 billion.
663
 (see Figures 6.2. and 
6.3) The export volume shows 26 percent increase in quantity and 25 percent increase of 
value compared to 2009.  
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Figure 6.3- Petrochemical Export (US$ million) 
 
Source: NIPC Annual Report (2010) 
Figure 6.4-Value Export Market (2010) 
 
Source: NIPC Annual Report (2010) 
The cost of construction of petrochemical plants, depending on the location, product’s 
specifications and plants capacity, varies between US$500 million and US$1 billion. For 
example, the development of the Ilam Petrochemical Complex which started in 2010 and 
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is expected to come on stream in early 2014 is estimated to cost around US$1 billion.
664
 
The plant’s production capacity is 700 thousand tonnes different grades of High Density 
Polyethylene (HDPE). 
Development of petrochemical industry in a country like Iran where there are low-price, 
abundant feedstock and large population, can significantly contribute to the overall 
development of the economy. By a way of comparison with export projects, Iran 
consumed around 17 percent of 143bcm of its total gas consumption in 2011, equivalent 
to 24bcm, in the petrochemical industry yielding around US$12 billion of revenue 
whereas export of 8.4 bcm of gas generated around US$3 billion worth of revenue. More 
importantly, according to NIPC’s annual report in 2010, 25 thousand people are 
employed in 9 petrochemical companies only in Assaluiyeh region which is one of the 
least-developed parts of the country.
665
  
The Iranian petrochemical industry is not, however, an exception to the current trend of 
postponement and/or cancellation of petroleum projects. The lack of finance and 
technologies due to international sanctions have placed challenges in the materialisation 
of expansive policies of Iran in the petrochemical industry, causing significant delays in 
bringing production capacities on stream.  
6.3.3.2.2. Gas-to-Liquids (GTL) 
Gas-to-liquids (GTL) projects have received special attention from a broad range of 
Iranian politicians and energy specialists.
666
 GTL process is a process for converting 
natural gas into synthetic oil, which can then be further processed into fuels and other 
hydrocarbon-based products. The first GTL plant in Iran was planned to be built by Shell 
in the early 2000s; however, as a result of disagreement over the contractual terms and 
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political and economic pressures resulting from international sanctions, the project never 
materialised. Later on when Shell decided to carry out the project in Qatar (know as Pearl 
GTL), its cost rose substantially higher than the initial estimation, i.e. from US$5 billion 
to around US$18 billion,
667
 casting significant doubt over economic feasibility of GTL 
projects whether in Qatar and elsewhere. Iran’s GTL capacity has not gone beyond a 
small-scale, pilot GTL production plant which was inaugurated in Tehran in December 
2012. But, as there are serious uncertainties over GTL plants’ investment and 
construction cost, and considering the fact that Iran’s access to the required technologies 
is strictly limited, it is highly unlikely that Iran can develop large-scale GTL plants in 
near future. 
6.4. Final Remarks  
Iran has ambitious plans to develop its natural gas markets both domestically and 
internationally. The country’s production capacity, however, can hardly meet its domestic 
consumption and re-injection needs, leaving no surplus for exports. Iran’s natural gas 
allocation policies have been subject to many discussions both among Iranian politicians 
and energy experts. However, no in-depth economic study has been conducted on the 
subject matter to draw a clear conclusion over the economic return from each of the gas 
allocation options. While this Chapter acknowledged that such analysis is beyond the 
scope of this work and not possible due to lack of data, attempts were made to shed some 
light on the challenges and opportunities for allocating the Iranian gas to different 
markets. 
Iran’s gas export policy has been mostly encouraged by political incentives rather than 
economic objectives. Establishment of regional and international gas trade relations were 
perceived by politicians as a diplomatic and political means to strengthen Iran’s 
geopolitical position. A review of Iran’s gas export projects, however, shows that the 
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country has failed to achieve its political objectives through gas exports and also failed to 
achieve significant economic returns in relation to other utilisation options. The situation 
could have been different, had Iran successfully implemented its gas export projects 
proposed and planned in the mid-1990s. Back then, Russia and Qatar- Iran’s main 
competitors- were amidst domestic and international political turmoil which placed them 
in a potentially difficult situation similar to Iran but for different reasons. In the mid-
1990s Iran, recovering from the war with Iraq and aiming to open up its petroleum sector 
to foreign investments in addition to owning some of the largest gas reserves in the world 
while being geopolitically well-situated, was in a strong position to emerge as an 
influential player in the international gas markets. However, exports never materialised 
principally as a result of U.S. and international sanctions.  
Today, when discussing the prospects for Iran’s gas exports, one may carefully examine 
the current surrounding political and economic conditions affecting the country’s 
economy as a whole and its petroleum sector as a part. Iran’s title of second largest gas 
owner in the world has made many “illusional” about the country’s export capabilities.668 
Setting strategic policies requires a fact-based understanding of Iran’s natural gas 
industry. Lack of reliable data, transparency and the disconnection between upstream 
activity and downstream objectives makes almost impossible any assessment of the cost 
and potential for development. 
Export facilities require huge capital investment, the access to which is extremely limited 
for Iran in the light of international sanctions. In addition, speedy and efficient 
development of resources requires up-to-date technologies, which is not readily available 
to the country due to the same challenges. Additionally, the present legal framework 
governing the participation of international oil companies is not conducive for such 
speedy development of gas resources. Therefore, in 2013, due to the current limited 
production capacity, a growing domestic market and rising oil prices on which the 
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Government’s budget is highly dependent, the re-injection of gas into oilfields should be 
the Government’s top priority. As Hassantash, one of the Iranian senior energy analysts 
puts it, “re-injection of gas today is a guarantee for export of oil tomorrow”.669  
Allocation of natural gas to the domestic market also has significant social and economic 
returns. According to Razavi, the benefit of using gas in the domestic market is 
“substantially above the net gain from gas exports.”670 He argues that in countries like 
Iran where the national grid is extensively developed, the economic return in using gas in 
the domestic markets is substantially higher than exports.
671
 The argument is also in line 
with Dehghani’s work which concludes that, both from “expected value” and “risk 
analysis” point of view, the priorities for natural gas resource allocation should be: 1) re-
injection projects, 2) petrochemical projects, and 3) export markets.
672
  
As mentioned in the introduction, all these studies have limitations as the examination of 
many variables has not been possible due to lack of data. But it was important to address 
the allocation challenges in the Iranian natural gas industry and try to shed some light on 
the complex debate over allocation of its natural gas resources to export or domestic 
markets based on available data and rough estimations. To borrow from Robert Mabro, 
“approximate results are better than no results at all”.673 
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7. Chapter 7- Summary, Conclusion and Future Research  
7.1.  Summary 
In this thesis, many challenges were identified which have prevented Iran from becoming 
a major player in the international gas trade. These challenges, and how they have 
affected the development of the Iranian natural gas industry, are presented below as 
findings of this research. 
Chapter 2 presented a general background to Iran’s natural gas industry, including its 
organisation, domestic market, and export projects. It reviewed the industry’s history both 
before and after the Revolution when different Governments adopted contradictory 
policies for the development of the country’s natural gas industry. While in the 1970s, 
there was a reasonable degree of confidence that Iran could become a major player in 
international gas markets, after the Revolution, hopes for materialisation of this goal 
vanished and since then Iranian gas export projects have remained undeveloped. 
However, the domestic market has shown astonishingly rapid growth since the 
Revolution, although its huge and growing size proved to be a challenging problem. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the majority of Iran’s gas production and export projects have 
been either cancelled or substantially delayed, raising the question of why Iran, despite its 
enormous gas resources, has not been successful in fulfilling its export potential. In the 
following four Chapters, attempts were made to answer this question by examining 
multitude challenges, including political, legal and economic and how these have 
impacted the development of different aspects of the natural gas industry. 
In Chapter 3, the political challenges hindering the expansion of the Iranian gas sector 
were discussed. Central to this Chapter was the discussion of international sanctions and 
politicisation of the Iranian petroleum industry in constraining the country’s development 
of its petroleum sector. Chapter 3 showed the impact of the progressive U.S. unilateral 
and international sanctions which have severely limited Iran’s access to international 
financial institutions and prohibited foreign investors from participating in the 
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development of its petroleum sector. In addition to international sanctions, the 
politicisation inherent in the institutional structure of the petroleum sector has posed 
serious challenges to substantial development of the Iranian natural gas sector. Iran's 
historical concern about the exploitive nature of foreign influence has left a deep, and 
seemingly permanent negative impact on the policy making process. The consequent lack 
of trust has encouraged constant intervention from a multitude of different bodies in the 
petroleum sector’s decision-making, with the result that it is almost impossible to 
understand where ultimate decision making responsibility lies in the sector. This Chapter 
concluded that international political and economic pressures are the fundamental reasons 
behind the country’s failure to develop its gas exports, and unless international sanctions 
are eased and the country’s political and diplomatic relations with the international 
community are improved, it is hard to see any progress, and with perhaps the possibility 
of further deterioration of this situation.  
In Chapter 4, the legal and contractual regime in the Iranian petroleum sector was 
assessed in order to evaluate the attractiveness of the country’s investment framework. 
The study showed that, despite criticisms of the Iranian buy-back contracts, prior to 
intensification of international sanctions, the country had been relatively successful in the 
conclusion of substantial investment contracts with major IOCs. Although a large number 
of these contracts either never materialised or were cancelled/postponed, mainly as a 
result of international sanctions, the research reviewed the evolutionary trend of buyback 
contracts since their inception and the Iranian Government’s willingness to modify their 
legal and fiscal terms and adopt more favourable clauses to promote foreign investment.  
This research rejected the proposition that Iran should adopt or transplant the legal and 
contractual frameworks of successful gas producing countries, such as Qatar, in order to 
be in a better position to attract foreign capital and circumvent international sanctions. 
One cannot doubt the success of for example the Qatari investment model in development 
of its gas industry and export, but the solution of importing and transplanting such a 
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model  to the Iranian investment and legal system is highly unlikely to be successful in 
the light of the country’s historical and cultural background. This research suggested that 
more important than changing the legal and contractual framework, is the restructuring of 
governance institutions in order to ensure the implementation and enforcement of 
contractual commitments between parties. It also demonstrated how lack of strong and 
transparent governance institutions has deterred investors and diminished their confidence 
in making substantial investments in capital-intensive sectors, including the gas sector.  
In Chapter 5, the issue of energy subsidies in Iran and the impact of low gas prices on the 
development of the natural gas sector were discussed. In this Chapter, energy subsidies 
were introduced as inefficient, socially regressive and environmentally harmful measures 
which Governments usually use to redistribute wealth among their populations. The 
initiative to reform energy subsidies in 2010 was badly affected by the Government’s 
mistakes in its implementation, and the most stringent round of international sanctions 
against the country, leaving Iran in an unprecedentedly difficult political and economic 
situation. In this Chapter some of the shortcomings of the subsidies reform plan were also 
identified, specifically: universal citizen eligibility for monthly cash payments; lack of a 
clear time framework for different stages of the reform including for payments of cash 
hand-outs; the implementation of the plan in a hostile international environment; and lack 
of transparency in the reform process.  It was also shown that increasing inflation 
diminished the value of the Government’s mitigation measures and increased the risk of 
subsidies returning to the energy sector and the economy as a whole. In addition, the 
substantial increase in gas prices did not have a significant downward effect on gas 
demand, mainly as a result of the Government’s domestic market expansion policy and 
continued utilisation of old and inefficient technologies and capital stock in the industrial 
sector, in particular, power generation plants. With regards to reinvesting the capital 
gained from price increases for development of the energy sector (as had been planned 
initially), the Government, while failing to pay back the 30 percent share of the cash 
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handouts due to the industries, including the natural gas sector, spent the energy sector’s 
allocated funds in the annual budgets of 2011 and 2012 on cash payments to the nation. 
This Chapter, therefore, concluded that subsidy reform in Iran not only has failed to 
improve the natural gas industry’s situation, it has placed further pressure on NIOC’s 
budget as a portion of the fund allocated for the development purposes has been 
distributing to the population as a part of Government’s mitigation measures.  
Chapter 6 addressed the prolonged debate among Iranian politicians over the role of 
exports in Iran’s natural gas allocation policy. The debate centres on the optimal 
allocation of exhaustible resources to options which yield the highest economic return for 
the country. This Chapter also discussed the importance of ‘welfare maximisation’ in 
resources allocation, and showed how social considerations and distributional impacts 
inevitably offer challenges to economic analysis of the optimal allocation of natural 
resources. In this Chapter, allocation of gas to domestic markets, oilfields re-injection, 
and exports were reviewed and an attempt was made – within the limitations of available 
information and data- to examine the economic and political returns from each of these 
options. It concluded that those Iranian politicians which favour exports do so 
predominately to pursue political influence in the international arena, and their views on 
exports and domestic utilisation are not based on an economic analysis of costs and 
benefits of these options. It also considered the issue of oilfield re-injection and 
demonstrated that, in the context of oil prices in excess of US$100/bbl, the revenue 
generated from this option is significantly greater than that from gas exports, particularly 
when taking into account the initial investment and operational costs which are 
considerably lower for re-injection projects. Although, due to the lack of data and the 
limited scope of this study, these comparisons lack thorough analysis of the many 
variables required for a full decision making analysis of the allocation of gas resources, it 
was important to illustrate these allocation challenges, which clearly differentiate Iran 
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from gas exporting countries with small population and limited oil production potential, 
such as Qatar.  
7.2. Concluding Remarks  
I now return to the central research questions on which this thesis is based (see page 17):  
1. Will Iran become a major exporter of gas to global markets over the next 10-
20 years? 
The answer to this primary thesis question is certainly not for 10, and probably not for 20 
years. This is due to the existence or continuation of existence of several challenges, which 
throughout the course of this research, were identified and examined as major factors 
preventing Iran from becoming a major gas exporter. These challenges constitute the 
answer to the second thesis question, i.e.: 
2. What are the major challenges which have prevented Iran from becoming a 
major gas exporter? 
and include: 
- Politicisation of the petroleum industry, resulting in mismanagement and absence 
of a solid strategy planning; 
- International sanctions and lack of investment, financing and technology; 
- Lack of an attractive legal and fiscal regime and poor governance institutions; 
- Growing domestic gas market (including reinjection into oil fields) and lack of 
energy efficient capital stock. 
An important part of the immediate answer to the question of whether Iran can become a 
major exporter depends on the international political situation surrounding the country’s 
relationships with the international community, particularly the U.S. As reviewed in 
Chapter 3, the fundamental challenge to the integration of Iranian natural gas into global 
markets is the imposition of progressive political and economic sanctions against the 
country as a result of its nuclear activities. Iran’s huge natural gas resources and its 
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unique geopolitical position provide the country with substantial potential for export of its 
natural gas not only to regional but also to international markets. However, the 
consequence of the political situation in the early 2010s is that despite its massive 
potential, Iran is highly unlikely to become a major contributor to the international gas 
trade for many years. Even if international sanctions are lifted and favourable fiscal and 
contractual terms are offered to IOCs for development of the country’s energy sector, it 
would take Iran decades to develop its export infrastructure to the point where it could 
become a major gas exporter. By a way of comparison, the development of the natural 
gas sector in Qatar is a good example of the time horizon required for substantial gas 
exports when taking into account the attraction of foreign investment and technologies, 
the construction of the required infrastructure and marketing.  
After several interruptions to develop its natural gas resources since the discovery of the 
North Field in the early 1970s, Qatar started phase one of the North Field development in 
the early 1990s. The Qatari leadership pursued a strategy of global LNG export markets 
and invested substantially in the natural gas sector. Adopting the fastest export 
development programme in the world,
674
 the country has made remarkable progress as an 
LNG exporter since the first cargo was loaded in the end of 1996. The country’s annual 
LNG export capacity reached 102.6 bcm in 2011, over three times the capacity of 
Malaysia, its closest competitor.
675
 The emergence of Qatar as the world’s largest LNG 
exporter required 20 years from the start of export-oriented gas field development, and 16 
years from the first cargo of LNG. Strong leadership and political cooperation ensured 
key decisions being taken and implemented quickly.
676
 The Government practically 
utilised all the resources available for fast and effective development of its natural gas 
resources, including partnering with international oil companies which were major 
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players in the LNG industry and could bring expertise and experience, adapting project 
structures to make them more attractive for foreign investors and changing the fiscal 
regime to improve the economics and encourage investment.
677
 As reviewed in this thesis, 
these are important attributes that have not been, and are unlikely to be, seen in Iran. 
Therefore, taking the Qatari gas development as a successful model, it would take Iran 
15-20 years to become a major gas exporter, following the lifting of international 
sanctions, and assuming that the country is prepared to offer better contractual and fiscal 
terms to attract foreign investors. Taking the assumption that the ongoing negotiations 
between Iran and P 5+1 (the UN Security Council’s permanent members and Germany) 
to resolve Iran’s nuclear crisis proceeds successfully, and that the next presidential 
election in June 2013 brings into power a moderate president, willing to mend fences with 
the international community, the earliest complete lifting of sanctions could take 3-5 
years. Implementing changes in the Iranian legal and fiscal regime and improving the 
governance institutions, in order to promote and protect foreign investments, could also 
be achieved within a 5-year time frame, which could happen at the same time as 
international relations improve. Therefore, adding a lead time of 15 years for the 
development of export infrastructure, one should not expect Iran to become a major gas 
exporter until the 2030s at the earliest. 
Having said that, one should ask whether, even if Iran can become a major player in the 
international gas market, exports should be the priority for the Government. Iran has a 
population of 75 million and is a developing country with growing population and rapid 
industrialisation. It needs to supply gas to domestic markets, including oilfield re-
injection, gas-based industries, power generation and growing household and commercial 
sectors. Therefore, the country is in a completely different situation to Qatar domestically, 
as well as internationally. Our research showed that domestic consumption of gas, 
particularly in oilfield re-injection, yields greater economic and social returns compared 
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with gas exports. Moreover, factors which have prevented Iran from becoming a major 
gas exporter are very likely to continue for many years, reinforcing the likelihood that the 
country will never, despite its huge resources, become a major gas exporter.  
Therefore, prior to making any plans for substantial increase of Iran’s gas export capacity, 
decision makers are advised to thoroughly assess social and economic benefits resulting 
from allocating Iranian natural gas to various options in order to secure the long-term 
strategic and economic interest of the country. In other words, the gas resource allocation 
policy should establish a balance between the requirement for ‘economic’ and ‘welfare’ 
maximisation.   
7.3. Future Research  
Although this research aims to offer a holistic analysis of issues related to the Iranian 
natural gas industry, no single study can adequately cover all of the historical, political, 
and economic issues influencing the development of the sector. Future studies may be 
undertaken to yield further sound and informative results.  
First and foremost, future research may examine how international political relations and 
any subsequent economic and political measures would affect the promotion and 
attraction of foreign investment in Iran’s petroleum industry. A second issue to examine 
is the effect that changing political attitudes in Iran towards foreign investors could have 
on attraction of foreign investment, potential modification of legal, fiscal and contractual 
regimes, leading to substantial development of the petroleum sector by external actors. 
Future development of the subsidies reform plan, and its political and economic 
ramifications on Iran’s economic growth and development of its petroleum sector, is also 
worth additional study. The reform process has seen numerous upheavals and any 
changes in the political and economic conditions, including further intensification or 
easing of international sanctions, or changes in Government policy, can have direct 
impact on future success or failure of the plan. It is particularly important in the light of 
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the presidential election in Iran in June 2013, where there are hopes that a more moderate 
president, who may establish a better relationship with the international community 
comes into power. It is equally important that future studies focus on the economic 
analysis of optimal allocation of Iranian natural gas to various options. These studies 
should conduct a thorough cost-benefit analysis of different options, including different 
sectors of the domestic market, oilfield re-injection and export, to determine which 
options yield maximum economic return for the country giving due consideration to the 
importance of welfare maximisation and the important role of gas in raising living 
standards. However, in order to carry out such research, far more detailed economic 
information and statistical material needs to be available than could be accessed in the 
preparation of this thesis. Therefore, given the limitations of this thesis in terms of the 
huge canvas of historical, political, legal and economic issues which are required for a 
full analysis of the Iranian gas industry, numerous other avenues of research remain open.  
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Appendices   
 
Appendix 1-The D'Arcy Oil Concession678 
Between the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia, of the one part, and 
William Knox d'Arcy, of independent means, residing in London at No. 42, Grosvenor 
Square (hereinafter called "the Concessionnaire") of the other part; 
The following has by these presents been agreed on and arranged-viz.: 
Article 1 
The Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shah grants to the concessionnaire by these 
presents a special and exclusive privilege to search for, obtain, exploit, develop, render 
suitable for trade, carry away and sell natural gas petroleum, asphalt and ozokerite 
throughout the whole extent of the Persian Empire for a term of sixty years as from the 
date of these presents. 
Article 2 
This privilege shall comprise the exclusive right of laying the pipelines necessary from 
the deposits where there may be found one or several of the said products up to the 
Persian Gulf, as also the necessary distributing branches. It shall also comprise the right 
of constructing and maintaining all and any wells, reservoirs, stations, pump services, 
accumulation services and distribution services, factories and other works and 
arrangements that may be deemed necessary. 
Article 3 
The Imperial Persian Government grants gratuitously to the concessionnaire all 
uncultivated lands belonging to the State which the concessionnaire's engineers may 
deem necessary for the construction of the whole or any part of the above-mentioned 
works. As for cultivated lands belonging to the State, the concessionnaire must purchase 
them at the fair and current price of the province. 
The Government also grants to the concessionnaire the right of acquiring all and any 
other lands or buildings necessary for the said purpose, with the consent of the 
proprietors, on such conditions as may be arranged between him and them without their 
being allowed to make demands of a nature to surcharge the prices ordinarily current for 
lands situate in their respective localities. 
                                                          
678
 From Gelvin. J. The Modern Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp: 154-
156. 
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Holy places with all their dependencies within a radius of 200 Persian archines are 
formally excluded. 
Article 4 
 As three petroleum mines situate at Schouster, Kassre-Chirine, in the Province of 
Kermanschah, and Daleki, near Bouchir, are at present let to private persons and produce 
an annual revenue of two thousand tomans for the benefit of the Government , it has been 
agreed that the three aforesaid mines shall be comprised in the Deed of Concession in 
conformity with Article 1, on condition that, over and above the 16 percent mentioned in 
Article 10, the concessionnaire shall pay every year the fixed sum of 2,000 (two 
thousand) tomans to the Imperial Government . 
Article 5 
 The course of the pipe-lines shall be fixed by the concessionnaire and his engineers. 
Article 6 
Notwithstanding what is above set forth, the privelege granted by these presents shall not 
extend to the provinces of Azerbadjan, Ghilan, Mazendaran, Asdrabad, and Khorassan, 
but on the express condition that the Persian Imperial Government  shall not grant to any 
other person the right of constructing a pipe-line to the southern rivers or to the South 
coast of Persia. 
Article 7 
All lands granted by these presents to the concessionnaire or that may be acquired by him 
in the manner provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of these presents, as also all products 
exported, shall be free of all imposts and taxes during the term of the present concession. 
All material and apparatuses necessary for the exploration, working and development of 
the deposits, and for the construction and development of the pipelines, shall enter Persia 
free of all taxes and Custom-House duties. 
Article 8 
The concessionnaire shall immediately send out to Persia and at his own cost one or 
several experts with a view to their exploring the region in which there exist, as he 
believes, the said products, and in the event of the report of the expert being in the 
opinion of the concessionnaire of a satisfactory nature, the latter shall immediately send 
to Persia and at his own cost all the technical staff necessary, with the working plant and 
machinery required for boring and sinking wells and ascertaining the value of the 
property. 
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Article 9 
 The Imperial Persian Government authorises the concessionnaire to found one or several 
companies for the working of the concession. The names, "statutes" and capital of the 
said companies shall be fixed by the concessionnaire, and the directors shall be chosen by 
him on the express condition that, on the formation of each company, the concessionnaire 
shall give official notice of such information to the Imperial Government, through the 
medium of the Imperial Commissioner, and shall forward the "statutes", with information 
as to the places at which such company is to operate. Such company or companies shall 
enjoy all the rights and privileges granted to the concessionnaire, but they must assume 
all his engagements and responsibilities. 
Article 10 
It shall be stipulated in the contract between the concessionnaire, of the one part, and the 
company, of the other part, that the latter is, within the term of one month as from the 
date of the formation of the first exploitation company, to pay the Imperial Persian 
Government the sum of 20,000 sterling in cash, and an additional sum of 20,000 sterling 
in paid-up shares of the first company founded by virtue of the foregoing article. It shall 
also pay the said Government annually a sum equal to 16 percent of the annual net profits 
of any company or companies that may be formed in accordance with the said article. 
Article 11 
The said Government shall be free to appoint an Imperial Commissioner, who shall be 
consulted by the concessionnaire and the directors of the companies to be formed. He 
shall supply all and any useful information at his disposal, and he shall inform them of the 
best course to be adopted in the interest of the undertaking. He shall establish, by 
agreement with the concessionnaire, such supervision as he may deem expedient to 
safeguard the interests of the Imperial Government. The aforesaid powers of the Imperial 
Commissioner shall be set forth in the "statutes" of the companies created. The 
concessionnaire shall pay the Commissioner thus appointed an annual sum of 1,000 
sterling for his services as from the date of the formation of the first company. 
Article 12 
The workmen employed in the service of the company shall be subject to His Imperial 
Majesty the Shah, except the technical staff, such as the managers, engineers, borers and 
foremen. 
Article 13 
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At any place in which it may be proved that the inhabitants of the country now obtain 
petroleum for their own use, the company must supply them gratuitously with the 
quantity of petroleum that they themselves got previously. Such quantity shall be fixed 
according to their own declarations, subject to the supervision of the local authority. 
Article 14 
The Imperial Government binds itself to take all and any necessary measures to secure 
the safety and the carrying out of the object of this concession of the plant and of the 
apparatuses, of which mention is made, for the purposes of the undertaking of the 
company, and to protect the representatives, agents and servants of the company. The 
Imperial Government having thus fulfilled its engagements, the concessionnaire and the 
companies created by him shall not have power, under any pretext whatever, to claim 
damages from the Persian Government . 
Article 15 
On the expiration of the term of the present concession, all materials, buildings and 
apparatuses then used by the company for the exploitation of its industry shall become the 
property of the said Government, and the company shall have no right to any indemnity 
in this connection. 
Article 16 
If within the term of two years as from the present date the concessionnaire shall not have 
established the first said companies authorised by Article 9 of the present agreement, the 
present concession shall become null and void. 
Article 17 
In the event of there arising between the parties to the present concession any dispute of 
difference in respect of its interpretation or the rights or responsibilities of one or the 
other of the parties there from resulting, such dispute or difference shall be submitted to 
two arbitrators at Tehran, one of whom shall be named by each of the parties, and to an 
umpire who shall be appointed by the arbitrators before the proceed to arbitrate. The 
decision of the arbitrators or, in the event of the latter disagreeing, that of the umpire shall 
be final. 
Article 18 
This Act of Concession, made in duplicate, is written in the French language and 
translated into Persian with the same meaning. But, in the event of there being any 
dispute in relation to such meaning, the French text shall alone prevail. 
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Appendix 2- An Overview of the Iranian Model Buyback Contract 
(Paydar West Field, Asmari and Bangestan Reservoirs)679 
Article 2- Scope of service 
National Iranian Oil Company, South Fields (Year 1999) 
Contractor responsible to N.I.O.C. for operations and is to provide all capital, technology 
and skills necessary for the conduct of Development Operations for this Contract, and 
shall bear the Petroleum Costs required in carrying out Development Operations, and to 
recover such costs as provided in Clause 22 hereof, and bear the risks that sufficient 
production additional production of Crude Oil, and or Natural Gas may not be produced 
from the Contract Area in order to recover all such Petroleum Costs. 
Article 3 -Term (Duration) 
3.1. N .I.O.C. hereby authorizes Contractor to conduct development Operations in the end 
of the Development Phase in (To Be Negotiated) field. The conclusion of the 
Development Phase, under the Master Development Plan, for (To Be Negotiated) Field is 
(To Be Negotiated) months, unless extended by mutual agreement. 
3.3. This Contract shall commence on the Effective Date, and shall continue through the 
Development Phase and thereafter until Contractor has recovered all Petroleum Costs and 
remuneration fee in accordance with Clause 22 ... which period shall not exceed (To Be 
Negotiated) years from the date on which ... Field has commenced first/additional 
production, unless extended by agreement. 
Article 5- Rights of NIOC 
N.I.O.C. shall exercise all necessary control and supervision and has all rights to utilise 
the Contract Area for purposes not related to this Contract, except that such usage shall 
not prevent or hinder the carrying out of the Development Operations within the Field. 
N.I.O.C.s rights include inter alia: 
(c) – Insurance 
N.I.O.C. has the option to provide any legally required insurance coverage of materials 
and equipment, pursuant to 12. 
Article 6- NIOC Assistance 
6.1 Land and water reasonably required by Contractor for the purpose of Development 
Operations shall be acquired by the N .l.O.C. and put at the disposal of Contractor. The 
                                                          
679
 The draft buyback contract is provided from Kakhki Hedayati, M (2008).  
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purchase prices shall be either paid by N.l.O.C. or included in the Petroleum Costs if paid 
by Contractor. 
Article 7 - Rights and Obligations of Contractor 
7.2 Contractor shall register a branch office in Iran for the purpose of following and 
complying with local laws. 
Article 8 - Levies, Charges, Fees and Taxes 
8.1 Any Iranian corporate income tax, Social Security Charges, or other levies imposed 
are payable by Contractor and an amount representing such charge shall be compensated 
by the N.l.O.C. to Contractor. 
8.2 Contractor shall not be entitled to recover as Petroleum Costs and taxes charges, fees 
and levies upon its income levied outside of Iran nor any taxes, charges, fees and taxes of 
any nature that are paid directly by N.l.O.C. 
Article 11 -Fixtures and Installations 
11.2 - Ownership of Assets - All lands and assets acquired by the Contractor shall be the 
property of N.I.O.C., except for machinery and equipment imported on a temporary basis 
pursuant to provisions of clause 25 hereof. 
Article 12 - Liability and Insurance 
12.1 - Insurance - Contractor shall maintain insurance coverage in amounts required and 
N.I.O.C. may exercise the option to provide, at the Contractor cost, such coverage at rates 
not greater than market rates elsewhere. 
Article 13 - Local Employment and Training 
13.1 Contractor shall give priority to Iranian citizens in employment, or personnel to 
carry out the Development Operations, limiting the employment of foreign personnel to 
only positions where qualified Iranian citizens are not available. 
In regards to the requirements set out in the above Article, it can be added that the foreign 
company is obligated to prove that a non-Iranian employee has skills that are not 
available on the domestic employment market. Additionally, it is mandatory for training 
to be provided to Iranians with the purpose of eventually substituting the foreign worker. 
A further requirement is that the foreign employer must, on a mandatory basis, donate a 
sum of money that is a certain percentage of the foreign worker's pay (which must be at 
least IR 560.00 (about US$70), as of 2001)). With regard to the expatriate employees' 
legal status, they must acquire a work permit from the Department for Employment of 
Expatriates at the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MLSA), as well as a 
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simultaneously applied-for, one-year duration, renewable residence permit. If the 
company wishes to terminate their employment, they must navigate a complicated 
process, including a permission to terminate from the Labour Boards, which rarely 
favours the employer in their judgements. 
Article 16- Operator ship 
16.1 N.I.O.C. shall be the operator for all facilities, immediately after commissioning and 
start up. 
Article 17- Joint Management Committee 
17.1 Joint Management Committee ("JMC") of five representatives from each party. 
N.I.O.C. shall function as the JMC Chairman until the end of the first year, and thereafter 
JMC chairmanship shall alternate between members annually. 
Article 18 - Master Development Plan and Budget 
18.1 Master Development Plan, including Work Programs and Budgets for the 
Development Phase I attached as Appendix "[ ... ]". Capital Costs shall be equal to or less 
than (To be Negotiated) for the field to carry out the Development Operation, expended 
over (To Be Negotiated) years from effective date in the manner set out in more detail in 
Appendix "X". First I or additional production in the field is projected to occur within (To 
Be Negotiated) months after the Effective Date. 
The amount is Sub-Clause 18.1 shall be the contracts ceiling, which shall not be 
increased. 
Article 22 -Cost Recovery and Remuneration Fee 
22.1 Contractor shall recover Petroleum cost, together with bank charges from the month 
the expenditure occurred at a rate equal to LffiOR plus/minus (To Be Negotiated) 
percent. 
22.3- Remuneration Fee- In additional to the Capital Costs, Non-Capital Costs, Bank 
Charges thereon and Operating Costs, Contractor shall be entitled to a remuneration fee 
of (To Be Negotiated) US Dollars to be paid commencing the first month following the 
date of first/additional production from the field as follows: (To Be Negotiated) 
In case of any changes required and approved by JMC in order to achieve the objectives 
of the Development Operations set forth in the original Master Development plan 
Contractor shall only be entitled to recover the additional related capital costs, resulting 
from all such approved changes up to the ceiling amount pursuant to clause 18.1 and 
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subject to clause 18.3. In such case the Remuneration Fee shall remain fixed and 
unchanged. 
22.4 - Payment in Oil - Petroleum costs and the remuneration fee shall be paid to the 
Contractor. Oil/gas out of (To Be Negotiated) percent of the product produced from the 
field and delivered to Contractor pursuant to the crude oil/gas sales agreement. 
In the event that the petroleum Cost and Remuneration Fee are not fully paid during the 
Amortization Period, Contractor shall be entitles to receive Crude oil/Gas produced from 
the field as a result of Development Operation carried out by Contractor, pursuant to the 
Long Term Sales Agreement, until such Petroleum Costs and Remuneration fees are 
recovered, or the terms expires pursuant to clause 3.3. 
Article 24- Use of National Companies and Equipment 
Contractor shall use the service of Iranian firms for the provisions of maximum utilization 
of Iranian content of the project with due regard to the laws of Iran. Article 25- Exports 
and Imports (Customs) 
25.1. Materials and equipment are not available in Iran shall be imported in the name of 
N.I.O.C. 
Any customs duties shall be paid by the Contractor and shall be reimbursed as non-capital 
costs. 
Article 27 -Assignment 
27.1 Any assignment by Contractor shall require the prior written consent of N.I.O.C., 
and which shall be granted or refused within thirty days of receipt by N.I.O.C. of notice 
from Contractor that it intends to make such an assignment. 
Article 31 -Governing Law 
Contract governed, interpreted by the laws of Iran. 
Article 32 -Arbitration 
Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach, 
termination or invalidity thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration before three 
arbitrators. 
Any award of the arbitrators shall be final and binding on the parties. Either party may 
seek execution of the award in any court having jurisdiction over the party against whom 
execution is sought. 
APPENDIX "A" -Description of the Contract Area 
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APPENDIX "B"- Accounting Procedure 
APPENDIX "C" - Long Term Crude Sales Agreement 
Quantity 
JMC under the Service Contract shall advise Seller (N.I.O.C.) and Buyer (Contractor) of 
the recoverable costs to be due to Buyer of the recoverable costs to be due to Buyer and 
the Service Contract (Service Contract Fees) during the next Quarter. Based upon the 
forecasted Service Contract Fees due to Buyer, Buyer shall furnish to Seller a statement 
of the volume of Crude Oil to be lifted in the lifting Quarter in order to compensate Buyer 
for the forecasted Service Contract Fees. 
Payment 
The Proceeds receivable by Seller under this Agreement shall be used to reduce the 
amounts owed to Buyer by Seller under the Service Contract and therefore no payments 
to Seller are required to pay Seller not post letters of credit or other guarantees of 
payment, relative to such deliveries, except as to any Crude Oil that Buyer may purchase 
from Seller in excess of amounts owed to Buyer under the Service Contract. 
APPENDIX "D" -Agreement on Procedure for Arbitration 
3 - The place of arbitration shall be agreed upon by the parties to the dispute. In the event 
that an arbitration site cannot be agreed upon prior to the appointment of a third 
arbitrator, then the arbitral tribunal shall, as its first act, convene in Tehran, Iran, to decide 
upon the site of arbitration. 
4 - Each party shall appoint an arbitrator, and two arbitrators so appointed shall appoint a 
third arbitrator who shall act as chairman of the tribunal whom shall be from a country 
other than those of which the Parties are nationals. 
II -Referral of matters on dispute to arbitration by either party, shall if necessary to 
subject to the obtaining of the approvals of the appropriate authorities of the parties 
concerned.  
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Appendix 3- Subsidies Reform Act 2010 
Article 1. The Government is required to reform the prices of energy carriers in 
accordance with the provisions of this law:
680681682
 
- Domestic sale prices of energy carriers: gasoline, diesel fuel, fuel oil, kerosene, liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG), and other oil condensates, inclusive of relevant costs (including 
transport and distribution expenses, taxes, and other legal duties) and depending on the 
quality of carriers, will be adjusted gradually until the end of the 5th Five-Year 
Development Plan (FYDP) 2010-15, up to a level which shall not be less than 90 percent 
of Persian Gulf FOB prices.
683
 
- Average domestic sale price of natural gas will be adjusted gradually until the end of the 
5th FYDP up to a level which shall not be less than 75 percent of average export price of 
natural gas, excluding transfer costs, taxes and legal duties.
684
 
- Average domestic sale price of electricity will be adjusted gradually until the end of the 
5th FYDP up to a level which shall be equal to full cost price.
685
 
                                                          
680
 With regard to electricity and natural gas prices, the government is authorized to apply 
preferential prices, 
considering geographical regions, type, amount, and time of consumption. In cases where several 
families or 
subscribers share the benefits of a single subscription, Water, Electricity, and Gas Companies are 
required to 
install additional individual meters for additional families by charging only the cost of meter and 
its installation 
expenses; and in case it shall not be possible to install additional individual meters, the number of 
subscribers 
shall be increased to the number of individual users of the shared subscription. 
681
 Calculation of prices of energy carriers after the first year of implementation of this law will be 
based on the exchange rate used in the relevant annual budget. 
682
 The adjustment of relevant prices in the first year of implementation of this law will be made in 
a manner that generate an additional aggregate amount of revenue up to RLS 200,000 billion, but 
not less than RLS 100,000 billion. 
683
 Sale prices of crude oil and gas liquids to domestic refineries will be equal to 95 percent of 
Persian Gulf FOB prices, and purchase prices of products from the refineries will be set in line 
with the said prices. 
684
 To encourage investment, for a period of at least 10 years from the date of approval of this law, 
the prices 
of feedstock for industrial, refinery, and petrochemical plants per cubic meter, will not exceed a 
level which is 
equal to 65 percent of a basket of gas export prices of Persian Gulf origin (excluding transfer 
costs). 
685
 Calculation of electricity cost price will be based on total costs of energy conversion, 
transmission and 
distribution, and fuel costs, with an efficiency of at least 38 percent of power plants and 
observance of 
standards; and the efficiency of the country’s power plants shall be improved by at least 1 percent 
per year, so 
that it reach a level of 45 percent within 5 years from the date of implementation of this law, and 
also 2 the transmission and distribution power grid losses to be reduced to 14 percent by the end of 
the 5th FYDP. The government is required to make arrangements for rating of electricity 
producers in terms of efficiency and its distributers in terms of energy losses by establishing a 
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Article 2. To manage the impact of energy carriers price fluctuations on the domestic 
economy, the Government is authorized to keep the prices unchanged for consumers as 
long as Persian Gulf FOB prices fluctuate within a range of 25 percent, by paying subsidy 
or collecting differentials, as the case may be, and include such amounts in the account 
established for regulating energy carriers market, in the relevant annual budget. If price 
fluctuations exceed the said 25 percent range, prices will be adjusted accordingly. 
Article 3. The Government is authorized to adjust the price of water and the fee 
chargeable 
for sewage collection and disposal, in accordance with the provisions of this law. 
- Average price of water for different uses will be adjusted gradually until the end of the 
5th FYDP, up to a level which shall be equal to the cost price, considering the quality and 
the manner of purification.
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- Calculation of chargeable fee for sewage collection and disposal services will be based on 
total costs of maintenance and operation of the sewage system, after deduction of the 
intrinsic value of delivered wastewater and Government aids under the annual budget (in 
connection with incentive policies). 
Article 4. The Government is required to make arrangements for gradual targeting of 
subsidies payable on wheat, rice, cooking oil, milk, sugar, postal services, and air and rail 
(passenger) transportation services, until the end of the 5th FYDP.
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Article 5. The Government is required to make available the flour and bread subsidies to 
consumers, who have applied, to the extent payable in accordance with the annual budget 
bill, through appropriate methods.
689
 
Article 6. The Government is required to adopt incentive and supportive policies, which 
are necessary to establish and expand industrial bread production units, and also to help 
compensate the losses to the flour and bread production units that may face difficulties as 
a result of implementing this law. The implementing regulations of this Article will be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
work group comprising governmental and nongovernmental experts, and to adopt appropriate 
incentives and supportive policies. 
 
686
 The government is required to set the cost price of water by including all costs of water supply, 
transfer and distribution, and observing efficiency. 
687
 Setting preferential and multiple prices for different uses of water, in view of geographical 
regions, type, and amount of consumption, will be authorized. 
688
 Subsidies paid to producers in agriculture sector in each year should not be less than the same 
for the preceding year. 
689
 Per capita bread subsidy payable to population of villages and the cities with less than twenty 
thousand people, and vulnerable groups in other cities, will be at least 50 percent more than the 
average per capita subsidy, at the discretion of the government. 
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prepared by the Ministry of Commerce, in cooperation with relevant organizations, and 
approved by the Cabinet within three months after the approval of this law. 
Article 7. The Government is authorized to spend up to 50 percent of net proceeds 
resulting from the implementation of this law under the following items: 
- Cash and non-cash subsidies payable to all households countrywide, considering the level 
of household income; 
- Implementing a comprehensive social security system for the targeted population, such 
as: (i) Providing and expanding social insurances, health care services, ensuring and 
enhancing public health, and medical coverage for special and difficult-to-cure diseases; 
(ii) Providing assistance for financing housing costs, enhancing resistance of buildings, 
and creating employment; (iii) Empowering and implementing social support 
programs.
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Article 8. The Government is required to spend 30 percent of the net proceeds resulting 
from the implementation of this law to pay for grants, or subsidies on bank facility 
charges, or specially-managed funds for implementation of the following items:
692
 
- Optimizing energy consumption in production, services, and residential units, and 
encouraging energy savings and observing the consumption pattern introduced by the 
relevant implementing organization. 
- Reforming technological structures of production plants, aimed at increasing efficiency of 
energy and water, and developing electricity generation from renewable resources. 
- Compensating part of losses to the companies providing utility services–water and 
sewage, electricity, and natural gas—and oil products, and municipalities and townships, 
incurred as a result of implementing this law. 
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 The implementing regulations of this Article, including how to identify the targeted population, 
and establish 
and update the needed databases; the method of payment to the targeted population; and the 
payments under 
this Article, will be proposed by Ministers of Economic Affairs and Finance, and Welfare and 
Social Security, and Head of Management and Planning Organization (MPO), and approved by the 
Cabinet, within three months after the approval of this law. 
691
 The government can open the subsidy targeting account in the name of the head of each eligible 
family, or another eligible person determined by the government. The government is authorized to 
exercise control over 
the manner in which the funds are spent under the said account, including the applicable time, type 
of drawings, and the refund of amounts that have erroneously been deposited. 
692
 The implementing regulations of this Article, including the method of supporting industries, 
agriculture, and services, and the manner of payments under this Article, will be proposed by 
Ministers of Economic Affairs and 
Finance, Industries and Mines, Agricultural Jihad, Commerce, Petroleum, Energy, and Interior, 
Chairman of the 
Iranian Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines, the Secretary General of the Chamber of 
Cooperatives, and Head of MPO, and approved by the Cabinet within three months after the 
approval of this law. 
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- Developing and improving public transportation, under the framework of Public 
Transportation Development and Fuel Consumption Management Law, and paying an 
amount up to the credit ceiling determined under Article (9) of the said law. 
- Supporting the producers in agriculture and manufacturing sectors. 
- Supporting production of industrial bread. 
- Supporting non-oil export promotion. 
- Developing interactive electronic services to eliminate or reduce need for unnecessary 
traffic. 
Article 9. Sources discussed under Articles (7) and (8) of this law, including aid, 
facilities, and specially-managed funds, will be made available to the said persons 
through state-owned and private bank and non-bank financial institutions. 
Article 10. Receipt of aids and subsidies discussed under Articles (7) and (8) of this law 
will be subject to providing accurate information. If the provided information proves to 
be inaccurate, the Government is required to take necessary legal actions for refunding 
the amounts so paid, while preventing future payments. If the persons consider that they 
are eligible for receipt of the aids and subsidies discussed under Articles (7) and (8) of 
this law, they may submit their objection to the Commission that shall be foreseen under 
the implementing regulations of this Article The implementing regulations of this Article 
will be proposed by Ministers of Justice, Economic Affairs and Finance, Welfare and 
Social Security, and Head of MPO, and approved by the Cabinet within three months 
after the notification of this law. 
Article 11. The Government is authorized to spend up to 20 percent of the net proceeds 
resulting from the implementation of this law, to compensate its impact on spending and 
the acquisition of capital assets. 
Article 12. The Government is required to deposit all income sources resulting from 
implementation of this law into a special account titled subsidy targeting account with the 
General Treasury. 100 percent of funds so deposited will be allocated for the uses 
authorized 
under Articles (7), (8) and (11) of this law, and under the framework of annual budget 
laws.
693694695
 
                                                          
693
 The government is required to present credits amounts of sources and uses discussed under the 
said Articles 
in four separate items in the relevant annual budget bill. 
694
Cash and noncash aids provided to natural and legal persons as a result of implementation of 
this law will be exempt from income tax under the Direct Taxes Law 6 approved in Esfand 1366 
(February 1988) as amended. 
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Article 13. The petty cash needed to implement this law will be included in the petty cash 
of the annual budget, and will be settled from sources generated by implementation of 
this law during the year. 
Article 14. The interchangeability of credits discussed in Articles (7), (8) and (11) of this 
law will be authorized only for a maximum of 10 percentage point in the annual budget, 
so that the total proceeds so resulted shall be used as provided in this law. 
Article 15. The Government is authorized to establish, within one month after coming 
into force of this law, a new organization of public company nature named Subsidy 
Targeting Organization (the Organization) for implementation of this law in accordance 
with the FYDP Law, by using the available resources (facilities, manpower and credits) 
or by restructuring and merging the existing companies. The Government is authorized to 
draw whenever needed the funds deposited to the Treasury as a result of implementation 
of this law, and make such amounts available to the Organization as aid, after deduction 
of the Government's share as per Article (11) hereof, which amounts will be utilized 
solely for purposes and obligations specified in Articles (7) and (8) of this law. The 
Organization’s administration will be centralized, and it will be authorized to have only 
staff, planning, and supervising units in the centre. The members of its General Assembly 
will comprise Ministers of Welfare and Social Security, Economic Affairs and Finance, 
Commerce, Roads and Transportation, Agricultural Jihad, Industries and Mines, 
Petroleum, Energy, and Head of MPO. The company’s Organization’s articles of 
association, including its pillars, responsibilities and powers, will be prepared by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and MPO, and approved by the Ministerial 
Cabinet. Funds and credits discussed in this law, including in Articles (12) and (15), will 
be reflected in the country’s general budget, like those of other public companies, and 
changes in the company's Organization’s credit ceilings during the year will be subject to 
providing a proposal by the Government and its approved by Parliament, except for the 
cases authorized in accordance with provisions of this law, including Articles (2) and 
(14).7. The Organization’s unutilized funds in any year could be used in the succeeding 
year, and in any year it may make commitments for the succeeding years under the 
framework of this law. Credits governed by this law are subject to the Regulations 
Governing Spending Credits Exempted from Observance of the Public Audit Law and 
Other General Government Regulations Law approved on 06/11/1364 (January 26, 1986). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Such aids to such persons for compensation in part or in whole of the price of goods or services 
provided by them will not be subject to the tax exemption provided under this note. 
695
 The government is required to provide the Supreme Audit Court and Parliament with the 
detailed report of operations under this Article every six month. 
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The Organization is required to provide reports on performance, receipts and payments 
related to resources from subsidy targeting, for each of Articles (7) and (8) separately, at 
the end of each six-month period, to Parliament’s Planning, Budget and Audit Committee 
and other relevant committees. The Supreme Audit Court is required to provide semi-
annual reports to Parliament on the Organizations’ operations based on the contemplated 
targets as provided in this law. 
Article 16. Starting from the beginning of the year 1389 (March 21, 2010), the 
Government is authorized to increase the tax exemption level provided under Article (84) 
of the Direct Taxes Law, proportional to price adjustments under this law and in addition 
to its annual increase, subject to Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance’s proposal, 
over a period of five years and up to a maximum of 100 percent. 
The above law, consisting of 16 Articles and 16 Notes, was approved by the Islamic 
Assembly on Tuesday, 15 Day 1388 (January 5, 2010) and was confirmed by the 
Guardian Council on 23 Day 1388 (January 13, 2010). 
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Appendix 4- Natural Gas Pricing in Iran   
Table 1- Post-reform Household Natural Gas Prices 
 
Tier 
Consumption Range 
(cubic meter) 
IRR/cm( during 5 
cold months) 
IRR/cm ( during 7 
non-cold months) 
1 0-45 300 700 
2 46-95 500 900 
3 96-145 700 1200 
4 146-195 900 1600 
5 196-245 1100 2000 
6 246-295 1600 2200 
7 296-345 1900 2500 
8 346-395 2200 2800 
9 396-445 2500 3000 
10 446-495 2800 3200 
11 496-545 3200 3400 
12 >545 3500 3500 
 
Source: NIGC 2010 
 
Table 2- Post-Reform Gas Prices in different Geographical Regions 2010 
 
 
Consumption 
Level 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Region 1 
Up to 
300 
301- 
400 
500-
401 
600-
501 
700-
601 
800-
701 
900-
801 
1000-
901 
1100-
1001 
1200-
1101 
1300-
1201 
> 1300 
Region 2 
Up to 
250 
350-
251 
450-
351 
550-
451 
650-
551 
750-
651 
850-
751 
950-
851 
1050-
951 
1150-
1051 
1250-
1151 
> 1250 
Region 3 
Up to 
200 
300-
201- 
400-
301 
500-
401 
600-
501 
700-
601 
800-
701 
900-
801 
1000-
901 
1100 -
1001 
1200-
1101 
> 1200 
Region 4 
Up to 
150 
250-
151 
350-
251 
450-
351 
550-
451 
650-
551 
750-
651 
850-
751 
950-
851 
1050-
951 
1150-
1051 
> 1150 
Region 5 
Up to 
76 
76-
150 
250-
151 
350-
251 
450-
351 
550-
451 
650-
551 
750-
651 
850-
751 
950-
851 
1050-
951 
> 1050 
Price 
(IRR/cm) 
300 500 700 900 1100 1600 1900 2200 2500 2800 3200 3500 
Source: NIGC (2010) 
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Table 3- Natural Gas Tariffs in various Sectors ( 2010-2011) 
 Sector 
 
Sub-Sector 
 
 
 
Pric
e 
(IR
R/c
m) 
Household Residential premises 1200 
Central heating system 
Public Cat.1 Commercial and Services 2000 
Cat.2 Sport, education, religious premises 1000 
Cat.3 Governmental premises 2000 
Indust
ry 
Cat.1 
 
 
Industrial units, private power generations, hotels, 
refineries, gas transmission stations, petrochemical 
plant 
700 
 
Agriculture 1000 
Cat.2 Governmental power generations 800 
Cat.3 Transportation ( CNG stations) 2600 
Source: NIGC 2010-2011 
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